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Part I
PREPARATORY ASPECTS
1
1 Introdution
Insurane and reinsurane undertakings are the largest group of institutional investors
in the European Union.
1
As these undertakings reeive an inow of premiums through
all phases of the eonomi yle, they have to alloate funds to appropriate investments
ontinuously. Poliyholders use insurane as protetion against rare but possibly disastrous
events, as a savings-vehile to nane their retirement or to protet their family's standard
of living. They benet from suessful investment deisions of insurane undertakings as
insurane premiums may be set lower than the average laims burden (in the ase of a non-
life insurer) or exess returns may be distributed among shareholders and poliyholders (in
the ase of a life insurer).
2
In 2012 European insurane undertakings managed assets worth EUR 8.5 trillion whih
were mainly alloated to orporate bonds (36%), government bonds (28%), equity (15%),
property (4%), ash (3%), hedge funds (1%) and derivatives (1%). Assets of European
insurers inluded 21% of all issued European orporate bonds, 11% of all bank debt in
the Eurozone and 24% of all European government debt.
3
About 80% of these assets were
held by life insurers (Fith, 2011). Insurane undertakings have the inentive to nane
long-term projets suh as infrastruture and produt development. When mathing their
usually long-term liabilities with illiquid long-term assets, these undertakings are rewarded
an illiquidity premium whih inreases their return on investments.
Under the urrent regulatory regime for insurane undertakings, Solveny I, the required
apital margin does not depend on the alloation of investments, i.e. it is not sensitive
to market risk arising from the volatility of market pries for e.g. equity, bond or real
estate investments. Instead, limits to the maximum share of assets of a single ounterparty
or of an entire asset lass are set individually by eah ountry.
4
In general, the required
apital margin under Solveny I is derived from a bakward-looking and simplisti fator-
1
Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman (2013) report that by 31 Deember 2011 insurane undertakings
manage 51% of all assets held by institutional investors followed by pension funds (24%).
2
In the following, insurane undertakings and insurers are used in referene to both insurane and
reinsurane undertakings.
3
All data are from Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman (2013).
4
For life insurers, the Diretive 2002/83/EC ontains EU-wide restritions to the asset-alloation. EU
member states may speify additional limits, e.g. for the ase of Germany see the German Investment
Regulation (Anlageverordnung).
2
approah (EIOPA, 2011a).
To improve the protetion of poliyholders and reate a unied regulatory regime in all
ountries of the European Eonomi Area (EEA), a risk-sensitive, forward-looking and
priniple-based regulatory aord for insurane undertakings alled Solveny II will replae
the urrent regime by 01.01.2016.
5
Similar to the Basel II/III aord for banks, Solveny
II is based on the following three pillars
(i) the alulation of the solveny and minimum apital requirement and of the own
funds eligible to over the apital requirements (Pillar I),
(ii) qualitative requirements regarding the risk management and its embedment into the
general business planning of the undertaking as well as the Own Risk and Solveny
Assessment (Pillar II), and
(iii) requirements for publi and regulatory dislosure (Pillar III).
The solveny apital requirement an be alulated using either a standard formula with
risk fators already alibrated to a representative European insurane undertaking or a
(partial) internal model that better mathes the risk prole of the respetive undertaking
whereby the latter has to undergo a supervisory approval proedure. The user of an internal
model under Pillar I of Solveny II has to adhere to various requirements regarding data
quality, validation standards, doumentation and the statistial-atuarial methods used. It
is expeted that only large undertakings will seek supervisory approval for using an internal
model under Pillar I (Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013).
Irrespetive of the use of an internal model, own funds eligible to over the solveny apital
requirements under Solveny II shall be based on the dierene of market-onsistently
valuated assets and liabilities in the Solveny II balane sheet. If market pries exist on
ative markets, they shall be used (mark-to-market valuation); otherwise the valuation
shall be based on models (mark-to-model valuation).
Unlike Solveny I, Solveny II requires the baking up of any investment in risky assets with
risk apital rather than imposing investment limits. Solveny II thus ontains modules for
market risk and ounterparty default risk in addition to the underwriting risk modules for
life, health and non-life insurane. In the standard formula, apital requirements for these
5
The European Eonomi Area onsists of all EU member states as well as Ieland, Liehtenstein and
Norway.
3
modules are aggregated using linear orrelations to arrive at the Basi Solveny Capital
Requirement (BSCR).
6
Aording to the results of the last overall quantitative impat
study on the standard formula, QIS 5 (f. EIOPA, 2011a), market risk (67.4%) and life
underwriting risk (23.7%) make up the largest ontributions to the BSCR for life insurers.
7
For non-life insurers, non-life underwriting risk (52.4%) and market risk (32.8%) have the
highest share in the BSCR. Within the market risk module, several dierent risks are
aggregated using linear orrelations. Equity risk, spread risk and interest rate risk have the
largest relevane within market risk (EIOPA, 2011a), whih results from the dominane of
bonds in the investment portfolio of insurane undertakings as well as from the large risk
fator for equity positions under the standard formula. The apital requirement for equity
listed in regulated markets in EEA and OECD ountries is 39% of its urrent market value;
for other equity types suh as unlisted equity, private equity, hedge funds and ommodities
the risk fator is 49% of their market-onsistent value.
8
Risk weights for xed inome positions inrease with the duration and derease with the
reditworthiness of the issuer. Covered bonds reeive a preferential treatment due to the
ollateral provided. Yet, the urrent speiation of the Solveny II standard formula envi-
sages a zero risk weight for bonds issued or guaranteed by governments of all EEA ountries
inluding those whih required bailouts of their sovereign debt in the past.
As the volume of assets managed by insurers is large, these risk harges may lead to dis-
tortions on nanial markets beause they are likely to lead to unintended onstraints and
inentives to spei investment deisions. This may also jeopardize the insurers' funti-
on to provide long-term funding for e.g. banks, orporate undertakings and infrastruture
projets. In this thesis, we summarize aademi ontributions as well as opinions from in-
dustry experts on the expeted onsequenes of the urrent alibration of the Solveny II
standard formula. The auray of the alibration itself is another foal point of this work.
We present results of own researh on the Solveny II valuation approah and the auray
6
Further, solveny apital requirements for operational risk and intangible asset risk are added. Loss-
absorbing eets for tehnial provisions related to life insurane ontrats as well as for deferred taxes
an lead to dedutions from the apital requirement (see Setion 2.3.1).
7
The German Insurane Assoiation (GDV) additionally onduted a loal QIS 6 in 2012. The Long-
term Guarantee Assessment (LGTA) was performed in the entire EU in 2013 but foused mainly on life
insurane undertakings.
8
Equity risk fators may vary up to +/- 10% aording to the urrent market phase (see Setion 2.3.2).
The eventual marginal risk harge for eah asset depends on diversiation eets with other risk types.
4
of the market risk module of Solveny II, respetively.
The struture of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we briey desribe the urrent
regulatory regime for insurane undertakings, Solveny I, and its shortomings (Setion
2.1). We also explain the general priniples of Solveny II (Setion 2.2), the struture of
its standard formula and in more detail the market risk as well as the ounterparty default
risk module of the standard formula (Setion 2.3).
9
Setion 2.4 disusses the potential impat of the tehnial speiations of Solveny II.
The main areas of onern are the zero risk weight of European government bonds, the
alibration of the equity risk harge and the market-onsistent valuation approah. The
latter may be partiularly problemati as market values may be inuened by fators
other than the eonomi fundamentals of the underlying asset, an example of whih is
risk ontagion from a single or a group of ountries to other ountries. Unlike Solveny I,
the new regulatory framework implies a one-to-one transfer of eah devaluation of assets
into the pool of own funds available to over solveny apital requirements. As Solveny
II presribes a determination of the solveny status several weeks after the valuation date,
unovering temporary distortions of market pries may explain unexpeted utuations of
available own funds and thus of solveny ratios of insurers under Solveny II. This may
help insurers interpret and ommuniate the results of their solveny assessment. With
respet to investment deisions of insurers, the presene of ontagion an also lead to an
unintended abandonment of those assets that are prone to ontagion eets. The author's
own researh investigates the issue of sovereign risk ontagion in the Eurozone during the
reent nanial risis and presents an approah that is appliable on a daily basis to losely
trak the evolution of ontagion tendenies in any system of ountries or markets (f. the
paper in Chapter 3).
In Setion 2.5, we summarize the urrent aademi literature on the auray of the stan-
dard formula and the appropriateness of the alibration of the market risk module in
partiular. The author's own researh in this area fouses on two issues whih are intensely
disussed by researhers and pratitioners alike: the zero risk weight for sovereign debt of
all member states of the European Union and the alibration of the equity risk module.
Regarding the zero risk harge assumption for EU government bonds, we use ointegration
9
The ounterparty default risk is relevant with regard to money market instruments, mortgage loans
and instruments for nanial risk mitigation.
5
tehniques to test for the onvergene between the yields of government bonds of 25 EU
member states and the yields of a risk-free asset. If there is onvergene with a risk-free as-
set, the government bonds of the respetive ountry an be deemed as risk-free as well. As
the relations between the onsidered yields an have been aeted by regime-shifts suh as
the introdution of the Euro or the global nanial risis, we also test for possibly multiple
strutural breaks. In the ase of a regime-shift between the yield series of a spei ountry
and that of the risk-free asset, we only onsider the regime after the last break to infer
whether onvergene takes plae or not (f. the paper in Chapters 4). In a seond paper,
we fous on three peripheral Eurozone member states and ontrast results of a standard
ointegration test that does not take into aount strutural breaks with more advaned
ointegration tehniques (f. the paper in Chapter 5). Both papers give insights into the
dynamis of bond market onvergene and provide instruments insurane undertakings
an use to perform the Own Risk and Solveny Assessment regarding the auray of the
standard formula for their undertaking.
10
Regarding the alibration of the equity risk module, we test the impliit assumption of a
perfet orrelation between all listed equity from EEA and OECD ountries. We set out
a general method for this investigation whih an be used by insurane undertakings to
monitor the auray of this assumption in their Own Risk and Solveny Assessment. Our
approah is based on a dynami evaluation of ointegration relationships between stok
pries and an evaluation of speed of adjustment fators after a shok. The paper ontains
results for the orrelation between the main stok indies of the United Kingdom, Germany
and Frane (f. the paper in Chapter 6). Chapter 7 onludes this thesis.
10
We briey desribe main aspets of the Own Risk and Solveny Assessment in Setion 2.2.3.
6
2 The regulatory regime shift in the European insurane
setor
This hapter provides a brief desription of the urrent regulatory standard for insurane
undertakings in the European Union, Solveny I, and a brief enumeration of aws inherent
in this regulatory regime (Setion 2.1). The implementation proess and ore elements of
Solveny II whih are relevant for all insurane undertakings are desribed in Setion 2.2.
Setion 2.3 fouses on the standard formula to alulate the solveny apital requirement
whih is expeted to be used by the majority of insurane undertakings after the initiation
of Solveny II. In Setion 2.4 we present aademi researh and expert opinions on the
expeted impat of Solveny II on the investment deisions of insurers. Setion 2.5 ontains
a ritial assessment of those aspets of the Solveny II standard formula alibration that
may be ruial for investment deision making. The latter two setions explain the relevane
of the author's own researh for insurane undertakings.
2.1 Solveny I
The way for the urrent regulatory regime for insurane undertakings (Solveny I) was
paved by the First Counil Diretives on non-life insurane business in 1973 (Diretive
73/239/EEC) and on life insurane business in 1979 (Diretive 79/267/EEC). The amend-
ments ontained in the Diretive 2002/13/EC established Solveny I for non-life insurers.
For life insurers, various diretives have been onsolidated in the Diretive 2002/83/EC
whih has beome the fundament of Solveny I for these undertakings. The diretives pas-
sed in 2002 are the soures for the following desription of the ornerstones of the Solveny
I regime (Setion 2.1.1). Setion 2.1.2 highlights some tehnial issues related to Solveny
I that make the shift to a more advaned regulatory regime neessary.
2.1.1 Desription
For non-life insurane undertakings, the required solveny margin shall equal the maximum
of a solveny margin based on annual premiums and a solveny margin based on the average
ompensation for laims of the past three years. The solveny margin based on annual
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premiums shall be alulated
a) as the higher of gross written premiums and gross earned premiums of the last nan-
ial year,
11
b) up to a threshold value of EUR 50,000,000 18% of the value shall be taken, above
this threshold 16% shall be taken,
12
) the resulting value shall be multiplied with the average realized retention rate over
the last three nanial years, but at least 50%.
13
The solveny margin based on laims ompensations shall be alulated
a) as the average value of laims paid minus the amount of reoveries over the past three
nanial years,
14,15
b) up to a threshold value of EUR 35,000,000 26% of the value shall be taken, above
this threshold 23% shall be taken,
) the resulting value shall be multiplied with the average realized retention rate over
the last three nanial years, but at least 50%.
For life insurane undertakings, the required solveny margin is the sum of
a) 4% of the tehnial provisions reserved for insurane obligations multiplied with the
ratio of net tehnial provisions, i.e. after aounting for reinsurane, and gross teh-
nial provisions for the last nanial year, but at least 85%, and
b) 0.3% of the apital-at-risk for poliies where the apital-at-risk is not negative mul-
tiplied with the ratio of the apital-at-risk retained, i.e. not reinsured, and the total
apital-at-risk, but at least 50%.
16,17
11
For liability insurane, this value has to be inreased by 50%.
12
The threshold values related to premiums and laims paid inrease in line with the European index
of onsumer pries. The values stated here are the original values from the Diretive 2002/13/EC.
13
The retention rate is the ratio of the net amount of laims paid, i.e. after dedution of reoverables
from reinsurane, divided by the gross amount of laims paid.
14
For liability insurane, this value has to be inreased by 50%.
15
For undertakings whih mainly provide insurane against redit, windstorm, hail and frost, the average
shall be taken over the past seven nanial years.
16
The apital-at-risk for a single poliy is the dierene of the sum insured of this poliy and the urrent
value of the provisions reserved for the obligations expeted to arise from this poliy.
17
There are deviations from this fator for insurane ontrats where the investment risk is borne by
the poliyholder (unit-linked insurane ontrats) as well as for insurane on death.
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Additionally, there is a minimum guarantee fund whose amount depends on the type of
insurane the undertaking onduts.
The required solveny margin has to be overed by the available solveny margin. The latter
onsists of paid-up share apital, reserves not orresponding to insurane liabilities and the
prot or loss brought forward, eah based on statutory aounting standards, whereas
the amounts of own shares and of foreseeable dividends have to be deduted. Further
positions an be taken into aount given the fulllment of ertain onditions (f. Diretive
2002/13/EC and Diretive 2002/83/EC) or the approval by the supervisory authority. The
elements of the available solveny margin result from loal statutory aounting rules.
2.1.2 Critiism
The rule-based Solveny I formula to determine the solvability of an insurane undertaking
is relatively easy and transparent. However, it is bakward-oriented, fousing on statutory
aounts and  overall  not risk-sensitive:
 There is no onsideration of market risk. The required solveny margin does not
depend on the asset alloation of the undertaking.
18
 Risk-mitigation through reinsurane is only onsidered until a pre-speied limit is
reahed. This limit shall reet the potential default of the reinsurer but does not
depend on the probability of default of the reinsurer or ollateral provided.
 Risk-mitigation fators due to reinsurane are derived from past aounting values
and do hene neither take into aount existing ontrats that over future ompen-
sations for laims already inurred nor newly written ontrats for future laims on
existing ontrats.
 Given the same risks, the undertaking whih sueeds in reeiving larger premium
amounts has to hold a larger solveny margin. Put another way, the less autious
premium heights are set, the less apital the insurer has to hold.
 Given the same risks, the undertaking whih sets larger tehnial provisions (reserves)
has to hold a larger solveny margin.
18
Under Solveny I, there are only xed rules for investment diversiation whih set maximum shares
for the exposure to a single ounterparty or to asset lasses in the investment portfolio.
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 Future prots / losses from existing ontrats and assets in the investment portfolio
are not onsidered in the solveny position.
 The risk of unexpeted losses in the future whih results from ontrats and laims
existing at the valuation date is only reeted by simple measures based on past
premiums and laims volumes.
 Risks assoiated with future business, e.g. within the next 12 months, are not onsi-
dered (no going-onern perspetive).
 There is no onsideration of diversiation eets between dierent lines of business
(LoB) as premium and laims volumes are added over all LoBs.
Solveny II in general is a future-oriented (next 12 months) and risk-sensitive regulatory
regime that is built upon a holisti eonomi balane sheet approah. The next setion
presents its basi priniples.
2.2 Solveny II: General priniples
Solveny II is a priniple-based, future-oriented and omplex regulatory system whih is
based on a three pillars arhiteture analogue to Basel II/III for banks. In this system,
Pillar I denes the priniples for the market-onsistent valuation of balane sheet items
and for the determination of the apital requirement as well as of the eligible own funds to
over the apital requirement. Pillar II stipulates requirements on the system of governane
of the insurane undertaking whih inlude an assessment of the adequay of alulations
made under Pillar I in omparison with the models used by the undertaking for its inter-
nal risk and asset-liability-management. Pillar III omprises requirements for publi and
supervisory dislosure.
The following subsetions desribe the implementation proess for Solveny II and the ore
elements of its three pillars.
2.2.1 Implementation
The implementation of Solveny II is based on the so-alled Lamfalussy proess for regu-
latory reforms in the nanial setors in the European Union. This proess is omposed of
four levels (f. the Report of the Committee of Wise Men, 2001):
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(i) Level 1 shall provide general priniples agreed upon by the trilogue parties the Eu-
ropean Commission, the European Parliament and the Counil.
(ii) Under Level 2, the European Commission shall detail out tehnial implementing
measures.
(iii) Implementing measures shall be transformed into reommendations, onsistent gui-
delines and ommon standards by the group of national regulators under Level 3.
19
(iv) The purpose of Level 4 is to enfore the ompliane of national laws with the new
European regulations and their appliation by the insurane industry.
With regard to Level 1, the Diretive of the European Parliament and of the Counil
on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurane and reinsurane (Solveny II)
(Diretive 2009/138/EC; abbreviated by DIR09 in the following) was passed in 2009 by
the trilogue parties and aptures the basi priniples of the new regulatory regime. The
Omnibus II Diretive passed in 2014 ontains hanges to the Solveny II Diretive as well
as transitional measures for the phasing-in of Solveny II.
With respet to Level 2, a draft diretive for the tehnial implementing measures of Solven-
y II was presented by the European Commission in 2011. Several proposals for guidelines
and reommendations for the interpretation of the tehnial implementing measures have
already been reated (Level 3).
Sine 2005, several European-wide eld studies have been performed in order to assess the
adequay and appliability of the new solveny apital requirements. Among these eld
studies, ve quantitative impat studies (QIS) were related to all insurane and reinsuran-
e undertakings (2005-2010) whereas the most reent study in the rst quarter of 2013
foused on the long-term guarantees of life insurane undertakings (Long Term Guaran-
tees Assessment, LTGA; f. EIOPA, 2013a). The latter was devoted to an evaluation of
the onsequenes of the reent nanial risis, whih among others is takled by a low
interest-rate environment to stimulate investments, on the solveny position of insurers
under Solveny II. If the term struture is based on a projetion of suh low interest ra-
tes, larger present values of market-onsistent estimates of liabilities and therefore smaller
19
For insurane and oupational pension undertakings, the Committee of European Insurane and
Oupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) was reated as an advising ommittee to the European
Commission in 2003. In January 2011, a joint European insurane supervisory authority alled the Euro-
pean Insurane and Oupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) was founded.
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amounts of eligible own funds emerge (f. Setion 2.2.2). In this sense, the LTGA tested
dierent approahes for ounter-ylial measures to better reet the nature of long-term
life insurane ontrats that inlude guarantees to the poliyholders as well as the nature
of the investment behavior of these undertakings within the market-onsistent valuation
framework of Solveny II.
The taking eet of Solveny II is sheduled for 01.01.2016 (see e.g. Europian Parliament,
2013, p. 476).
2.2.2 Pillar I: Regulatory apital
The rst pillar of Solveny II denes priniples for the valuation of assets, tehnial pro-
visions for insurane obligations and other liabilities in the Solveny II balane sheet, for
the determination of eligible own funds, the solveny apital requirement (SCR) as well as
the minimum apital requirement (MCR) on insurane undertakings. The SCR provides a
measure for the target apital. If the eligible own funds of the insurane undertaking fall
short of the SCR, a regulatory intervention ladder sets in. If they fall below the MCR,
the undertaking is not allowed to write new business in ase that it annot reestablish its
solveny position in a short period of time (f. DIR09).
In the following we summarize the basi priniples of the Solveny II approah to deter-
mining the solvability ratio. As far as possible, referenes are made with respet to the
Solveny II Diretive already passed by the trilogue parties. In ase that further details
not speied by the Diretive are needed for a general understanding, we also inlude
referenes to the tehnial speiation draft douments by EIOPA (2013a).
Market-onsistent valuation
Solveny II pursues a holisti eonomi balane sheet approah. The value of assets and
liabilities shall equal the amount for whih they ould be exhanged/transferred between
knowledgeable willing parties in an arm's length transation (DIR09, Art 75 (1)). To this
end, Solveny II requires a market-onsistent valuation of all assets and liabilities of the
insurane undertaking. Market values shall be used if they are available on liquid markets
(mark-to-market valuation), otherwise they have to be estimated by adequate, appliable
and relevant atuarial and statistial methods (mark-to-model valuation) (DIR09, Art 77
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(2)). To assess the risks assoiated with olletive investment funds, suh funds have to be
disentangled into the assets underlying the investment vehile (look-through approah; f.
EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.9-14).
The market-onsistent value of insurane liabilities is determined from the sum of the best
estimate of these insurane liabilities and a risk margin (DIR09, Art 77 (1)). The (gross)
best estimate equals the present value of expeted future ash-ows that are disounted
with the urrent risk-free term struture. These ash-ows ontain ompensations for ins-
urane laims, internal and external osts, future premiums as well as reeivables for salvage
and subrogation. Reoverables from reinsurane ontrats or speial purpose vehiles, i.e.
expeted future ash-inows from suh ontrats, are not netted with gross best estimates
but detailed separately on the asset side of the Solveny II balane sheet (DIR09, Art 77
(2)). Their valuation has to aount for the expeted loss from a default of the ounterparty
(DIR09, Art 81).
The risk margin equals the osts a referene insurane undertaking would inur besides the
best estimate of insurane liabilities if it were to take over the ontratual obligations from
the insurane undertaking onsidered. If the risk margin is alulated separately from the
best estimate, it shall equal the present value of future osts of apital to over unexpeted
losses from these obligations until their nal run-o (DIR09, Art 77 (5)).
Lastly, revaluation prots or losses for assets and liabilities with respet to statutory a-
ounting rules would have to be taxed in ase of their realization. Hene, before ompleting
the Solveny II balane sheet, deferred tax assets and/or liabilities have to be derived from
the dierene of market-onsistent values and those values that are reognized for tax
purposes (EIOPA, 2013a, V.10).
Figure 2.1 displays the main building bloks of the Solveny II balane sheet and high-
lights dierenes with respet to loal aounting priniples in Germany (Handelsgesetz-
buh, HGB). Under HGB, book values of assets have to be redued only if a permanent
depreiation of their value has to be expeted (modied lower-of-ost-or-market prini-
ple).
20
The book value of assets hene does often not oinide with their urrent market
value leading to hidden reserves or unrealized losses. Regarding the liabilities side of the
20
Corporate and government bonds, among others, are similarly treated under IFRS as they an be
assigned to the held-to-maturity investment ategory, whih implies a valuation at amortized osts instead
of fair value.
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balane sheet, there are several onservative valuation rules whih do not exist under Sol-
veny II. For example, insurers may reate a reserve to equalize loss heights over time and
they have to valuate tehnial provisions on a ase-by-ase basis whih stands in ontrast
to the valuation of tehnial provisions by atuarial and statistial methods under Solveny
II.
Figure 2.1: Statutory aounts vs. Solveny II balane sheet
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Going-onern priniple
Solveny II follows the going-onern priniple (DIR09, Art 101 (2)). It is therefore assumed
that the insurane undertaking ontinues its operation and thus has to hold enough own
funds to over risks from existing and new business written within the next 12 months
(DIR09, Art 101 (3)). Expeted prots in future premiums from existing business may
already be inluded in the Solveny II balane sheet (by reduing orresponding liability
positions) and thus may ontribute to the own funds eligible to over apital requirements.
Determination of Eligible Own Funds
Eligible own funds are those funds that an be used to over the apital requirements.
Eligible own funds are determined from the sum of basi and anillary own funds (DIR09,
Art 87) after their assignment to three quality tiers (DIR09, Art 95) and the appliation
of quantitative limits regarding the distribution of own funds with respet to these tiers
(DIR09, Art 98).
Basi own funds are determined from the exess of assets over liabilities in the Solveny
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II balane sheet (net asset value) as well as subordinated liabilities, whereas the amount
of own shares held by the undertaking and of foreseeable dividends has to be withdrawn
(DIR09, Art 88). Anillary own funds are further items that an be alled to absorb losses
suh as unpaid share apital or initial fund that has not been alled up and letters of
redit and guarantees (DIR09, Art 89). EIOPA (2013a, Setion 4) provides a detailed list
of potential own fund items and riteria for their lassiation into the three quality tiers.
Solveny apital requirement
The solveny apital requirement (SCR) shall orrespond to the Value-at-Risk of the basi
own funds to a 99.5% level over a one-year period (DIR09, Art 101 (3)). Put another
way, the undertaking shall be able to survive a one-in-200-year loss event. This an be
formalized as follows. At the valuation date t = 0, the values of assets A0 and liabilities
L0 and hene the net asset value NAV0 = A0 − L0 are known, i.e. they an be inferred
from an appliation of the market-onsistent valuation approah. Future values of assets
A1 and liabilities L1 after one year, i.e. at time t = 1, are stohasti and so is the net asset
value NAV1. Dening the undertaking's loss as a hange in the net asset value from t = 0
to t = 1, the SCR an be interpreted as the absolute value of the 0.5% perentile of the
undertakings' distribution of hanges in the net asset value given the information set F0
at t = 0:21
SCR =
∣∣V aRF00.5%(NAV1 −NAV0)∣∣ = ∣∣V aRF00.5%(NAV1)−NAV0∣∣ (2.1)
The SCR shall over at least the following risks: non-life, life and health underwriting risk,
market risk, ounterparty default risk and operational risk (DIR09, Art 101 (4)). Other
types of material risk not aounted for under the quantitative regulatory risk measurement
of Pillar I shall be assessed in the Own Risk and Solveny Assessment under Pillar II
(DIR09, Art 45). Risk-mitigation tehniques suh as loss-sharing through reinsurane or
seuritization and hedging of market risk by derivatives shall be aounted for but the risks
arising from suh tehniques shall be onsidered as well (DIR09, Art 101 (5)).
Internal model vs. standard formula
Insurane undertakings an determine the solveny apital requirement using one of the
21
For the sake of a simplied notation, disounting is disregarded in eq. (2.1).
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following approahes:
 Full internal model
 Partial internal model
 Standard formula with undertaking-spei parameters
 Standard formula with pre-speied parameters
 Simpliations of the standard formula
The standard formula is a alulation framework overing a set of algorithms already pa-
rameterized to quantify the risks mentioned above. It was alibrated from a data sample
of undertakings that shall be representative of all of Europe (CEIOPS, 2010). The ali-
bration of all risk fators is pre-speied in a way supposed to ensure the validity of eq.
(2.1). The standard formula is further desribed in Setion 2.3.
Within the framework of the standard formula, undertakings are allowed to replae a
subset of pre-dened parameters of the underwriting risk modules by internally estimated
parameter values provided that the data used is omplete, aurate and appropriate and
the replaement is approved by the supervisory authority (DIR09, Art 104 (7)).
Further, in ases that the standard formula alulations require disproportionate eorts by
the undertaking simpliations may be used (DIR09, Art 109).
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After reeiving the approval of the supervisory authority, undertakings may alulate the
solveny apital requirement by a full or partial internal model (DIR09, Art 112). The
supervisory authorities an also fore undertakings to use a full or partial internal model
in ase that their risk prole deviates signiantly from the assumptions underlying the
standard formula (DIR09, Art 119). The approval of supervisors is based on the fulllment
of standards regarding
 the quality of data and the statistial-atuarial methods applied (DIR09, Art 121),
 the alibration of the internal model with respet to the derivation of the SCR a-
ording to eq. (2.1) (DIR09, Art 122),
 the validation of the internal model with respet to its permanent auray regarding
the 99.5% ondene level, its stability and its sensitivities to underlying risk fators
(DIR09, Art 124) and
22
Setion 2.3.3 provides an example within the alulation of the ounterparty default risk.
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 the doumentation of the internal model (DIR09, Art 125).
Further, a use test shall demonstrate the relevane of the internal model for the risk-
management of the undertaking (DIR09, Art 120) and a prot and loss distribution shall
provide a omparison of soures of risk to soures of prots and losses (DIR09, Art 123).
Minimum apital requirement (MCR)
The minimum apital requirement (MCR) shall be alibrated suh that the solveny of the
undertaking for one year is ensured at the 85% ondene level (DIR09, Art 129 (1)). It
is alulated on the basis of a linear fator approah that involves the amounts of the un-
dertaking's tehnial provisions and written premiums for non-life insurane undertakings
(EIOPA, 2013a, MCR.13) and the amounts of tehnial provisions and apital-at-risk for
life insurane undertakings (EIOPA, 2013a, MCR.14), respetively, all values being on a
net basis after the onsideration of reinsurane (DIR09, Art 129 (2)). Moreover, there are
absolute lower bounds in aordane with the type of the insurane undertaking (DIR09,
Art 129 (1)) and of 25% of the SCR as well as an upper bound that equals 45% of the
SCR (DIR09, Art 129 (3)).
2.2.3 Pillar II: System of governane
All insurane and reinsurane undertakings must have in plae an eetive system of
governane whih provides for sound and prudent management of the business (DIR09,
Art 41 (1)). This system inludes
 t and proper requirements for the management of the undertaking (DIR09, Art 42),
 an eetive risk-management system integrated into the organizational struture and
the deision-making proess of the undertaking (DIR09, Art 44 (1)),
 the Own Risk and Solveny Assessment whih shall espeially assess the validity
of the assumptions of the standard formula for the individual risk prole of the
undertaking and the ompliane with the apital requirements on a ontinuous basis
(DIR09, Art 45),
 an eetive internal ontrol system whih inludes a funtion that shall inform the
management on ompliane with solveny regulations (DIR09, Art 46),
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 an objetive internal audit funtion that is independent from the operational funti-
ons (DIR09, Art 47),
 an atuarial funtion responsible for the assessment of the suieny and quality of
data and the appropriateness of methods used in the alulation of tehnial pro-
visions, for the assessment of the reliability of the outomes of these alulations
with respet to own experiene and for the ommuniation of this assessment to the
management (DIR 09, Art 48 (1)) and
 requirements on the exeution of outsouring arrangements (DIR09, Art 49).
The Own Risk and Solveny Assessment (ORSA) an be pereived as the ore of the
requirements subsumed under Pillar II sine
(i) the ORSA proess onnets the Pillar I framework to determining a regulatory mea-
sure for the solvability of the undertaking with internal measures for its solvability.
Signiant deviations might lead to apital add-ons in the alulation of the SCR (f.
Setion 2.3.1).
(ii) the ORSA shall ontain a projetion of the solveny apital requirement to future
validation dates within the business planning period. This inludes an assessment
of the availability and quality of own funds at future dates. Therefore, the ORSA
establishes an embedment of regulatory onstraints into the business planning proess
aiming for a ontinuous ompliane with a ondene level of 99.5% for the going-
onern of the undertaking aording to eq. (2.1).
For further details, refer to EIOPA (2011b).
2.2.4 Pillar III: Dislosure
Pillar III denes standards for the publi and supervisory dislosure of insurane underta-
kings under Solveny II. The reporting will onsist of three main formats (EIOPA, 2011
and 2011d):
 To fulll the requirements of Artile 51 of the Solveny II Diretive regarding publi
dislosure, undertakings have to annually dislose the Solveny and Finanial Con-
dition Report (SFCR) whih shall inform about the risk and apital management of
the undertaking, espeially with regard to the ompliane with the MCR and SCR
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and the adequay of the standard formula in relation to the models the undertaking
uses internally.
 Undertakings further have to provide a qualitative report to the supervisory authority
(Regular Supervision Report, RSR) that shall ontain the statements of the SFCR
but provide information in a degree of detail whih is neessary for the purposes of
supervision (DIR09, Art 35 (1)).
 Both reports shall be aompanied with a pre-speied list of Quantitative Reporting
Templates (QRT). However, some QRTs will also have to be prepared eah quarter
of the year (see e.g. DIR09, Art 129 (4) requiring a quarterly reporting of the MCR).
For further details, refer to EIOPA (2011, 2011d).
2.3 Solveny II: Standard formula
The standard formula simplies the alulation of the solveny apital requirement (2.1)
in the following aspets:
(i) It disassembles the probability distribution of hanges (i.e. losses) in the net asset
value of the undertaking with respet to all risk fators into unexpeted losses aused
by single risks whih are then aggregated assuming linear orrelations.
(ii) Instead of a derivation of the risk harge for a single risk from the distribution of the
net asset value at t = 1, risk harges are determined from the shoked net asset value
at t = 0 applying risk fators whih are themselves alibrated to the desired 99.5%
perentile.
(iii) There are pre-dened losed-form formulae and shoks on risk fators, respetively,
to alulate the solveny apital requirement.
In the following we will highlight the most relevant elements of the Solveny II standard
formula whose understanding is neessary for the purpose of this work. Setion 2.3.1 ex-
plains the aggregation of risks along the Solveny II risk tree. Setion 2.3.2 fouses on
the elements and alibration of the market risk module, and the ounterparty default risk
is desribed in Setion 2.3.3. These risk modules are the foal point of this work. Setion
2.3.4 ontains a brief desription of risk drivers aptured by the underwriting risk modules.
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2.3.1 Risk aggregation
The so-alled Solveny II risk tree ontains all risks quantied with the standard formula
(f. EIOPA, 2013a).
The design of the overall risk aggregation in the standard formula has already been de-
ned by the Solveny II Diretive (f. DIR09, Annex IV (1)). The Basi Solveny Capital
Requirement (BSCR) shall be alulated as
BSCR =
√∑
i,j
Corri,j · SCRi · SCRj + SCRint (2.2)
The sum in eq. (2.2) runs over the solveny apital requirements for market risks (SCRmkt)
, ounterparty default risk (SCRdef ), and the insurane underwriting risks related to life
(SCRlife), health (SCRhealth) or non-life obligations (SCRnl). The risk harge for unex-
peted devaluations of intangible assets (SCRint) was omplemented at a later stage (f.
European Commission, 2011, Art 76, and EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 1.32). The apital require-
ment for this risk is alibrated to be 80% of the market-onsistent value of intangible assets
(EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 4.4). Correlation parameters in eq. (2.2) were already speied in the
Solveny II Diretive (f. DIR09, Annex IV), see Table 2.1.
The overall Solveny Capital Requirement is the sum of BSCR, the apital requirement for
operational risk (SCRop) and adjustments made for the loss-absorbing apaity of tehnial
provisions (ADJTP ) and deferred taxes (ADJDT ) whih are both smaller or equal to zero
(f. DIR09, Art 103):
SCR = BSCR + ADJTP + ADFDT + SCRop (2.3)
Operational risk shall over legal risks but exlude risks arising from strategi deisions as
Table 2.1: Basi solveny apital requirement orrelations
Corri,j SCRmkt SCRdef SCRlife SCRhealth SCRnl
SCRmkt 1
SCRdef 0.25 1
SCRlife 0.25 0.25 1
SCRhealth 0.25 0.25 0.25 1
SCRnl 0.25 0.50 0 0 1
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well as reputation risks (DIR09, Art 101 (4)). EIOPA (2013a, SCR 3.1) points out that it
is the risk of loss arising from inadequate or failed internal proesses, or from personnel
and systems, or from external events. The solveny apital requirement for operational
risk shall be based on volumes of premiums and tehnial provisions and be not larger than
30% of the BSCR (DIR09, Art 107 (3)).
The loss-absorbing apaity of tehnial provisions arises from life insurane ontrats when
future disretionary benets attributed to the poliyholder an be redued to mitigate
unexpeted losses (f. DIR09, Art 108).
23
Further, if the insurane undertaking inurred
an instantaneous loss that is equal to the amount
SCRshock = BSCR + ADJTP + SCRop (2.4)
the undertaking would be able to inrease deferred tax assets and thus mitigate the overall
loss of the insurane undertaking in a going-onern perspetive (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR
2.17). However, there are several onditions that need to be met for the reognition of
the loss-mitigating eet of deferred taxes (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 2.25-31). Espeially, the
undertaking needs to demonstrate that it will again be able to ahieve prots in future
nanial years after suering an instantaneous loss in the amount speied in eq. (2.4).
In ases that the risk prole of the undertaking deviates signiantly from the assumptions
of the standard formula, the supervisory authority will be allowed to adjust the SCR in eq.
(2.3) by a apital add-on (DIR09, Art 37 (1)). The apital add-on shall be set suh that
the adjusted SCR again omplies with the overall ondene level of 99.5% (DIR09, Art
37 (2). It shall be reviewed at least annually (DIR09, Art 37 (4)).
2.3.2 Market risk module
The Solveny II Diretive already denes the shape of the formula to estimate the solveny
apital requirement for market risk (f. DIR09, Annex IV (4)):
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For eah spei risk faed by life insurane undertakings, a net SCR value (or: (n)SCR value)
should be alulated onsidering the loss-absorbing apaity of tehnial provisions in the shok senario
for the respetive risk. The dierene between the net BSCR (or: (n)BSCR) obtained by an aggregation
of (n)SCR values aording to eq. (2.2) and the BSCR must not exeed the sum of future disretionary
benets available (EIOPA, 2013, SCR 2.14).
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SCRMkt =
√∑
i,j
CorrMkti,j ·Mkti ·Mktj (2.5)
The sum in eq. (2.5) runs over the apital harges for risks arising due to hanges of interest
rates, equity values, property values, redit spreads and foreign exhange rates and due to
an exessive asset onentration. Correlations for the square root formula (2.5) are shown
by EIOPA (2013a, SCR 5.5):
Table 2.2: Market risk orrelations
CorrMkti,j INT EQ PROP CS CURR CONC
Interest rate 1
Equity A 1
Property A 0.75 1
Credit Spread A 0.75 0.50 1
Curreny 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1
Conentration 0 0 0 0 0 1
Here, A is set to 0 in the ase that the interest rate upward shok is the relevant shok
for the undertaking, and it is set to 0.5 if the interest rate downward shok is the relevant
shok (see the subsetion for interest rate risk below). The orrelations within the market
risk module have been set suh that they shall reet the empirial evidene provided
by the urrent risis on the existene of a signiant degree of tail orrelations between
dierent market risk drivers (CEIOPS, 2010).
In the following, key aspets of the alulation of these single risks are outlined.
Interest rate risk
Interest rate risk results from the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and nanial
instruments to hanges in the term struture of interest rates, or in the volatility of interest
rates (DIR09, Art 105 (5)). Aording to EIOPA (2013a, SCR 5.21), the undertaking
shall rst derive the hange to its net asset value after an upward and downward shok,
respetively, to the interest rate term struture r(t) for t = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, ...
Mktupint = max {NAV (r(t))−NAV (rup(t)); 0}
Mktdownint = max
{
NAV (r(t))−NAV (rdown(t)); 0}
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where the shoked term strutures are determined from the following equations
rup(t) = max {r(t) + 0.01; r(t)(1 + sup(t))}
rdown(t) = max
{
0;min
{
r(t)(1− sdown(t)); r(t)− 0.01}}
i.e. absolute hanges shall at least amount to 1%. The relative hanges sup(t) and sdown(t)
are tabulated in EIOPA (2013a, SCR 5.23). The apital harge is then determined as the
maximum loss with respet to both shoks:
24
Mktint = max
{
Mktupint;Mkt
down
int
}
(2.6)
Equity risk
Equity risk arises from the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and nanial
instruments to hanges in the level or in the volatility of market pries of equities (DIR09,
Art 105 (5)). Equities are partitioned into two equity types (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.34):
(i) Type 1 equity (Global equity, in the following abbreviated by G) ontains listed
equity in regulated markets in EEA and OECD ountries.
(ii) The type 2 ategory (Other equity, in the following abbreviated by O) onsists of
equity listed in regulated markets in ountries that do neither belong to the EEA nor
OECD, unlisted equity as well as private equity, hedge funds, ommodities and other
alternative investments. Further, this ategory shall inlude investment funds that
are subjet to equity risk but for whih an appliation of the look-through approah
is not feasible (f. Setion 2.2.2).
The apital harge for equity is determined from the sum of pre-dened risk fators and
a symmetri adjustment (DIR09, Art 106 (1)) whih is supposed to mitigate the risk for
re-sales of equity after a market downturn and to reet the fat that market risks are
usually high in boom yles and lower after a market shok (Majri and de Lauzon, 2013).
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For the sake of a onise presentation, we disregard that the seletion of the relevant senario for the
interest rate risk, spread risk for redit derivates and urreny risk shall be based on the shok that leads
to the higher apital requirement after onsidering the loss-absorbing apaity of tehnial provisions in
life insurane ontrats with future disretionary benets (f. e.g. EIOPA, 2013, SCR 5.27).
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The apital harge is
Mkteq =
√
(SMVG · rf eqG )2 + 2 · ρG−Oeq · SMVG · rf eqG · SMVO · rf eqO + (SMVO · rf eqO )2
(2.7)
(f. EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.43) where SMVi denotes the sum of all market values in the
respetive equity type and the risk fators equal
rf eqi =

39% + SA i = G
49% + SA i = O
(2.8)
SA denotes the symmetri adjustment to the equity apital harge as required by the
Solveny II Diretive (f. DIR09, Art 106). The most urrent proposal for the symmetri
adjustment an be found in the European Commission's (2011) Draft Implementing Mea-
sures on Solveny II. Given the urrent level of an equity index (CI) and the weighted
average of the equity index over the last 36 months (AI), the adjustment shall be alulated
as
SA = max
{
−10%;min
{
1
2
(
CI −AI
AI
− 8%
)
; 10%
}}
(2.9)
The MSCI World Developed Prie Equity Index has been onsidered as an appropriate
equity index so far (f. CEIOPS, 2010).
Although the orrelation within the two baskets of equity investments is not stated expli-
itly in the apital requirements of Solveny II, it an be derived from eq. (2.7). In this
equation, the volume measure for risk in eah basket, whih is then multiplied by the risk
fator rf eq, is given by the sum of market values of equity investments. A sum of single
values as aggregation rule is equivalent to the assumption of a perfet orrelation between
the onsidered assets. Otherwise there would also be a square-root-formula inluding
orrelation assumptions for the aggregation over equities within a basket. Eq. (2.7) there-
fore implies that the orrelation of equity positions within eah of the two equity types is
assumed to be
ρwithineq = 1 (2.10)
For the aggregation of the risk harges for both types of equity, the orrelation is assumed
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to be (f. EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.43)
ρG−Oeq = 0.75 (2.11)
Property risk
Property risk results from the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and nanial
instruments to hanges in the level or in the volatility of market pries of real estate
(DIR09, Art 105 (5)). Land, buildings and immovable-property rights as well as property
investment for the own use of the insurane undertaking are subsumed under property
(EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.48). The apital harge for property risk shall be derived from an
instantaneous shok on the value of suh investments of 25% (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.54).
Credit spread risk
Credit spread risk arises from the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and nanial
instruments to hanges in the level or in the volatility of redit spreads over the risk-
free interest rate term struture (DIR09, Art 105 (5)). The following investments are in
partiular relevant for the redit spread risk module: investment grade orporate bonds,
high yield orporate bonds, subordinated debt and hybrid debt (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.72),
all types of asset-baked seurities and all tranhes of strutured redit produts suh as
ollateralized debt obligations (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.73) as well as redit derivatives
(EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.74). The apital harge for redit spread risk amounts to the sum
of
a) the apital harge MktBLcs for bonds and loans other than residential mortgage loans
that fulll the riteria to be handled in the ounterparty default risk module (EIOPA,
2013a, SCR 5.84-93),
b) the apital harge MktRLPcs for repakaged loan produts (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.94-
97) and
) the apital harge MktCDcs for redit derivatives (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.98-101).
In the following, the apital harges for bonds and loans are brought into fous, whereas the
apital harges for repakaged loan produts and redit derivatives are presented briey.
The apital harge for bonds and loans other than residential mortgage loans is determined
from the immediate eet of the widening of redit spreads on the undertaking's net asset
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Table 2.3: Spread risk harges for bonds and loans
Credit
quality
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dur: 0-5 0.90%*
Dur
1.10%*
Dur
1.40%*
Dur
2.50%*
Dur
4.50%*
Dur
7.50%*
Dur
7.50%*
Dur
Dur: 5-10 4.50%+
0.53%*
(Dur-5)
5.50%+
0.58%*
(Dur-5)
7%+
0.70%*
(Dur-5)
12.50%+
1.50%*
(Dur-5)
22.50%+
2.51%*
(Dur-5)
37.50%+
4.20%*
(Dur-5)
37.50%+
4.20%*
(Dur-5)
Dur: 10-15 7.15%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
8.40%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
10.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
20%+
1%*
(Dur-10)
35.05%+
1.80%*
(Dur-10)
58.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
58.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
Dur: 15-20 9.65%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
10.90%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
13%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
25%+
1%*
(Dur-15)
44.05%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
61%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
61%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
Dur>20 12.15%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
13.40%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
15.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
30%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
46.55%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
63.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
63.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
Minimum
duration
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum
duration
176 173 169 140 107 73 73
value (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.85):
MktBLcs =
∑
i
MVi · F up(Ratingi, Duri) (2.12)
where the sum runs over all relevant investments i with market valueMVi. F
up
is a funtion
that depends on the modied duration (measured in years and abbreviated Dur in the
following) and the redit quality of the investment.
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It is alibrated suh that a Value-
at-Risk at a ondene level of 99.5% for the adverse eets of widening redit spreads is
ahieved (f. EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.86-88), see Table 2.3.
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Mortgage overed bonds and publi setor overed bonds reeive a preferential treatment 
due to the ollateral overing them  as long as their redit rating is either AAA or AA, the
duration is smaller than 10 years and they fulll ertain further requirements (see EIOPA,
2013a, SCR 5.90, for further details), see Table 2.4.
27
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If two or more ratings are available for an exposure, the seond-best rating shall be applied (European
Commission, 2011, Art 141 (3)).
26
As an example onsider a orporate bond with AA rating and a modied duration of 8 years. The
risk harge for this bond amounts to 5.50%+0.58%*(8-5)=7.24% of its market value.
27
As an example onsider a mortgage overed bond with AA rating and a modied duration of 8 years.
The risk harge for this bond amounts to 4.50%+0.50%*(8-5)=6% of its market value.
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Table 2.4: Spread risk harges for overed bonds
Credit qua-
lity
0 1
Dur: 0-5 0.70%*
Dur
0.90%*
Dur
Dur: 5-10 3.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-5)
4.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-5)
Minimum
duration
1 1
Maximum
duration
178 176
Debt issued or demonstrably guaranteed by an EEA state, multilateral development bank
or international organization as well as debt issued by the European Central Bank shall
fae a zero risk harge if it is issued in the domesti urreny (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.91):
F up(Ratingi, Duri) = 0 ∀i issued by EEA gov. or ECB (2.13)
Further, exposures to non-EEA governments shall be also given a zero risk harge as long
as their redit rating is at least AA and bonds are issued in the domesti urreny (EIOPA,
2013a, SCR 5.92). For worse redit quality steps, risk harges are supposed to be still lower
than for e.g. orporate bonds, see Table 2.5.
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The apital harge MktRLPcs for repakaged loan produts is determined from the produt
of the market value of the investment, its modied duration and a funtion of the rating
(EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.95):
MktRLPcs =
∑
i
MVi ·Duri · F ′up(Ratingi) (2.14)
For the alibration of the funtion F
′up
, we refer to EIOPA (2013a, SCR 5.96). Further, for
repakaged loans for whih a rating is not available, the risk harge shall be 100% (EIOPA,
2013a, SCR 5.97).
The apital harge MktCDcs for redit derivatives is derived from the larger loss of the
undertaking's net asset value onsidering an instantaneous widening and derease of redit
28
Sovereign bonds issued by a non-EEA government with duration of 5 years and redit rating A, for
instane, fae a risk harge of 5.5% of its market value in omparison with a harge of 7% for orporate
bonds with the same duration and rating.
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Table 2.5: Spread risk harges for non-EEA government bonds
Credit
quality
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dur: 0-5 0 0 1.10%*
Dur
1.40%*
Dur
2.50%*
Dur
4.50%*
Dur
4.50%*
Dur
Dur: 5-10 0 0 5.50%+
0.58%*
(Dur-5)
7%+
0.70%*
(Dur-5)
12.50%+
1.50%*
(Dur-5)
22.50%+
2.51%*
(Dur-5)
22.50%+
2.51%*
(Dur-5)
Dur: 10-15 0 0 8.40%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
10.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-10)
20%+
1%*
(Dur-10)
35.05%+
1.80%*
(Dur-10)
35.05%+
1.80%*
(Dur-10)
Dur: 15-20 0 0 10.90%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
13%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
25%+
1%*
(Dur-15)
44.05%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
44.05%+
0.50%*
(Dur-15)
Dur>20 0 0 13.40%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
15.50%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
30%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
46.55%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
46.55%+
0.50%*
(Dur-20)
Minimum
duration
N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum
duration
N/A N/A 169 140 107 73 73
spreads, respetively (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.99):
MktCDcs = max
{
MktCD,upcs ;Mkt
CD,down
cs
}
(2.15)
For the alibration of the upward and downward shoks, f. EIOPA (2013a, SCR 5.100).
Curreny risk
Curreny risk results from the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and nanial
instruments to hanges in the level or in the volatility of urreny exhange rates (DIR09,
Art 105 (5)). The risk harge is determined from the larger loss of net asset value onsidering
a 25% instantaneous rise and fall, respetively, of exhange rates (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.65).
For urrenies that are pegged to the Euro, stress fators are adjusted to take the urreny
peg into aount (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.66).
Conentration risk
Conentration risk omprises additional risks to an insurane or reinsurane undertaking
stemming either from a lak of diversiation in the asset portfolio or from large exposure
to default risk by a single issuer of seurities or a group of related issuers (DIR09, Art
105 (5)). All assets that are dealt with under the equity, spread and property risk modules
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Table 2.6: Conentration thresholds and risk fators
Credit
quality
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or
unrated
Conentration
Threshold
3% 3% 3% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
Risk
fator
12% 12% 21% 27% 73% 73% 73%
but not under the ounterparty default risk module should be regarded here (EIOPA,
2013a, SCR 5.104). The risk harge Mktconc for onentration risk is determined under
the assumption of unorrelated risk harges for eah ounterparty i (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR
5.120):
Mktconc =
√∑
i
(Conci)2 (2.16)
where the individual apital requirement Conci is the produt of a risk fator gi whih
depends on the redit quality of the ounterparty, and the exess exposure (EIOPA, 2013a,
SCR 5.115-116):
Conci = gi ·max {0;EADi − CTi ·Assets} (2.17)
In eq. (2.17) EADi is the exposure at default to ounterparty i, CTi is a onentration
threshold whih also depends on the redit quality of the ounterparty, and Assets refers
to the sum of assets whih are exposed to onentration risk (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.104,
5.115). The onentration thresholds CTi and risk fators gi are presented in Table 2.6.
Analogue to the spread risk module, mortgage overed bonds and publi setor overed
bonds reeive a preferential treatment due to their risk prole. The onentration threshold
is set to 15% for overed bonds with a redit rating of at least AA whih fulll ertain
further riteria (see EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.122, for details). Additionally, debt issued or
demonstrably guaranteed by EEA governments, multilateral development banks, interna-
tional organizations or the European Central Bank is not subjet to onentration risk
(EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 5.127):
gi = 0 ∀i issued by EEA gov. or ECB (2.18)
Further, there is also a preferential treatment for debt issued by non-EEA governments in
their domesti urreny in that risk fators are redued aording to Table 2.7 (EIOPA,
29
2013a, SCR 5.128).
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Table 2.7: Conentration risk fators for non-EEA government debt
Credit
quality
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or
unrated
Risk
fator
0% 0% 12% 21% 27% 73% 73%
2.3.3 Counterparty default risk
The solveny apital requirement for ounterparty default risk shall over unexpeted los-
ses due to default or adverse redit rating migration of ounterparties and debtors of the
insurane undertaking over the next 12 months (DIR09, Art 105 (6)). This risk module
distinguishes between two groups of exposures: possibly non-diversied exposures to large
ounterparties suh as reinsurers and issuers of derivatives who usually have a redit rating
(type 1 ounterparties) and diversied exposures to small ounterparties suh as poliyhol-
ders, intermediaries and mortgage debtors who usually do not have a redit rating (type 2
ounterparties).
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For type 1 ounterparties, the standard formula presribes the determination of the pro-
bability of default (PD) and the value of the loss-given-default (LGD) with respet to
the ounterparty. These values are aggregated to a apital harge by means of a fator-
based approah. The probability of default is derived from the seond-best rating for the
ounterparty. The loss-given-default equals the sum of
a) the market-onsistent value of nanial instruments or the reinsurane reoverable
that would be lost in ase of default of the ounterparty
b) and  if existent  the risk-mitigating eet on the SCR whih is yielded by nan-
ial instruments issued by a ounterparty or reinsurane protetion provided by the
ounterparty
) minus  if existent  the risk-adjusted market value of ollaterals provided by the
ounterparty
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There are further regulations for this risk type whih are not relevant for the sope of this work and
thus not desribed here. Instead, the reader is referred to EIOPA (2013a, SCR 5.114-131).
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Mortage loans have to fulll a set of riteria to be aepted under the ounterparty default risk module
(f. EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 6.9). Otherwise they have to be regarded under the spread risk module.
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For type 2 ounterparties, the apital harge only depends on the LGD value and a risk
fator. The risk fator equals 0.9 for reeivables from intermediaries already due for more
than three months and 0.15 for all other exposures inluding mortgage loans. For mortgage
loans, the LGD value is alulated as
LGDi = max {0;Loani − 0.8 · raMortgagei} (2.19)
where Loani denotes the value of the mortgage loan in aordane with the market-
onsistent valuation approah pursued by Solveny II and raMortgagei is the risk-adjusted
value of the mortgage. The risk-adjusted value raMortgagei shall either be alulated (ex-
atly) as the marginal ontribution of the respetive mortgage to the undertaking's total
market risk (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 6.37) or  given that ertain onditions are fullled  by
the following simpliation (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 6.65)
31,32
raMortgagei = 0.85 ·Mortgagei (2.20)
A orrelation of 0.75 between the apital harges for type 1 and type 2 exposures is assumed
(EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 6.13). Further details and referenes to EIOPA (2013a) are outlined
in Figure 2.2.
2.3.4 Underwriting risk modules
In the following, we summarize the underwriting risk modules, whih are not the primary
onern of this work. For eah risk module, the risk types overed by the module, their
risk drivers and the alibration of these risk drivers in the standard formula are briey
presented.
Life underwriting risk
31
This simpliation usually imposes a larger shok fator to the mortgage value than the marginal
SCR-inreasing eet of adding the mortgage to the investment portfolio of the insurer. In the exat
alulation, the property risk harge of 25% (see Setion 2.3.2) would usually be largely diversied away
due to the dominane of interest rate risk, equity risk and spread risk within the market risk module (see
Chapter 1).
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Applying eq. (2.19) and (2.20), a mortgage loan worth less than 60% of the ollateral value would
reeive a risk harge of 0% as the produt of adjustment fators for the ollateral value (0.8 · 0.85) is still
larger than 60%.
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Figure 2.2: Counterparty default risk
All independent 
counterparties 
(SCR 6.5)
Type 1 
exposure
Type 2 
exposures
Assignment of
exposures to types 
(SCR 6.4-8)
Receivables from 
intermediaries due 
for >3 months
Other type 2 
exposures
Netting with liabilities 
of counterparty 
(SCR 6.61)
Determination of 
PD 
(SCR 6.19-27)
Calculation of LGD for 
contracts without risk-
mitigating effects
(SCR 6.45-47)
Calculation of LGD for 
risk-mitigating contracts
(SCR 6.28-44)
Netting with liabilities 
of counterparty 
(SCR 6.61)
SCR Counterparty 
default risk
(SCR 6.11-14)
LGD equals a function of
a) Recoverables (for 
reinsurance) or market value 
(for derivatives)
b) Risk-mitigating effects:
• Difference of hypothetical 
SCRs for market and 
underwriting risk with and 
without the default of the 
counterparty (iteratively)
• Simplifications (SCR 6.62-64)
c) Collateral values: market value 
minus market risk charge
(simplification, SCR 6.65)
e.g. receivables from 
intermediaries,
policyholder debtors, 
mortgage loans
e.g. reinsurance 
contracts, cash at 
bank, derivatives, 
guarantees
Determination of SCR 
factor-based
(SCR 6.15-18)
Calculation of SCR by 
stress scenario 
(SCR 6.48-49)
Separation
Otherwise: 
aggregation 
(SCR 6.26)
The solveny apital requirement for life risk is determined by a square root formula as in
eq. (2.5) (f. DIR09, Annex IV (3)). Correlations are given by EIOPA (2013a, SCR 7.7).
Table 2.8 outlines the types of life risk onsidered in the standard formula.
Non-life underwriting risk
The solveny apital requirement for non-life risk is determined by a square root formula
as in eq. (2.5) (f. DIR09, Annex IV (2)). Correlations are given by EIOPA (2013a, SCR
9.7). Table 2.9 outlines the types of non-life risk onsidered in the standard formula. For
atastrophe risk, the standard formula ontains the most omprehensive algorithm. Thus,
the presentation in Table 2.9 is restrited to the most important type of atastrophe risks
for non-life insurers, whih is natural atastrophe risk (f. EIOPA, 2011a).
Health underwriting risk
Health underwriting risk is further distinguished into sub-modules omprising
 risks arising from health insurane ontrats similar to life tehniques (Health SLT),
 health insurane ontrats similar to non-life tehniques (Health Non-SLT) and
 health atastrophe risk
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Table 2.8: Life underwriting risk module
Life risk Risk driver and alibration EIOPA
(2013a)
Mortality
risk
Instantaneous permanent inrease of 15% in mortality rates SCR 7.15
Longevity
risk
Instantaneous permanent derease of 20% in mortality rates SCR 7.25
Disability
risk
Combination of
a) inrease of 35% (25%) in disability and morbidity rates in the next
(after the following) 12 months
b) derease of 20% in morbidity/disability reovery rates
SCR 7.35
Lapse risk Maximum loss of three senarios:
a) instantaneous permanent derease of 50% in the assumed option
exerise rates but not by more than 20 perentage points
b) instantaneous permanent inrease of 50% in the assumed option
exerise rates with a ap of 100 perentage points
) mass lapse event (for details see EIOPA (2013a, SCR 7.48))
SCR 7.44-
48
Expense
risk
Combination of
a) an inrease of 10% in the amount of expenses taken into aount
in the alulation of tehnial provisions
b) an inrease of 0.01 to the expense ination rate
SCR 7.59
Revision
risk
Instantaneous permanent inrease of 3% in the annual amount payable for
annuities exposed to revision risk (risk of hanges in the legal environment
or in the state of health of the person insured)
SCR 7.70
Catastrophe
risk
Instantaneous inrease of 0.15 perentage points to the mortality rates in
the following 12 months
SCR 7.76
(f. EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 8.3). The apital requirements for these three sub-modules are
aggregated in a square root formula (EIOPA, 2013a, SCR 8.6). The Health SLT and Health
Non-SLT modules are similar to the life underwriting risk and non-life underwriting risk
modules, respetively, as desribed above. They do not, however, ontain the respetive
atastrophe risks as health atastrophe risk is modeled separately and aggregated on a
higher level. The apital requirement for health atastrophe risk is derived as the aggregated
apital requirement of three unorrelated events (mass aident, onentration senario,
pandemi senario); see EIOPA (2013a, SCR 8.89-121) for further details.
2.4 Expeted impat of Solveny II on the investment deisions
of insurers
This setion ontains a review of aademi researh and expert opinions with regard to the
expeted impliations of the Solveny II apital requirements on the investment deisions of
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Table 2.9: Non-life underwriting risk module
Non-life
risk
Risk driver and alibration EIOPA
(2013a)
Premium
and reserve
risk
Premium risk: premiums not suient to over future laims and laims-
handling osts
Reserve risk: urrent reserves not suient to over the run-o of laims
already existing (but not neessarily already reported to the insurer)
Fator-based approah where
1. Volume measures and volatilities for both risks are determined se-
parately and per line of business (LoB) (SCR 9.19-26)
2. Volume measures and volatilities are aggregated for eah LoB (SCR
9.29, 9.32)
3. An overall volatility is alulated assuming linear orrelations bet-
ween LoBs (SCR 9.30), volume measures are added
4. The apital harge is determined as 3*overall volatility*overall vo-
lume (SCR 9.15)
SCR 9.8-
35
Lapse risk Risk that expeted prots in future premiums drop out whih implies an
inrease of tehnial provisions
• Disontinuane of 40% of the insurane poliies for whih disonti-
nuane would result in an inrease of tehnial provisions
SCR 9.36
Catastrophe
risk
Risk of not suient priing and provisioning related to extreme or ex-
eptional events
• Distinguished into:
a) natural atastrophe risk
b) atastrophe risk related to non-proportional property
reinsurane
) man-made atastrophe risk
d) other non-life atastrophe risk
• Aggregation of a)-d) via linear orrelations
• Calulation sheme for natural atastrophe risks:
1. For eah risk zone in a single region (ountry) and peril
(windstorm, hail, ood, windstorm, subsidene), summation
of sums insured of suh ontrats that are exposed to the
peril (SCR 9.54, 9.58)
2. Multipliation with a risk weight for eah risk zone and peril
(SCR 9.53)
3. Aggregation over risk zones via linear orrelations and mul-
tipliation with a peril risk fator (SCR 9.52)
4. Netting by reinsurane (SCR 9.47)
5. Aggregation over regions via linear orrelations (SCR 9.46)
SCR 9.39-
141
insurers (Setion 2.4.1). Amongst others, the market-onsistent valuation approah makes
the insurers' solveny position sensitive to spread inreases of issuer ountries of government
bonds as well as to the risk ontagion of suh rises to other ountries. We summarize own
ontributions regarding the existene of ontagion in the Eurozone during the nanial
risis in Setion 2.4.2.
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2.4.1 Literature review
The following subsetion ontains a review of aademi researh onduted to assess the
impliations of the standard formula alibration with respet to the investment deisions
of insurers. Here we also point out diulties in modeling the omplexity of the standard
formula and of internal models in omparative assessments of risk apital models (see also
IMF, 2011a). In subsetion 2.4.1.2, we summarize researh that is based on expert opinions
from industry representatives and aademis.
2.4.1.1 Aademi researh
Aademi researh on impliations of the Solveny II market risk alibration under the
standard formula an be ategorized into two strands:
(i) investigations based on setting up sample investment portfolios for whih apital
requirements are derived under the standard formula and ompared with apital re-
quirements under internal models (Gatzert and Martin, 2012), rating models (Höring,
2012), or the Basel II/III apital harges for banks (Laas and Siegel, 2013)
(ii) researh foused on inferring optimal investment strategies from models for portfolio
optimization under the onstraint of the market risk harge under Solveny II (Braun
et al., 2013) or for shareholder value optimization under the onstraint of the Solveny
II equity risk harge (Fisher and Shlütter, 2012)
In the following we will present the main ndings of these works and highlight ruial
assumptions made to derive the results.
Standard formula vs. partial internal model (Gatzert and Martin, 2012)
Gatzert and Martin (2012) ompare the apital requirements for interest rate, equity and
redit-spread risk in the standard formula and in a partial internal model for sample portfo-
lios of non-life insurers. Restriting their attention to non-life insurers, Gatzert and Martin
do not model the liability side of the insurer as there are fewer interations with the asset
side for non-life insurers in omparison to life insurers. However, as the authors assume a -
xed value of liabilities under eah market stress, they do not onsider the ounter-balaning
eet of the liabilities in the interest rate shok.
33
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The authors do further neither model diversiation eets with underwriting risks nor the loss-
absorbing eets from deferred taxes as both issues are likely to have similar risk-mitigating eets on the
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The sample portfolios inlude orporate and sovereign bonds whih are further distinguis-
hed into bonds from EEA and non-EEA ountries as well as ve dierent equity indies.
Gatzert and Martin (2012) nd that the standard model appears to partiularly undere-
stimate the risk of low-rated bonds, while it overestimates the risk of high-rated bonds.
This observation is attributable to the preferential treatment of EEA sovereign debt as
well as high-rated bonds issued by non-EEA governments under the Solveny II standard
formula (f. Setion 2.3.2).
For equity positions, they nd that there is a onsiderably higher diversiation benet
that is fully aounted for when using the internal model (Gatzert and Martin, 2012). This
is a onsequene of the restrited diversiation allowed for under the standard formula,
espeially within the ategories Global Equity and Other equity, f. eq. (2.10). In their
partial internal model, Gatzert and Martin ompute orrelations between all equity positi-
ons by linear orrelation oeients obtained from monthly data. However, the authors do
not omment on whether this is ompliant with the overall aim of Solveny II to establish
a ondene level of 99.5% implying the use of (tail) orrelations that are representative
for the one-in-200-year senario as well (f. CEIOPS, 2010, Mittnik, 2011).
Overall, the work by Gatzert and Martin (2012) shows sensitivities of the standard formula
and internal models to risk fators and indiates benets of an internal model to insurers.
Standard formula vs. Standard & Poor's rating model (Höring, 2012)
Höring (2012) ompares the regulatory apital requirements for market risk indued by
the Solveny II standard formula with those from Standard & Poor's rating model. Using
various statistis and annual reports of insurane ompanies of the years 2009 and 2010,
he reates a balane sheet of a representative European life insurer. Assets inlude listed
equity, private equity and hedge funds (both of whih are Other equity), real estate
property and debt instruments (sovereign debt, orporate debt, overed bonds). The author
nds that the sum of apital harges for the single risks is larger under the standard formula
than in S&P's rating model for the target rating A.
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standard formula and internal model results if taken into aount.
34
Standard & Poor's A rating orresponds to a ondene level of 99.4% whih is lose to the ondene
level targeted by Solveny II.
36
The diversiation redit given by the standard formula, however, is signiantly higher
than in the rating model by S&P. This is due to a 50% hairut of the diversiation
benet by S&P to aount for unertainties around tail orrelations (Standard & Poor's,
2010). Further, as Solveny II allows the inlusion of loss-absorbing adjustments of the
SCR as opposed to the rating model, the net Solveny II apital harge for market risk
beomes even less than the rating model's requirement for a BBB rating. Here, Höring
applies fators whih he derived from values averaged over all partiipants of the fth
Quantitative Impat Study on Solveny II (f. EIOPA, 2011a), i.e. values whih depend
on the share of life insurane ontrats inorporating future disretionary benets to the
poliyholders and the ability of the insurer to generate future prots against whih deferred
tax assets ould be oset (f. Setion 2.3.1).
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Höring onludes that although the appliation of the Solveny II standard formula does
not seem to be a binding onstraint in relation to S&P's rating model at the moment (for
the representative undertaking reated), the Solveny II standard model and the rating
model are still in the proess of hange what might lead to other results at a later stage.
Further, if a redit rating is not relevant for an insurer, the regulatory apital requirement
may indeed be a binding onstraint for future business.
Standard formula vs. Basel II/III for banks (Laas and Siegel, 2013)
Laas and Siegel (2013) ompare the apital harges for market and ounterparty default
risk (redit risk) under Solveny II and Basel II/III. They onsider a stylized asset portfolio
that is derived from an average of 21 Swiss life insurane ompanies and inludes equity,
sovereign and orporate debt, real estate, hedge funds, private equity and ash at bank.
Their numerial results show that Solveny II apital harges seem to be even higher than
the apital harges for systematially relevant banks under Basel III for whih a 2.5%
additional buer is applied to the apital harge.
However, the alulations do not ontain further diversiation benets with underwriting
risks as well as adjustments for the loss-absorbing apaity of tehnial provisions and
deferred taxes whih are part of the standard formula (f. eq. (2.3)). If one applies the same
fators for diversiation eets and adjustments for loss-absorbing eets as in Höring
35
Höring uses a fator of 0.82 to aount for the diversiation eet of market risk with the other risk
modules at the aggregation to the BSCR and a fator of 0.64 to aount for the two loss-absorbing eets
mentioned.
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(2012), the apital harge appears to be smaller than under the Basel III requirements for
all banks (own alulations). Moreover, as the authors do not onsider the ounterbalaning
eet of liabilities with respet to interest rate risk, the ontribution of interest rate risk
seems to be partiularly large in their analysis (f. Laas and Siegel, 2013, Figure 4()).
Portfolio optimization under Solveny II (Braun et al., 2013)
Braun et al. (2013) impose a market risk onstraint to a quadrati optimization program
to nd risk-return-optimal portfolio alloations. Assuming a risk-averse investor, the target
funtion of their optimization program is to minimize the variane of the portfolio given
a onstant return. They further onsider a budget onstraint that exludes borrowing, the
investment limits inherent in the German Investment Regulation (Anlageverordnung) and
they rule out short sales. The authors separately apply a market risk onstraint derived
from the Solveny II standard formula and from a partial internal model. In the latter, asset
returns and liability growth rates are assumed to be normally distributed whih allows an
analytial derivation of the apital harge for the internal model as well. The distribution
of risks underlying insurane liabilities, however, is usually skewed (f. the disussion in
Setion 2.5), whih is not disussed by the authors.
Braun et al. (2013) inlude equity, government and orporate bonds, real estate, hedge
funds and money market instruments in their optimization program. To alibrate their
partial internal model, the authors derive annualized returns and standard deviations as
well as linear orrelation matries from monthly return time series of representative indies
for these investments. They do not omment on the issue whether these orrelations are
representative for the one-in-200-year senario as well (f. CEIOPS, 2010, Mittnik, 2011).
With regard to the standard formula, the authors give valuable insights into what might
happen if the solveny apital requirement beomes a binding onstraint to insurers: as
the standard formula only onsiders single risk fators (f. Setion 2.3.2) but not the entire
risk-return prole of investments, it beomes likely that eient portfolios are not syste-
matially preferred to ineient portfolios, i.e. eient and near-eient portfolios along
the eieny boundary in the risk-return spae might not be admissible for the insurane
undertaking. Espeially, the standard formula was found inapable to promote those e-
ient portfolios that lead to a tighter duration gap (Braun et al., 2013), whih is in strong
ontrast to the overall aim of the Solveny II proess to link regulatory apital require-
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ments with methods and models for internal risk management inluding the asset-liability
management of insurane undertakings. As the authors' partial internal model ensures that
larger standard deviations are rewarded by higher returns, suh ineienies do not our
here.
Shareholder value optimization under Solveny II (Fisher and Shlütter, 2012)
Fisher and Shlütter (2012) present a model to investigate the insurer's hoie of the
share of risky assets (stoks) when maximizing the shareholder value under the Solveny II
equity risk harge (2.7). Using option priing tehniques and Monte Carlo simulations, they
show that there are funtions of the probability of the insurer's default and of the share of
stoks depending on the equity risk stress fator (f. eq. (2.8)) whih vary with the insurer's
individual orrelation of asset risk (market risk) and liability risk (underwriting risk). The
authors show that insurers have an inentive to strive for a large orrelation between these
risks in order to maximize the shareholder value as long as the regulator does not beome
aware of this fat and remains the orrelation in the standard formula at a lower level
(urrently 0.25, f. Table 2.1). This nding underlines the neessity to institutionalize the
Own Risk and Solveny Assessment under Pillar II in whih insurers have to ommuniate
deviations of the own risk prole from the assumptions of the standard formula to the
regulator (f. Setion 2.2.3). Moreover, Fisher and Shlütter show that there are ases
when it is optimal for the insurer to invest ompletely risk-free. This ould indue large
portfolio realloations among insurers. The regulatory reporting under Pillar III will serve
as a suitable means to trak the trends in the investment deisions of insurers and their
likely auses (f. Setion 2.2.4).
General remarks
The omparison between the market risk harges imposed by the Solveny II standard
formula and other risk apital models is diult due to omplex interations between the
asset and liability side of insurers. There is no interest rate risk harge, for instane, in
the ase of a perfet ash-ow mathing of assets and liabilities. Further, diversiation
eets with underwriting risk from insurane obligations are taken into aount under
Solveny II and a loss-absorption due to deferred tax assets may be aounted for as well.
Life insurers additionally may benet from the loss-absorbing eet of tehnial provisions
given a shok to its asset values. Further, the lak of suiently long time series seems to
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make it impossible to derive tail orrelations between risks that are representative for the
one-in-200-years event (f. Mittnik, 2011, and Setion 2.5), whereas internal models are
apable to provide the entire loss distribution with regard to all relevant risks from whih
the desired Value-at-Risk an be diretly observed.
As a onsequene of these limitations, we also provide expert opinions on the impliations
of Solveny II and its standard formula in partiular in the following.
2.4.1.2 Expert opinions
Expert opinions most often refer to expeted onsequenes resulting from the alibration
of the standard formula. Insurane undertakings whih will be allowed to use an internal
model for the alulation of their solveny ratio are supposed to adequately over their
individual and maroeonomi risks in the alulation of the SCR and hene are likely to
not be tempted to portfolio realloations along the risk weights of the standard formula.
Instead, risk-adjusted measures are likely to be already embedded in their asset alloation
proess. However, the approval of an internal model by the supervisory authority generates
osts that are likely to keep many undertakings away from initiating the approval proedure
(Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013). The eventual impat of Solveny II on the
investment deisions of insurane undertakings will also be inuened by the transitional
measures outlined in the Omnibus II Diretive (f. Setion 2.2.1) sine the length of the
time period that is given to the insurers to adjust to the new rules will also determine the
spae to hange strategies, redesign produts and adapt priing to the new Solveny II
world (Fith, 2011).
The following ornerstones of the Solveny II standard formula are expeted to have an
impat on the investment deisions of insurers, their solveny position and the nanial
and real markets as a whole:
Zero risk weight for sovereign debt
The preferential treatment of sovereign debt of EEA ountries in relation to other assets is
expeted to ause portfolio realloations towards sovereign debt (see e.g. BIS, 2011, IMF,
2011a, IMF, 2011b, Swarup, 2012) whih would be likely to imply
36
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The following four bullet points are extrated from the paper Credit risk-free sovereign bonds under
Solveny II: a ointegration analysis with onsistently estimated strutural breaks (f. Chapter 4).
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 higher funding osts for banks and orporate undertakings given the importane of
insurers for the funding of these undertakings (Bundesbank, 2012, Fith, 2011),
 a higher interonnetedness with banks through onverging portfolio strutures and
therefore an inrease of systemi risks (Bundesbank, 2012, IMF, 2011a),
 an inreasing pro-yliality of investment strategies as insurane ompanies are for-
ed to exhange equity or long-dated orporate debt to risk-free government bonds
in times of distress to maintain a suiently high solveny ratio and vie versa in
periods of prosperity in order to benet from booming equity markets (BIS, 2011),
and
 an artiial lowering of interest rates leading to an inrease in the present value of
market-onsistently evaluated insurane liabilities and thus to a derease in solveny
apital whih in turn fosters the need to realloate investments to risk-free sovereign
bonds (Swarup, 2012).
However, Deutshe Bank Researh (2011) expets the portfolio realloation from bank and
orporate debt to sovereign debt to be relatively modest sine
 insurers will not only fous on minimizing their solveny apital requirement but
infer their investment deisions from the risk-return prole of assets,
 the average duration of orporate bonds in insurer's portfolios is already relatively
small as it lies between three and ve years, and
 senior bank bonds with durations of three or ve years remain attrative for insurers
as they yield relatively large risk-adjusted returns on apital under Solveny II as
well
Dependene of the bond risk harge on duration
The inreasing risk weight of bonds with respet to their duration is expeted to lead to a
swith to shorter-dated bonds resulting in
 an inreasing risk that insurane undertakings inur a mismath of assets and liabi-
lities and thus fae reinvestment risk for their funds (IMF, 2011a)
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 further dereasing refunding possibilities for European banks
37
and orporate under-
takings (BIS, 2011)
Moreover, Fith (2011) predits a preferene of insurers to deposits at banks in omparison
to short-dated bank debt under Solveny II. Deposits are treated under the ounterparty
default risk module in whih the risk weight depends on the rating of the ounterparty (f.
Setion 2.3.3), whih is usually high in the ase of banks (Fith, 2011), and the volatility
of market pries is not taken into aount here. Thus, a lower risk harge for deposits is
likely to result.
Preferential treatment of overed bonds
Most ommentators expet an inreased relevane of overed bonds in omparison to un-
seured bonds (e.g. BIS, 2011, IMF, 2011a). Swarup (2012) argues that the preferential
regulatory treatment of overed bonds will lead to a onentration of the funding of espe-
ially weaker banks towards suh bonds. Moreover, if the ollateral is not suient to
reimburse the bondholder in the ase of default, overed bonds typially rank pari passu
with senior unseured reditors [suh that℄ their ultimate reovery rates will be higher whi-
le other senior unseured reditors will now have lower reoveries than before (Swarup,
2012). Aording to Swarup, this is likely to lead to demanding higher yields for senior
unseured debt and thus to an inrease in the ost of apital of banks.
However, Fith (2011) argues that the risk-adjusted returns for overed bonds are relatively
low making this asset lass rather unattrative from a return point of view.
Risk harges for equity
Assuming a ost of apital rate of 12%, BIS (2011) onludes that the return target for
Global equity seems reahable, espeially when further diversiation with other market
risks and underwriting risk is taken into aount (f. Setion 2.3.2). Fith (2011) also nds
that large moves out of equity are unlikely, whih might not be the ase for insurers from
the United Kingdom where equity shares have been traditionally large (Deutshe Bank
Researh, 2011). However, after dereasing portfolio shares of equity during the nanial
37
Basel III stipulates liquidity-related target measures for banks for the rst time. The Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR) is aimed at a stable medium- and long-term renaning of bank's assets, i.e. with
respet to a time period longer than one year. In the light of the NSFR, issuing debt with longer maturities
will be beneial for banks. See BIS (2010) for further details.
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risis, a broad-based re-entry into these asset lasses is not seen to be enouraged by
Solveny II (BIS, 2011).
Risk harges for ollateralized mortgage loans
Due to the dierenes in the regulatory treatment, Bundesbank (2012) expets a rise in
the ompetition between banks and insurane undertakings for ostumers in real estate
lending. Under Basel II/III banks fae a positive risk weight that is xed under the Stan-
dardized Approah and depends on the probability of default and the loss-given-default
under the Internal Ratings Based Approah (IRBA), respetively. Insurane undertakings,
however, an make use of the straightforward and advantageous approah to determining
the ounterparty default risk of their mortgage loans (f. eq. (2.19) and (2.20) in Setion
2.3.3). Here, a risk weight of zero is likely in many ases.
As lending is not within the traditional sope of insurers, the Bundesbank (2012) suspets
signiant risks from a lak of adequate risk management systems for diret and indiret
lending ativities of insurers.
Market-onsistent valuation approah
Unlike most statutory aounting standards as well as Solveny I, assets and liabilities
have to be valuated market-onsistently under Solveny II, i.e. at fair value. This leads to
a sensitivity of asset values to spread hanges or shifts of the interest rate term struture.
The nanial risis in the Eurozone brought rising yield spreads for sovereign debt of
peripheral Eurozone member states (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greee and Spain) but also to
ore ountries suh as Frane and Belgium. Moreover, the presene of short-term ontagion
between ountries may negatively aet market values of government bonds temporarily
and thus the net asset value of insurers  despite their intention to hold bonds until their
nal maturity  whih in turn leads to larger utuations in the solveny position of insurers
as under Solveny I (f. Setion 2.4.2).
The market-onsistent valuation approah may also fuel the pro-ylial eets of a regu-
latory regime whih fouses on a risk-based apital measure (BIS, 2011). In the ase of a
market downturn, asset values shrink and interest rates are likely to be lowered in order
to prevent a deepening of the risis. Both eets lead to a redution of the net asset value
of the undertaking and hene of its solvability ratio. To remain solvent, the insurer is now
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likely to re-sell these assets whih fae a large risk harge in order to redue its solveny
apital requirement. Suh re sales by institutional investors, however, are likely to push
market pries down further.
In the ase of insurers faing liabilities with long durations, present values of their liabilities
will be espeially sensitive to the urrent interest rate environment and so their net asset
value and solveny ratio.
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This volatility of the solveny position of the insurer is alled
artiial (EIOPA, 2013b, Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013) sine
(i) the obligations are often due in the far future and the payouts are preditable for the
olletive of insured persons with a high probability, and
(ii) assets are usually held till maturity in order to math the long durations of liabilities
and to earn an illiquidity premium (whih is at the benet of both shareholders and
poliyholders).
EIOPA tested measures to takle these negative short-term eets on the long-term-
oriented business of insurers in its 2013 eld study (f. EIOPA, 2013b). The nal tehnial
speiation of Solveny will integrate suh a measure (EIOPA, 2013b).
Risk-mitigation tehniques
Considering the expeted larger volatility of Solveny II balane sheets and hene of solvabi-
lity ratios, insurers are expeted to make use of reinsurane, seuritizations and derivatives
to a larger extent then under Solveny I (IMF, 2011a). Interest rate swaps may be used
to math ash-ows of liabilities instead of inreasing the share of risk-free government
bonds with long durations. Further, swaptions may play a more important role due to
their ability of reduing interest rate volatility (BIS, 2011). However, Fith (2011) expets
rising hedging pries and an inrease in the implied volatility in the derivative markets.
It is further expeted that insurers will buy larger amounts of reinsurane protetion to
redue their ost of apital, where this an be problemati in ases of reinsurane in non-
equivalent jurisditions with weaker solveny and supervisory standards (IMF, 2011a)
whih might lead to more frequent defaults of reinsurane reoverables.
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Liabilities of life insurers exhibit long durations, espeially for whole life annuities. For non-life insurers,
durations of liabilities are usually small but an be larger for some lines of business suh as professional
liability insurane for arhitets, dotors and nurses or annuities stemming from non-life ontrats suh as
ar liability or general aident insurane.
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2.4.2 Own ontributions
Under Solveny I, insurer's own funds available to over apital requirements are deri-
ved using statutory aounting standards (f. Setion 2.1.1). Most European insurers an
thus apply a modied lower-of-ost-or-market priniple to valuate their assets (f. Setion
2.2.2). Temporary utuations of market values do therefore not have an impat on their
solveny position under Solveny I. As a onsequene of the market-onsistent balane
sheet-approah under Solveny II, however, insurers' own funds at the reporting date will
depend on the ondition of the nanial market of this very day. This inludes aounting
for adverse hanges of bond pries despite the insurers' usual intention to hold these assets
until their nal maturity in order to math the usually long durations of their liabilities
(Beker and Ivashina, 2013, Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013). In this respet,
the value of insurers' own funds under Solveny II will additionally deteriorate in peri-
ods of inreased risk aversion of market partiipants and pure ontagion unoupled from
the fundamentals of the underlying.
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In the rst paper of this thesis, Sovereign risk
ontagion in the Eurozone: a time-varying oeient approah (f. Chapter 3),
we show that the inrease of sovereign bond yields in Spain, Italy, Frane, Belgium, Por-
tugal, Ireland and Greee an be rstly attributed to the inreasing relevane of general
risk aversion of investors to these ountries sine spring 2010 (wake-up-all ontagion)
and seondly to the presene of pure ontagion of sovereign risk from Greee, Ireland and
Portugal.
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The approah followed in this paper is based on the anonial model for ontagion suggested
by Pesaran and Pik (2007) and rened by Metiu (2012). In this model, one ontrols
for interdependene by inluding ountry-spei and global fundamentals of bond yield
spreads and tests for ontagion by signiane tests on shok-transmission oeients.
Unlike Metiu (2012), we allow for the time-variation of oeients to integrate ndings
from the literature whih show that the relevane of dierent bond yield fundamentals has
hanged over time, espeially sine the onset of the reent nanial risis in the Eurozone
(see e.g. Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012). Moreover, it is the purpose of poliy interventions
39
Pure ontagion of sovereign risk means the transmission of negative eets after a shok to a ountry
whih are not reeted in the risk priing of fundamental determinants of sovereign risk of the reipient
ountry.
40
Wake-up-all ontagion is dened as the hange of sovereign risk priing by market partiipants after
negative events in a single ountry or a group of ountries.
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to ut o ontagion hannels, whose suess in turn an only be evaluated when one
allows for time-variation in the model oeients. Amongst others, we nd that ontagion
from Greee, Ireland and Portugal to Spain, Italy, Frane and Belgium does not our
anymore after the introdution of the bailout programs for Greee, Ireland and Portugal,
respetively.
As insurane undertakings will alulate their solveny ratios several weeks after the re-
porting date, unovering eets that temporarily inuene the market value of assets and
hene of available own funds may help these undertakings understand and ommuniate
their solveny position. Due to the desire of insurane undertakings to hold bonds until
their nal maturity, temporary utuations of market values are not relevant for them in
the long-run. Regarding future investment deisions of insurers, an unintended onsequene
of the market-based balane-sheet approah is likely to be the relutane to purhase assets
not only from ontagious risis ountries but also from reipient ountries of ontagion. The
approah presented in the paper an hene serve the supervisor in his deision whether a
ounter-ylial measure in the Solveny II standard formula should be allowed for, i.e. in
ases of hanging risk-priing of bonds by market partiipants towards larger premiums for
general risk aversion (wake-up-all ontagion) as well as in ases of existing hannels of
pure ontagion.
2.5 Critial assessment of the Solveny II standard formula alibration
This setion provides a review of researh onduted with respet to the model setup of
the Solveny II standard formula in general and to the market risk module in partiular
(Setion 2.5.1). Further, it ontains non-tehnial summaries of the author's ontributions
with regard to two important issues in the alibration of risk harges for bonds and equity
(Setion 2.5.2).
2.5.1 Literature review
Aademi researh has so far dealt with various aspets of the alibration of the standard
formula whih are likely to have an impat on the sensitivity of the SCR on investment
deisions. We rst summarize this literature in a top-down view along the standard formula
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and subsequently provide more detailed insights into these ontributions:
 Floreani (2013) disusses the appropriateness of the seletion of a total risk measure
suh as the Value-at-Risk (or the Tail-Value-at-Risk) for solveny purposes (f. eq.
(2.1)).
 Devineau and Loisel (2009) deal with the simplifying assumption of the standard
formula to apply a shoked risk fator to determine the net asset value after shok,
whereas internal models derive a simulated distribution of the net asset value from
whih the desired perentile is taken (f. Setion 2.3).
 Filipovi (2009) disusses the two-step risk aggregation proedure under the standard
formula (f. Figure ??).
 Sandström (2007) and Pfeifer and Straÿburger (2008) examine the validity of the
square root formula (2.2) as a means to aggregate single risks.
 Mittnik (2011) disusses the methodology applied to alibrate the equity risk module
(f. Setion 2.3.2).
 Eling and Pankoke (2013) assess the validity of the index used to derive the Global
equity risk fator (f. Setion 2.3.2).
 Majri and de Lauzon (2013) examine the performane of the symmetri adjustment
mehanism (2.9) to the equity risk fators.
Solveny II risk measure (Floreani, 2013)
Floreani (2013) develops a theoretial model for the insurer's market onsistent balane
sheet and its net asset value distribution (f. Setion 2.2.2). He distinguishes the total risk of
the net asset value into systemati risk and diversiable risk. As the SCR is measured by the
Value-at-Risk for the total risk of the net asset value (f. eq. (2.1)), bigger/better diversied
insurers an redue the SCR by further growth and/or diversiation. For eah xed market
return, however, there is a funtion of the insurer's default probability that depends on
the diversiation degree. Floreani shows that in the ase of severe market shortfalls,
the insurer's default probability inreases with the diversiation degree. Bigger/better
diversied insurers are hene more exposed to market shortfalls than smaller/less diversied
insurers, whih is at odds with the purpose of a prudential regulatory framework.
Floreani (2013) sees a simple, viable and possibly eetive solution in restriting the
SCR reduing eets of diversiation until some threshold is reahed. Further diversia-
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tion shall not additionally be aounted for in the SCR. He shows that for diversiation
degrees beyond this threshold the dependene of the insurer's default probability on the
diversiation degree again beomes negative  an intuitive result as the further inrease
of diversiation would not be rewarded with a further derease of the apital requirement.
Instead, it would impliitly lead to a rise in the overall ondene level for suh insurers
whih possibly permits a higher redit rating by agenies (Floreani, 2013).
Simpliations in the standard formula (Devineau and Loisel, 2009)
The standard formula employs oneptual simpliations with regard to the alulation of
single risks (f. Setion 2.3). Devineau and Loisel (2009) provide onditions under whih
the perentile approah in the standard formula is equivalent to the approah taken in
internal models. In their empirial analysis, the authors nd that apital requirements for
single risks are indeed relatively lose in both the standard formula and an internal model.
For the aggregation of these apital requirements, however, they nd large dierenes.
To solve this issue, they propose an alternative aggregation mehanism that relies on the
simulation of a distribution for net asset values at t = 0 based on simulated risk fators
and the derivation of a orreted orrelation matrix that takes into aount non-linear
diversiation eets.
Two-step aggregation in the standard formula (Filipovi, 2009)
Filipovi (2009) ompares the risk aggregation in internal models with the two-step square
root formula in the standard formula (f. Setion 2.3). He argues that in internal models
risks are aggregated on the basis of a single orrelation matrix (base orrelation matrix)
that aggregates all risks in one go. This orrelation matrix reets the underlying na-
ture of the risks, whih is generi and ompany independent (Filipovi, 2009). He nds
that separating the risk aggregation into two steps leads to impliit ompany (data) - de-
pendent orrelations between the risks that are aggregated in the seond step.
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Hene,
solveny apital requirements are not omparable between ompanies. Instead, only orre-
41
To exemplify this, onsider equity and spread risk within the market risk module and longevity and
lapse risk within the life underwriting risk module, all other risk harges being zero. In the standard formula,
equity and spread risk are rst aggregated to measure market risk and longevity and lapse risk to measure
life underwriting risk. Subsequently, market risk and life underwriting risk are aggregated to the Basi
SCR. Filipovi (2009) shows that this separation of aggregating risks leads to ompany-dependent impliit
orrelation parameters in the relations equity/longevity, equity/lapse, spread/longevity and spread/lapse,
although these orrelations should be ompany-independent as well.
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lation parameters that are applied on a single base level of risks an lead to unequivoally
omparable apital requirements aross all insurers (Filipovi, 2009). As a remedy, Filipo-
vi proposes the expliit denition of minimal base orrelation matries, whih are still
ompany-dependent but yield a unique denition for a base orrelation matrix for all om-
panies. This orrelation matrix an be used to ompare the impliitly realized orrelations
of the standard formula with those of internal models and may hene be of relevane for
the ORSA proess under Pillar II.
Skewness of insurane laim distributions
Large insurane laims are usually rare, whereas small laims our often. Hene, distribu-
tions of insurane laims are usually skewed (see e.g. Verni, 2006). Moreover, asset returns
may also exhibit skewness (see e.g. Conrad et al., 2013). In this light Sandström (2007)
proposes a orretion for the orrelation parameters within the square root formula in order
to aount for the skewness of risk distributions. Aording to the results of Pfeifer and
Straÿburger (2008), however, the square root formula may deliver distorted results even in
the ase of skewness-orreted orrelations. They argue that a pragmati solution would be
to use the standard formula for these risk distributions where suh severe misspeiations
typially do not our, while using a onservative orrelation parameter of 1 in all other
ases.
Calibration of equity risk harges (Mittnik, 2011)
Mittnik (2011) argues that the approah used for the alibration of risk fators and or-
relations in the equity risk module leads to unjustied results. Due to a lak of data,
the standard formula's risk fator for e.g. Global equity as in eq. (2.8) was determined
from the 99.5% Value-at-Risk of rolling annualized returns of the MSCI World index (f.
CEIOPS, 2010), i.e. for eah trading day, the return was determined with respet to the
index value of exatly one year before. Running Monte Carlo experiments with indepen-
dently normal distributed daily returns, Mittnik (2011) shows that the autoorrelation of
the annualized return series is lose to 1. This strong temporal dependene leads to a near
unit-root behavior of the return series, whih implies that future values annot be predited
by past ones and hene Value-at-Risks vary dramatially in time. Mittnik onludes that
an insurane ompany's reliane on annual-return VaRs is bound to indue sudden and er-
rati portfolio adjustments, without any hange in the underlying market proesses. With
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regard to orrelations between risks, he arrives at a similar onlusion sine VaR-implied
tail orrelations as requested by CEIOPS (2010) exhibit a systemati upward bias when
orrelations are determined from annualized return series. In the ase of independent risks,
for example, the estimated orrelation parameter amounts to 0.09 on average suggesting a
positive dependene instead.
Representativeness of the equity index (Eling and Pankoke, 2013)
Eling and Pankoke (2013) provide empirial support for Mittnik's (2011) simulation-based
results. They nd dependene of the equity risk fators and the orrelation parameters on
the seleted time period. Further, they show that the alibration of the Global equity
risk fator based solely on the MSCI world index indues basis risk as insurer portfolios are
dominated by loal investments (see e.g. Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, for reasons for this
home bias). Depending on the performane of the loal stok market index, Eling and
Pankoke nd an over- and under-estimation of the true risk, respetively, by the overall
risk fator.
Symmetri adjustment for equity risk fators (Majri and de Lauzon, 2013)
Majri and de Lauzon (2013) show that the urrent proposal for a symmetri adjustment
(2.9) of the equity risk fators performs better than previous ones in that the volatility of
this model is lower and the overestimation of risk in tranquil periods is redued. However,
the one year losses for the 2007/2008 period ould not be overed. The authors propose
an alternative model whih is non-linear and yields Value-at-Risk preditions using Monte
Carlo simulations. Considering the MSCI World Index as well as the DJ Eurostoxx 50,
Majri and de Lauzon (2013) show that the alternative model yields more prudent results
than the model (2.7) - (2.9) sine historial one year losses are better aptured. Moreover,
the alternative model leads to a stronger redution of the Value-at-Risk after a market
shok and thus yields a greater release of own funds for a renewal of equity investments.
To the author's best knowledge, there are no results of aademi researh whih provide
a justiation or rejetion of the zero risk weight for government bonds under Solveny II
(f. eq. (2.13)). There is neither a disussion of the assumption of perfet orrelation of
assets within the ategory Global equity (f. eq. (2.10)). Researh presented in this thesis
lls these gaps and is outlined in the following setion.
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2.5.2 Own ontributions
The papers in Chapters 4 to 6 ontribute to the disussion of the validity of two ruial
assumptions made in the Solveny II standard formula. The rst two papers deal with the
zero risk weight for sovereign bonds issued by governments of EEA states (f. eq. (2.13)
in Setion 2.3.2). To assess the validity of this assumption, we analyze long-run relations
between German 10-year sovereign bond yields, whih are argued to be a good proxy for
a risk-free asset, and 10-year sovereign bond yields of 25 member states of the European
Union. To this end, we apply two dierent new approahes to bond market onvergene in
the period 1995-2012. As the analysis of long-run relationships requires data from longer
time periods, allowing for strutural breaks in the model seems unavoidable. If breaks are
present but not onsidered, tests for long-run relationships (ointegration) have low power
(Perron, 2006). In this period, breaks are a likely onsequene of the introdution of the
Euro and the reent nanial risis in the Eurozone. In both papers we test for the existene
of breaks. Methods previously used to assess bond market onvergene are disussed in the
following paper and found to be insuient for the purpose of our analysis.
Thus, in the seond paper of this thesis, Credit risk-free sovereign bonds under Sol-
veny II: a ointegration analysis with onsistently estimated strutural breaks
(f. Chapter 4), we utilize the sequential testing framework reently proposed by Kejriwal
and Perron (2008, 2010) whih yields onsistent estimates of the number and loation
of break points in regressions of non-stationary time series. Estimated break points an
be referred to real-events in the spei ountry and to events on an international sale,
respetively.
For eah ountry and regime, it is then possible to distinguish whether the bond yields
of a ertain ountry have already onverged or are about to onverge to the risk-free
asset or urrently diverge from the risk-free asset. Using this approah, there an only be a
justiation for the zero risk harge for the bonds issued by few of the ountries onsidered.
For the majority of ountries, it seems more reasonable to introdue a rating-based risk
harge as is planned for orporate bonds, f. eq. (2.12) and Table 2.3 in Setion 2.3.2,
possibly taking into aount diversiation eets between several (groups of) ountries.
The alibration of suh an approah is beyond the sope of this paper.
In the third paper of this thesis, Finding two breaks with a test designed for one?
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An appliation of the reursive ointegration approah to bond market on-
vergene (f. Chapter 5), we onne the analysis to sovereign bonds of Spain, Italy and
Portugal.
42
In ontrast to the paper mentioned before, whih started with an assessment of
strutural breaks and ontinued with a test for long-run relationships, a standard test for
ointegration is applied here rst and the stability of the long-run relationship is examined
afterwards.
A sole appliation of the standard test indiates long-run relationships with German yields.
To assess their stability, we propose a graphial proedure based on a simplied and easy-
to-implement version of the Hansen-Johansen utuation test statisti for breaks in ointe-
gration relationships (f. Hansen and Johansen, 1999). Despite the fat that the utuation
test was initially onstruted to distinguish between zero and one breaks in a ointegration
relationship, we nd that the graphial proedure an also reveal multiple breaks (even
at the orret loation) but does not always detet all breaks. In the empirial appliati-
on to bond series relationships with Germany, however, it indeed provides two strutural
breaks. The robustness of the breaks is onrmed by a forward and bakward appliation
of Andrews and Kim's (2003) end-of-sample ointegration breakdown test.
The fourth paper of this thesis, A two-step approah to examine the dynamis of
market onvergene (f. Chapter 6), provides evidene that the assumption of perfet
orrelation within the asset lass Global equity (see eq. (2.10) in Setion 2.3.2) is justied.
In a vetor error orretion model (VECM), speed of adjustment oeients show the
reation of eah variable after a shok to the system of these variables. Similarity of speed
of adjustment oeients implies a similar behavior of these variables after the shok. As
orrelations within the standard formula shall reet tail events at a 99.5% ondene level,
the onept of shok-adjustment in VECM is suitable for the examination of this issue.
By means of Monte Carlo simulations, we rst show that ontrolling for possible strutural
breaks in the ointegration vetor is a prerequisite to assess the evolution of speed of
adjustment oeients in a time-varying estimation approah. Otherwise, estimates of
rolling speed of adjustment oeients are likely to be distorted.
In the empirial analysis, speed of adjustment oeients are found to be onverging sine
42
The seletion of these ountries was based on the fat that the observation of strutural breaks for
these ountries were likely and that the standard test for ointegration surprisingly yielded the presene
of ointegration between the bond yields of these ountries and German yields over the whole sample.
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the mid-90s for Germany, Frane and the UK, a tendeny whih was even aelerated after
the outbreak of the reent nanial risis in developed ountries.
43
Hene, for solveny
purposes it seems reliable  at least in the urrent ondition of nanial markets  to
assume a perfet orrelation of equity from these ountries in an adverse event at the
99.5% ondene level. At a later point of time, a renewed appliation of the proposed
method may lead to results whih rather speak against assuming perfet orrelation. The
appliation of this method to a more granular level of equity e.g. within single ountries, to
a larger set of ountries or to equity types within Other equity is left for future researh.
43
We onsider these three ountries as they exhibit the largest Gross Domesti Produts (GDP) and
market apitalizations of listed ompanies among all European ountries.
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Part II
OWN CONTRIBUTIONS
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3 Sovereign risk ontagion in the Eurozone: a time-varying
oeient approah
Abstrat
This paper simultaneously analyzes wake-up-all and pure ontagion of sovereign
risk in the Eurozone during its reent nanial risis. Pure ontagion of sovereign
risk means the transmission of negative eets after a shok to a ountry whih are
not reeted in the risk priing of fundamental determinants of sovereign risk of the
reipient ountry. Wake-up-all ontagion is dened as the hange of sovereign risk
priing by market partiipants after negative events in a single ountry or a group of
ountries. To examine both types of ontagion in a unied framework, we apply an
extension of the anonial model for ontagion proposed by Pesaran and Pik (2007)
and Metiu (2012) in that we allow for time-varying oeients. Controlling for hanges
in the risk priing by investors, we detet several hannels of pure ontagion between
2008 and 2012 but with dereasing number over time. Further, we nd evidene for
a disruption of sovereign risk ontagion hannels from Greee, Ireland and Portugal
to Spain, Italy, Frane and Belgium after their respetive bailouts as was desired by
poliymakers. For all Eurozone ountries onsidered, we observe an inrease in the
relevane of general risk aversion towards sovereign debt sine May 2010. Our model
extension yields a devie that is suitable to determine whether poliy interventions
are required and to judge their suess ex-post.
44
44
This hapter ontains the working paper version of Ludwig, A., 2014. A unied approah to investigate
pure and wake-up-all ontagion: Evidene from the Eurozone's rst nanial risis, Journal of International
Money and Finane 48, 125-146. Used with permission from Elsevier.
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3.1 Introdution
Until the outbreak of the global nanial risis, sovereign bond yield spreads in the Euro-
zone saw an unpreedented level of onvergene. In 2007 the mean 10-year sovereign bond
yield spread in relation to Germany amounted to a mere 24 basis points (bp) for Greee,
16bp for Portugal and 12bp for Ireland. At the end of 2008, however, spreads already ro-
se to 201bp for Greee, 94bp for Portugal and 121bp for Ireland. Maximum values were
reahed at more than 5,500bp for Greee in Marh 2012, 1,400bp for Portugal in January
2012 and more than 900bp for Ireland in July 2011. What led to suh sharp inreases of
bond yield spreads?
A large body of literature is devoted to the fundamental determinants of bond yield spreads.
Bond yield spreads may ontain a premium for the redit risk of the underlying debt (Codo-
gno et al., 2003), for the liquidity risk arising in markets without suient depth or breadth
(Barrios et al., 2009) as well as for the general risk aversion of market partiipants (Favero
et al., 2010). Using time-varying oeient and dummy variable approahes, respetively,
Beirne and Fratzsher (2013), Bernoth and Erdogan (2012), Giordano et al. (2013) and von
Hagen et al. (2011) nd that hanges in the priing of sovereign risk by market partiipants
after negative events in a single ountry or a group of ountries (wake-up-all ontagion)
ontribute to explaining inreasing yield spreads during the reent nanial risis. Espei-
ally, the general risk aversion towards government bonds of Eurozone members in relation
to German Bunds and the relevane of sal variables that represent redit risk inreased
onsiderably.
However, hanges in the risk-priing of fundamentals may not sue to explain the evo-
lution of bond yields in times of inreased market unertainty. Negative shoks in a single
ountry may diretly lead to inreasing spreads in other ountries (pure ontagion). Evi-
dene for pure ontagion in the Eurozone between 2008 and 2012 is provided by e.g. Afonso
et al. (2012), Arezki et al. (2011), Wing Fong and Wong (2012), Kalbaska and Gatkowski
(2012), Mink and de Haan (2013) and Missio and Watzka (2011). To identify pure onta-
gion relationships, Pesaran and Pik (2007) propose their anonial model for ontagion
that diretly aounts for the fundamentals of bond yields and identies ontagion eets
under (observed and latent) interdependene (Metiu, 2012). In their model equation, the
signiane of positive ontagion oeients implies the existene of shok-transmission
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hannels from one to another entity from an arbitrarily large set of entities (ountries,
rms et.).
45
Applying the model proposed by Pesaran and Pik (2007), Metiu (2012) provides evidene
for ontagion of sovereign risk in the Eurozone, e.g. from Greee to Belgium, Frane,
Portugal and Spain. Pesaran and Pik (2007) and Metiu (2012) estimate the anonial
only one for their entire sample. A time-varying approah, however, is already inevitable
due to hanges in the risk priing of yield spread determinants over time (Bernoth and
Erdogan, 2012). Moreover, it is unlikely that ontagion eets i) are signiant over the
entire sample period and ii) our in the same intensity whenever signiant. Instead,
poliy measures are likely to have an eet on ontagion relations and may lead to their
disruption. Moreover, an assessment of the eet of poliy measures at a given time is not
feasible when the time-variation of oeients is not taken into aount.
In this work we therefore investigate the eets that arise from a ombination of both
the time-variation in oeients of yield spread fundamentals as well as in pure ontagion
relationships. To measure redit risk, liquidity risk and the general risk aversion of market
partiipants, we use these variables that the literature on bond yield fundamentals onsiders
as the best proxies at high frequenies. We then propose the appliation of Pesaran and
Pik's model in rolling windows of equal length whih allows a simultaneous study of wake-
up-all ontagion and pure ontagion.
46
The use of rolling windows allows for transitions of
oeient values without the need to pre-speify a stohasti proess for the oeients.
Further, in every window only the information set is used that is observable until the end
of the window. Therefore at eah point of time the ontagion eets observed in the most
reent sub-period an be extrated. Our approah an be used for predition purposes and
is a suitable means to judge the suess of poliy measures. It may also serve as a trigger
45
The anonial model therefore diers from other high-frequeny asset prie-based ontagion measures
suh as SRISK proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2011) and Aharya, Engle and Rihardson (2012) and
CoVaR suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) in that it is able to take into aount simultaneous
ontagion eets arising from a multiple set of entities. Using the extension of the anonial model suggested
in this paper, it also onsiders the dierene between wake-up-all ontagion and pure ontagion.
46
Independently from our work, Leshinski and Bertram (2013) also propose to apply the Pesaran and
Pik model in rolling windows. Yet, their results are questionable as they imply e.g. a positive eet of
Greek shoks on the spreads of other risis and non-risis ountries (see Table 2 in their paper), stronger
ontagion eets in the US subprime risis period than during the atual nanial risis in the Eurozone
(see Figure 4 in their paper) as well as similarly strong ontagion eets to non-risis ountries in the
tranquil period from 2003 till 2006 (see Figure 2 in their paper). Their results dier from the existing
literature on ontagion in the nanial risis in the Eurozone (see e.g. Missio and Watzka, 2011, Arghyrou
and Kontonikas, 2012) and from ours for whih we will give reasons in Setion 3.2.4.
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to suh measures as the presene of ontagion ould be eetively striken down by poliy
interventions (Dornbush et al., 2000, Pesaran and Pik, 2007).
Our results inlude evidene for the presene of pure sovereign risk ontagion in the Euro-
zone. We show that ontagion eets are indeed time-dependent and should hene not be
modeled assuming onstant oeients for the entire sample. We nd, for example, that
pure ontagion from Ireland, Portugal and Greee to the other four ountries onsidered
in this paper (Frane, Spain, Italy and Belgium) eased after the bailout programs for
the former set of ountries had been established. Despite the appearane of further redit
events in Greee, Ireland and Portugal after their bailout, negative shoks were not trans-
mitted to the other ountries anymore. During 2011 and 2012 ontagion eets originating
in Spain and Italy were most relevant instead.
For the fundamental fators explaining the levels of bond yield spreads, we argue that only
a redution of the general risk aversion an provide a systemati derease of spreads in all
Eurozone ountries onsidered, et. par. We nd a substantial inrease of the relevane of
general risk aversion in the Eurozone for the yield spreads of all ountries sine May 2010.
Country-spei redit risk measured by CDS spreads in relation to Germany showed a
dereasing trend in the oeients for almost all ountries onsidered in the analysis and
is likely to have been substituted by the inreased risk aversion of investors towards the
Eurozone as a whole.
The paper is strutured as follows. Setion 3.2 explains the eonometri framework of our
analysis. Suitable bond yield fundamentals at a high frequeny are disussed in Setion
3.3. In Setion 3.4 we present our empirial results whih inlude several robustness heks
to our model. Setion 3.5 ontains onluding remarks.
3.2 Eonometri framework
We investigate the timing of ontagion and its diretion in a dynami extension of the ap-
proah suggested by Metiu (2012). To test for ontagion of sovereign risk in the Eurozone,
Metiu applies Pesaran and Pik's (2007) anonial model for ontagion (Setion 3.2.1) and
ontributes a rened approah to identifying redit events. This approah is based on vio-
lations of one-step-ahead Value-at-Risks derived from the distribution of daily innovations
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(Setion 3.2.2). Further, Metiu (2012) reommends the use of new bak-testing methods
for Value-at-Risk reently developed by Candelon et al. (2011) to validate the seletion
of redit events (Setion 3.2.3). As the anonial model for ontagion in its urrent shape
assumes stability in the relationship between bond yield spreads and their fundamentals as
well as stable shok-transmission hannels throughout the whole sample, whih is rather
unlikely to happen, we allow for time-varying oeients instead. Our strategy to extrat
time-varying parameter oeients and point-wise ondene intervals is based on the ap-
pliation of Pesaran and Pik's (2007) model in rolling windows of equal length (Setion
3.2.4). The following desription of our eonometri setup follows a top-down approah,
i.e. we start with the nal equation to test for ontagion and omment on steps taken to
operationalize this equation.
3.2.1 Canonial model for ontagion
Metiu (2012) extents the anonial model of Pesaran and Pik (2007) to assess the pre-
sene and diretion of pure ontagion of sovereign risk. The diret shok-transmission from
ountry j to ountry i is equivalent to the signiane of parameters δi,j in the following
equation:
47
yi,t =
q∑
l=1
αi,lyi,t−l + β
′
igt + γ
′
icsi,t +
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
δi,jCj,t + ui,t (3.1)
Here yi,t denotes the sovereign bond yield spread of ountry i = 1, . . . , N at time t =
1, . . . , T . The rst sum aounts for the autoorrelation of bond yield spreads. Yield spreads
are explained by ountry-spei fators csi,t as well as ommon global fators gt. The
indiator variable Cj,t takes the value 1 if ountry j is in a redit event at time t, otherwise 0.
Credit events are dened as unexpeted large rises of yield spreads (for the preise denition
via Value-at-Risks, see Setion 3.2.2). The inlusion of at least one ountry-spei variable
is neessary to ensure the identiability of the parameters δi,j (Pesaran and Pik, 2007).
Using global as well as ountry-spei fators, the model aounts for the fundamental
determinants of yield spreads. Taking into aount ross-equation residual orrelations,
it identies ontagion eets under observed and unobserved interdependene between
47
For the ease of notation, we skip the onstant term in this and the following regression equations.
We summarize the parameterization of eq. (3.1)  (3.3) for the purpose of this paper in Table 3.3 in the
appendix.
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ountries (Metiu, 2012). To estimate eq. (3.1), we use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
whih is a two-step estimator that inorporates ross-equation orrelations derived from
ountry-wise ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations in a rst step (f. Zellner, 1962).
Credit event indiators are typially endogenous. Standard OLS estimation would lead to
inonsistent estimates of the oeients δi,j and the inferene whether ontagion our-
red or not would be biased (Pesaran and Pik, 2007). A standard approah to address
endogeneity is to use instrumental variable estimation. In this paper we apply the gene-
ralized instrumental variable estimation (GIVE) proedure as proposed by Pesaran and
Pik (2007) and Metiu (2012) who use lagged dependent variables of all ountries i 6= j to
instrument Cj,t. Sine daily yield spreads are highly persistent time series, we use lagged
rst dierenes of spreads as instruments to ensure the exogeneity of instruments (as in
Pesaran and Pik, 2007).
As the redit event indiators are a non-linear funtion of the dependent variables, power
series of the instruments are inluded in the set of instruments to inrease their strength
to approximate the indiators and to obtain onsistent 2SLS estimates (Kelejian, 1971).
We hene estimate the following rst stage equation
Cj,t =
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
q∑
l=1
m∑
r=1
µi,l,r(∆yi,t−l)
r + ǫj,t (3.2)
followed by the estimation of eq. (3.1) via SUR with the plug-in of the estimate Cˆj,t in plae
of the original redit event indiator Cj,t. In sum, we perform a three-stage least-squares
(3SLS) estimation. The derivation of the redit event indiators will be explained in the
following.
3.2.2 Determination of redit event indiators
In ase of frequent (partial) redit defaults or restruturing of sovereign debt, the redit
event indiators Ci,t ould be based on suh real events. However, due to their sarity, a
broader denition of bond market distress has to be found. Pesaran and Pik (2007) derive
suh events from the time series of bond yield spreads and set the indiator to 1 for these
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times t when the rst dierene of the yield spread exeeds twie its standard deviation.48
This is a suitable approah for the ase of a onstant variane σ2i,t = σ
2
i of innovations ui,t
of eq. (3.1). However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that a hange of the variane of
innovations, whih is likely to happen in times of nanial distress, distorts the judgement
of whether ontagion took plae or not. Metiu (2012) suggests a remedy to this issue.
He infers redit events from violations of one-step-ahead Value-at-Risks V aRi,t|t−1 of the
probability distribution of innovations ui,t onditional on the information set Ft−1 available
at time t− 1. Innovations are assumed to be t(ν)-distributed suh that
V aRi,t|t−1 = F
−1(p, ν)σi,t (3.3)
where F (·, ν) denotes the umulated distribution funtion of a t(ν)-distributed random
variable and p equals the ondene level. The degrees of freedom of the t-distribution an
be hosen aording to the results of appropriate baktesting proedures for the alibration
of Value-at-Risks (see Setion 3.2.3). Hene, to test for ontagion, redit events are dened
as the points in time when the inrease of a bond yield spread exeeds the upper bound
of its predition interval. In other words, redit events take plae on trading days with
signiant deviations of the spread from the urrent risk priing of market partiipants
through global and ountry-spei fators as well as values of bond yield spreads of the
most reent trading days.
To estimate the standard deviation σi,t in eq. (3.3), Metiu (2012) proposes a GARCH(1,1)
proess for the onditional variane of the yield spread
σ2i,t = ϕi + θiu
2
i,t−1 + τiσ
2
i,t−1 (3.4)
whose parameters have to fulll the onditions ϕi > 0, θi, τi ≥ 0, and θi + τi < 1.49 The
length of the sub-intervals to estimate eq. (3.4) is kept equal at length wl, i.e. we onsider
rolling intervals [t − wl + 1, t]. As old observations are thus ontinuously negleted, we
48
Alternatively, rating downgrades ould be used to dene redit events here. However, rating downgra-
des an also lag behind market developments: Afonso et al. (2012) provide evidene on two-way ausality
between ratings and sovereign bond yield spreads of 24 EU ountries; Karmann and Maltritz (2012) show
that bond market data implied inreases of the probability of default of Greee several months before the
downgrades of Greee by S&P and Fith in Deember 2009.
49
If these onditions were breahed for a pair (i, t), we set σi,t in eq. (3.3) to σi,t−1 from the previous
iteration.
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aount for the possibility of hanging volatility-regimes.
To set up an equation for the onditional mean, disregarding the redit event indiators in
eq. (3.1) (they are not known yet) gives a possible estimation approah (baseline model)
yi,r =
q∑
l=1
αti,lyi,r−l + (β
t
i)
′gr + (γ
t
i)
′csi,r + u
t
i,r (3.5)
with r ∈ [t − wl + 1, t]. Metiu (2012) suggests a modiation of eq. (3.5) to inorporate
ndings by Lumsdaine and Ng (1999). To enhane the robustness against potential model
mis-speiations, additional terms will be inluded in eq. (3.5). Lumsdaine and Ng (1999)
show that the integration of reursive residuals obtained from the baseline model (3.5)
and their squared values helps ontrol for slope and mean shifts, ignoring an MA(1) error
struture, omitting regressors in the onditional mean equation as well as over-dierening
the data when they are atually trend-stationary. Further, umulated sums of reursive
residuals provide means to ontrol for past additive outliers and an further improve the
robustness against the mis-speiations outlined above. Inluding these terms, eq. (3.5)
beomes
50
yi,r =
q∑
l=1
αti,lyi,r−l+(β
t
i)
′gr+(γ
t
i)
′csi,r+κi,1ωˆi,r−1+κi,2ωˆ
2
i,r−1+κi,3
r−1∑
s=t−wl+1
ωˆi,s+u
t
i,r (3.6)
with r ∈ [t− wl + 1, t], where the reursive residual at time r:
ωˆi,r = yi,r −
[
q∑
l=1
αˆr−1i,l yi,r−l + (βˆ
r−1
i )
′gr + (γˆ
r−1
i )
′csi,r
]
(3.7)
is determined from reursive oeient estimates of eq. (3.5) that are based on the obser-
vations in the time interval [t−wl+1, r− 1]. The rationale behind reursive residuals lies
in the fat that they an be interpreted as one-step-ahead foreast errors (Kianifard and
Swallow, 1996). Integrating reursive residuals in an auxiliary regression as in eq. (3.6), we
inorporate information that has not been used before.
It remains to dene a minimum number k of observations that are needed to enter the
50
Metiu (2012) did not inlude the partial sum of reursive residuals. We integrate this term in eq. (3.6)
to further inrease the robustness of the speiation for the onditional mean equation, i.e. to mitigate the
eets of past additive outliers whih are likely to distort the estimate of the ontemporaneous onditional
variane in eq. (3.4).
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determination of the estimators in eq. (3.7). Reursive residuals ωˆi,r are then obtained for
r ∈ [t − wl + k + 1, t]. It should be noted that in order to only use information inluded
in Ft−1 for estimating the onditional mean in eq. (3.6), reursive residuals must not enter
this equation ontemporaneously. Therefore the reursive residual lagged by one period
gives the most urrent term in eq. (3.6). The estimation of eq. (3.6) is hene based on
wl − k − 1 instead of wl − k observations.
Lastly, the redit event indiator for ountry i an be derived omparing the residuals of
eq. (3.6) with the estimates of the one-step-ahead Value-at-Risk aording to eq. (3.3)
Ci,t =
1 for û
t
i,t > V̂ aRi,t|t−1
0 otherwise
(3.8)
for t = wl + 1, . . . , T .
3.2.3 Baktesting the auray of the Value-at-Risk model
Aording to Christoersen (1998), Value-at-Risks (VaR) determined as in eq. (3.3) have to
fulll ertain riteria of goodness to be valid out-of-sample foreasts of a given time series.
First, from the seleted ondene level p the so-alled overage rate α = 1 − p follows,
whih gives the frequeny of VaR violations from eq. (3.8). Seleting a ondene level of
e.g. 99% should lead to one VaR violation in 100 trading days on average (unonditional
overage hypothesis, UC). Seond, violations should be distributed independently over the
sample (independene hypothesis, IND). Otherwise the VaR foreast would not take into
aount hanging volatility patterns (heterosedastiity) and would provide lusters of VaR
violations instead. A third hypothesis that should be tested for is the onditional overage
hypothesis (CC) whih merges the UC and IND hypothesis.
The baktesting approah proposed by Candelon et al. (2011) is a duration-based approah
that makes use of generalized moment onditions on orthonormal polynomials whih are
assoiated with the distribution of the durations under the null of a valid CC hypothesis.
Durations are dened as
dk = tk − tk−1 k = 1, . . . , K (3.9)
with tk as the point of time of the k-th VaR violation aording to eq. (3.8) and t0 = 0. In
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ontrast to existing baktesting methods, the approah proposed by Candelon et al. (2011)
has better power properties and it is not neessary to dene a distribution under the
alternative. Under the null of a valid CC hypothesis, i.e. VaR violations are independent
and our at an expeted frequeny of α, durations are distributed geometrially with
parameter α. A random variable D that follows a geometri distribution an in turn be
haraterized by moment onditions on the orthonormal Meixner polynomials
E [Mj(D,α)] = 0 ∀j ≥ 1 (3.10)
where the polynomials Mj(d, α) are dened reursively as
Mj+1(d, α) =
(1− α)(2j + 1) + α(j − d+ 1)
(j + 1)
√
1− α Mj(d, α)−
(
j
j + 1
)
Mj−1(d, α) (3.11)
with M0(d, α) = 1 and M−1(d, α) = 0. Testing the CC hypothesis is equivalent to testing
the moment onditions in eq. (3.10). Given a nite sample of data, the moment onditions
have to be redued to a feasible order J , i.e.
E [Mj(D,α)] = 0 j = 1, . . . , J (3.12)
Candelon et al. (2011) show that for a overage rate of α = 1% and α = 5%, respetively,
an optimal seletion for J is 5 and 3, respetively. Due to the asymptoti independene
and unit variane of the moments in eq. (3.12), whih follows from the orthonormality of
the Meixner polynomials, they obtain the following test statisti for the CC hypothesis
JCC(q) =
1
K
J∑
j=1
(
K∑
k=1
Mj(dk, α)
)2
−−−→
K→∞
χ2J (3.13)
The UC hypothesis reets the fat that the expeted value of eah duration variable D
equals 1/α. Inserting this expeted value in eq. (3.11) in the ase j = 0 yields an expression
equivalent to the UC hypothesis
E [M1(D,α)] = 0 (3.14)
This is a speial ase of eq. (3.12) suh that the test statisti for the UC hypothesis results
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as a speial ase of eq. (3.13)
JUC(q) =
1
K
(
K∑
k=1
M1(dk, α)
)2
−−−→
K→∞
χ21 (3.15)
Lastly, the CC hypothesis also inludes the IND hypothesis as a speial ase when the
observed VaR violation frequeny αˆ is used instead of the theoretial overage rate α.
Hene, the moment onditions equivalent to the IND hypothesis are
E [Mj(D, αˆ)] = 0 j = 1, . . . , J (3.16)
and the test statisti reads as follows
JIND(q) =
1
K
J∑
j=1
(
K∑
k=1
Mj(dk, αˆ)
)2
−−−→
K→∞
χ2J−1 (3.17)
The adjustment of the degrees of freedom for the JIND test results from the fat that
E[M1(dk, αˆ)] = 0 (Candelon et al., 2011).
In order to take into aount the usually small number of VaR violations espeially with
respet to a overage rate of 1%, Candelon et al. (2011) use the Monte Carlo simulation
approah suggested by Dufour (2006) to alulate small sample size-adjusted p-values.
Here, the test statistis are alulated under the null in M (e.g. 9999) iterations and
the p-value orresponds to the relative frequeny of how many times the simulated test
statisti exeeds the value of the test statisti originally obtained from the data. For the UC
hypothesis, we draw geometrially distributed random variables with parameter α under
the null until their sum exeeds the number of observations for whih VaR were projeted,
i.e. T −wl. For the CC and IND hypothesis, respetively, we simulate T −wl independent
Bernoulli-distributed random variables with parameters α and αˆ, respetively.51
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Candelon et al. (2011) also propose a remedy to estimation unertainty using subsampling simulation
methods to derive p-values of the test statistis. For the ase relevant in our appliation (α = 1%, J = 5),
however, size distortions of the JCC test inrease when applying this simulation method. Therefore, we do
not further follow the subsampling approah in this paper.
65
3.2.4 Extension to a time-varying oeient approah
The approah used by Metiu (2012) allows time-variation in the one-step-ahead Value-at-
Risk values in order to takle the issue of volatility lustering (see eq. (3.3)). Given the
redit event indiators determined from eq. (3.8), Metiu estimates model (3.1) and tests
for ontagion from ountry j to ountry i only one for the whole sample. His results an
only be valid, however, if there is no time-variation within the oeients of model (3.1).
Yet, for the set of ountry-spei as well as global fators, Beirne and Fratzsher (2013),
Bernoth and Erdogan (2012), Giordano et al. (2013) and von Hagen et al. (2011) show
instability regarding the signiane and the value of orresponding oeients over time,
espeially sine the onset of the US subprime risis in 2007. Additionally, it is unlikely
that the eet of sovereign risk ontagion between two ountries remains signiant and
onstant in its intensity over the entire sample period.
We therefore extend the approah by Metiu (2012) to allow for time-varying oeients
in eq. (3.1). To this end, we use rolling windows of a xed length wm and estimate eq.
(3.1) in eah window separately. At eah point of time the ontagion eets observed in the
most reent sub-period an be extrated. Our approah may hene serve more easily as an
early-warning-system to monitor both wake-up-all and pure ontagion eets. As a nie
side-eet of the determination of redit events at time t by one-step-ahead VaR onditional
on Ft−1, it sues to derive redit event indiators only one before applying the rolling
windows to eq. (3.1). The omputation of the redit event indiators is the most ostly
operation in terms of omputing time suh that their estimation in eah window would
lead to a high overall time-onsumption of the omputations. Instead, in eah window we
only need to perform the 3SLS estimation of eq. (3.1).
Alternative estimation approahes suh as the appliation of the Kalman lter (Aÿmann
and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2012) or a non-parametri kernel estimation approah (Bernoth and
Erdogan, 2012) would also allow for time-varying oeient values but have ertain dra-
wbaks. Kalman ltering is based on a pre-dened assumption regarding the proess of
state variables. The kernel estimation approah uses past and future observations to esti-
mate oeients at a single point of time. Future observations, however, might already be
aeted by poliy measures onduted after the point of time onsidered. When past and
future information are mixed, it is diult to judge the suess of poliy measures. For
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these reasons, we deided to use the rolling window approah.
52
3.3 Observation period, variables and hypotheses
We use data for the period 3 January 2005 until 31 Deember 2012 extrated from dierent
data soures (see Table 3.3 in the appendix).
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As opposed to the literature in whih the
distintion between pre-risis and risis period (possibly with dierent risis sub-periods)
is pre-dened exogenously by the authors, we determine strutural breaks in the relation
between yield spreads and their fundamentals as well as in shok transmission hannels
endogenously. We hene aount for the dynamis of ontagion eets and do not rely on
the pre-denition of sub-periods.
We use time series of government bond yields at a onstant maturity of 10 years and derive
yield spreads for Belgium, Frane, Greee, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in relation
to German yields. The ountries seleted are the largest debtors and the most aeted
Eurozone ountries in the reent risis, respetively.
Our aim at this point is to orretly speify eq. (3.1) suh that those determinants of
sovereign bond yield spreads are inluded in the set of ountry-spei and global risk
fators whih are generally aepted in the literature. The size of yield spreads is typially
explained by premiums that are related to redit risk, liquidity risk as well as the general
52
As mentioned in the introdution, Leshinski and Bertram (2013) also apply the Pesaran and Pik
(2007) model in rolling windows along the sample. The following modeling issues are likely to be the reason
for the large dierenes of their results in omparison to ours. First, separately for eah window, Leshinski
and Bertram set the redit event indiator Ci,t to 1 if the spread hange at time t exeeds the 80% quantile
of the empirial distribution funtion in the respetive window. This setting implies a frequeny of redit
events of one-in-ve-days whih is likely to average out substantial eets ourring after a one-in-100-days
redit event as in Metiu (2012) and our work. Further, it reintrodues the issue of volatility lusters that
was already resolved by Metiu (2012) and it leads to an inonsistent denition of redit events as they
now depend on the spei window. Seond, for non-risis ountries Leshinski and Bertram apply OLS
instead of the GIVE proedure whih impliitly assumes the absene of feedbak eets from non-risis
to risis ountries. Moreover, the distintion between risis- and non-risis ountries is rather subjetive
(seletion bias). Third, they apply F -tests for the (joint) signiane of ontagion parameters δi,j but
neglet an examination of the sign of these parameters. Negative shoks are only transmitted in the ase
of positive ontagion parameters, whereas the F -test also assumes high values for signiantly negative
parameters. Fourth, the authors do not infer the explanatory variables for bond yield spreads from the
existing literature on spread determinants, espeially they do not onsider premiums for ountry-spei
redit risk and liquidity risk (see Setion 3.3).
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For Greee, we onsider eq. (3.1) only until its quasi-default, i.e. when Greek debt was restrutured
under the seond bailout program. This program was agreed upon in a meeting of the Eurogroup and the
IMF on 20/21 February 2012. Greek redit-default swaps beame obsolete sine then whih is reeted in
at CDS spreads sine the beginning of Marh 2012.
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risk aversion of market partiipants (see e.g. Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012, Favero et al.,
2010, Gerlah et al., 2010, Maltritz, 2012, von Hagen et al., 2011).
The budget balane / GDP ratio or the debt / GDP ratio of a spei ountry are ommon
measures for redit risk. The higher the debt ratio and the budget deit, respetively, the
larger is the probability that the ountry's debt reahes an unsustainable level and the
more likely is the ountry's failure to pay bak its loans. However, the use of these ma-
roeonomi variables may be distorted in ases when it is diult to distinguish between
private and publi debt (Barrios et al., 2009). In the reent nanial risis governments
issued guarantees for the debt of private banks (e.g. Germany for the IKB and several
Landesbanken in mid-2007; Ireland for its six largest banks in September 2008; Frane and
Belgium for Dexia in Otober 2008). Agents on nanial markets are likely to onsider
suh information in their judgement on a ountry's reditworthiness.
54
Another reason for
the non-suitability of maroeonomi variables for the use in this study is given by the
frequeny of these data. Maroeonomi variables are at best available at a monthly fre-
queny. The assessment of ontagion, however, requires data of a higher frequeny to single
out the eets of a rapid hange in bond yield spreads. Therefore we deide to use redit
default swap (CDS) spreads whih have beneial properties in measuring redit risk at a
high frequeny as opposed to other indiators (see e.g. Blano et al., 2005, Longsta et al.,
2005). Sovereign CDS provide insurane protetion against the default of a ountry. The
higher the CDS spread, whih equals the prie of the insurane, the more likely ontrators
onsider the default of the underlying sovereign debt. Barrios et al. (2009) report a very
high orrelation between sovereign bond yield spreads and CDS spreads. As this may be
the result of the endogeneity of CDS spreads in this ase, we use lagged instead of on-
temporaneous CDS spreads. We use CDS with a maturity of 5 years as they are the most
liquid CDS on the CDS market.
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Additionally, we onsider ountry-individual stok market returns (as used by e.g. Afonso
et al., 2012, Metiu, 2012) whih serve as a market-based proxy for the outlook of an entire
eonomy. The smaller the returns, the weaker market partiipants pereive the eonomi
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We refer to Karmann and Maltritz (2012) for a general disussion of pros and ons of using market
data instead of ratings or maroeonomi variables.
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During 2008:H2 and 2009:H1, the height of the global nanial risis, CDS markets beame illiquid.
As a robustness hek, we therefore inluded an interation term alulated from a dummy variable with
entries 1 during this period and the CDS spreads and inlude it among the ountry-spei variables csi,t
in eq. (3.1). Contagion eets are very similar to the ones obtained from the baseline model.
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perspetives of the ountry. A weak eonomi growth implies less tax revenues of the state,
et. par., and more diulties to pay bak its loans. Hene, a higher interest for a ountry's
debt is likely in this ase.
Liquidity risk is pried into sovereign yield spreads in the ase of debt markets that do
not oer a suient volume of buy and sell orders or exhibit sensitivity of bond pries
on large-sale transations (Barrios et al., 2009). This is reeted in wide bid-ask spreads
of bond pries, whih are ommonly onsidered as the best measure for liquidity risk in
the literature (Bernoth and Pik, 2012). We take ountry-individual bid-ask spreads of
sovereign bonds from Bloomberg where the relevant time series is derived from the 10 year
government bond most reently issued. To aount for potential endogeneity, we use lagged
bid-ask spreads.
To apture the general risk aversion of market partiipants, we use log-dierened values
of the VSTOXX index (see e.g. Beber et al., 2009, Metiu, 2012). The VSTOXX belongs
to the lass of indies whih measure the implied volatility of options on a given stok
market and an be pereived as a measure of the market expetation of risk. In the ase
of VSTOXX, the underlying index is the EURO STOXX 50 whih overs the 50 largest
ompanies from Eurozone ountries. Another prominent example is the VIX index whih
reets the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Sine our analysis fouses on yield
spreads of Eurozone sovereign bonds, we deide to use the VSTOXX index. In Setion 3.4
we provide results of a robustness hek using the VIX index and another ommonly used
measure for global risk aversion, respetively.
To be in line with the derivation of the dependent variable, we use spreads for the ountry-
individual determinants over the respetive German values. This approah is used in the
majority of researh on bond yield determinants (Maltritz, 2012).
Table 3.4 in the appendix ontains desriptive statistis for the four ountry-spei va-
riables, i.e. bond yield spreads, CDS spreads, bid-ask spreads and stok market returns in
relation to German values, and for the log-dierened values of the VSTOXX index. For
eah ountry-spei variable, the largest absolute mean value is attained by Greee, the
rst ountry that was bailed-out and the only one with a hairut of its debt till the end
of 2012. Seond and third largest values for eah variable are observable for Ireland and
Portugal, the two other ountries among the seven onsidered that were bailed-out till the
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end of 2012. There are relatively similar mean and maximum values for the orresponding
Spanish and Italian variables whih rank fourth and fth. Smallest values are attained by
Frane and Belgium. From these desriptive onsiderations, a fundamental link between
explanatory ountry-spei variables and bond yield spreads already beomes apparent.
Regarding the loalization of redit events in time, we expet a onentration of redit
events (i) in the sequel of the ollapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 whih aused
signiant market turmoil and was followed by reessions in most European ountries, (ii)
in 2010 when the sal position of peripheral Eurozone ountries ame under loser srutiny
by market partiipants, Greee and Ireland reeived bailouts and austerity measures were
initiated to mitigate budget deits and (iii) in the seond half of 2011 when several
peripheral Eurozone ountries faed severe rating downgrades after their eonomi outlook
and sal position had rather deteriorated than improved by the austerity measures.
With respet to the presene of ontagion eets, i.e. periods with signiant oeients
δi,j in eq. (3.1), we expet large intensities of pure risk ontagion from the peripheral
Eurozone risis ountries after the revelation of their eonomi and sal situation during
2010 and the negative eets indued by austerity measures at the end of 2010 and in
2011. However, emergeny measures agreed upon by the Eurozone ountries and the IMF
between May 2010 and May 2011 were established to support Greee, Ireland and Portugal
and to redue ontagious eets from these risis ountries to Eurozone ore ountries. A
dereasing intensity of sovereign risk ontagion in the aftermath of bailout measures should
thus be expeted. The large-sized Seurities Markets Programme of the ECB is likely
to have further dereased pressure on bond markets and to have ut shok-transmission
hannels between ountries, espeially after its intensiation in August 2011.
3.4 Empirial results
This setion ontains a brief disussion of the stationarity property of bond yield spreads
(Setion 3.4.1), results from the determination of redit events and the baktesting of the
Value-at-Risk parameterization (Setion 3.4.2), the main results of this paper related to
the anonial model for ontagion in a time-varying oeient approah (Setion 3.4.3) as
well as results from robustness heks (Setion 3.4.4).
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3.4.1 Levels vs. rst dierenes
In the majority of ontributions, bond yield spreads are assumed to be stationary and the
persistene of spread series is takled by inluding lags of the dependent variable. However,
some authors onsider the possibility of spurious regression when eq. (3.1) is estimated in
levels of bond yield spreads and use rst dierenes of the yield spreads instead (e.g.
Pesaran and Pik, 2007, Barrios et al., 2009). In the following, we test for unit roots in the
bond yield spreads and ontribute a justiation of the use of bond yield spreads in levels.
The nanial risis in the Eurozone inluded several events whih are likely to have aused
strutural breaks in levels and trends of bond yield series. Standard unit root tests suh
as the augmented Dikey-Fuller (ADF) test do not have power against trend-stationarity
under strutural breaks (Perron, 2006). Indeed, the ADF test does not rejet the null of
non-stationarity for all seven series of bond yield spreads at any onventional level. This
result does not hange in the ase when a GLS-orretion of the ADF test is inluded as
suggested by Elliot et al. (1996).
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Therefore we also onsider the unit root test proposed by Lee and Straziih (2003). This
test has power against trend-stationary alternatives with strutural breaks and is derived
with two breaks under both the null and the alternative. We selet the model with en-
dogenous breaks in the level and trend and augment the test to take into aount serial
orrelation of errors. Results onrm the trend-stationarity of all series at the 5% level.
As a onsequene, we do not dierene bond yield spreads and ontinue our analysis with
their levels as presented in eq. (3.1).
3.4.2 Determination of redit events and baktesting of Value-at-Risk
As outlined in Setion 3.2.2, a redit event takes plae at time t if the innovation uti,t in eq.
(3.6) exeeds an ex-ante determined one-step-ahead Value-at-Risk (VaR). The Value-at-
Risk is obtained from the onditional distribution of innovations at eah point of time after
ontrolling for the fundamental risk-priing of yield spreads onditional on the information
set Ft−1. To estimate the one-step-ahead VaR, we follow Metiu (2012) and selet an in-
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Results for unit-root tests are not presented to save spae but are available on request.
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Table 3.1: Tests for the quality of the Value-at-Risk parameterization
Country
VaR
violations
Empirial
violation
rate αˆ
JUC
p-value
(JUC)
JCC
p-value
(JCC)
JIND
p-value
(JIND)
Belgium 18 0.0113 1.2449 0.2659 2.7576 0.3629 0.8927 0.8276
Frane 9 0.0057 1.5531 0.2136 4.8837 0.1539 1.5712 0.5684
Greee 23 0.0145 2.4704 0.1219 2.5959 0.3918 0.3531 0.9656
Ireland 15 0.0095 0.0155 0.8971 1.3461 0.6671 0.5183 0.9228
Italy 14 0.0088 0.0905 0.7460 0.7169 0.8651 0.4634 0.9334
Portugal 20 0.0126 1.4027 0.2375 2.5074 0.4062 0.9350 0.8153
Spain 16 0.0101 0.0924 0.7433 2.2414 0.4550 1.1207 0.7393
Note: the table ontains the number of redit events (VaR violations), the empirial violation rate αˆ, the
values of the test statistis J to test for the unonditional (UC) and the onditional overage (CC) and the
independene (IND) hypothesis as desribed in Setion 3.2.3. p-values are determined using the approah
of Dufour (2006) and M = 9999 simulations.
sample window length of wl = 500 trading days.57 The rst window thus ranges from 1
January 2005 till 1 Deember 2006 and gives a VaR for the 4 Deember 2006. The window
thus inludes only observations from a period well before the rise of sovereign bond yields.
We then gradually inlude information of trading days loser to or within the risis period
and exlude information of past trading days. In sum, we obtain Value-at-Risks and redit
event indiators Ci,t for eah trading day in the interval 4 Deember 2006 till 31 Deember
2012. This leads to a total sample size of T = 1586.
To parameterize the Value-at-Risk aording to eq. (3.3), we still have to dene the degrees
of freedom of the t-distribution of innovations and the ondene level p. As redit events
we model VaR violations whih happen in α = 1% = 1 − p of all trading days. Based on
the sample size of T = 1586, we would expet 16 redit event for eah ountry on average.
For the degrees of freedom ν of the t-distribution we tested several values between ν = 5 as
in Metiu (2012) and ν = 10. Applying the baktesting methods desribed in Setion 3.2.3,
we nd that the number of degrees of freedom should be optimally set to ν = 8 as this
leads to the aeptane of all three quality riteria for the alibration of the Value-at-Risk
(see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1 shows that there are no signiant deviations from the assumed
overage rate of 1% and there is no spurious lustering of redit events whih would result
from mis-speied Value-at-Risks. Given the same parameterization of Value-at-Risks for
eah ountry, i.e. the t(8)-distribution, we an observe onsiderably more unexpeted large
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Seleting other in-sample window length does not hange our main ndings.
58
Using smaller (larger) values for ν, the one-step-ahead Value-at-Risks beome larger (smaller) whih
is more (less) onservative and leads to a derease (inrease) of the number of VaR violations.
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Table 3.2: Correlation oeients between redit event indiators and rst-stage equation
statistis
SPA ITA FRA POR GRE BEL IRE Country Durbin-Wu-
Hausman-
Test
Single
Equation
F-Test
1.0000 0.1928 0.1604 0.0451 -0.0122 0.0487 0.1205 SPA 11.9401 2.6683
1.0000 0.1723 0.1706 0.2141 0.1808 0.0604 ITA 18.6992 2.5046
1.0000 0.1419 -0.0092 0.1504 0.0793 FRA 14.0267 3.1143
1.0000 0.1281 0.0412 0.0473 POR 12.0962 2.1142
1.0000 0.0866 0.0426 GRE 9.6611 1.1833
1.0000 0.0510 BEL 13.2792 2.4294
1.0000 IRE 19.7370 1.5283
Note: the table ontains the orrelation oeients between redit event indiators as well as the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test for the null of onsistent OLS estimates and the F-Test for the null of only non-signiant
instruments in the ountry-wise rst-stage equation (3.2). We report mean values of the test statistis over
all windows.
rises of yield spreads for peripheral Eurozone risis ountries suh as Greee and Portugal
than for Italy.
Table 3.5 in the appendix shows the distribution of redit events for eah ountry over time.
Large numbers of redit events ourred at the beginning of the Europe-wide reession in
2008Q4 that followed the ollapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, in 2010 when the
sal balanes of several peripheral Eurozone member states were revealed as unsustainable,
and in the seond half of 2011 when bond yield spreads reahed their maximal values in
most of the Eurozone ountries after undergoing several rating downgrades. Credit events
an be observed most often for Greee (23) and Portugal (20), whereas Frane (9) and
Italy (14) were hit the least often whih is in line with these ountries' risis exposure.
Correlation oeients between the redit event indiator series are relatively small (see
Table 3.2) but mostly signiant (the 5% ritial value is 0.0492). In sum over all ountries,
redit events happened on 90 trading days out of whih there are 17 days with redit events
in two or more ountries. As large rises of yield spreads may thus our simultaneously in
several ountries, redit event indiators have to be treated as endogenous variables. As
desribed in Setion 3.2.1, we address this issue by 3SLS estimation.
3.4.3 Time-varying oeient estimates
We now estimate eq. (3.1) in rolling windows of wm = 500 trading days using 3SLS (see
Setion 3.2.1). Compared to smaller window lengths, this seletion guarantees that at least
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one redit event per ountry lies in eah window. Further experiments showed that larger
windows already average over sub-periods of signiant ontagion with sub-periods of no
ontagion. It remains to dene the number q of lagged dependent variables in eq. (3.1).
We hoose q = 5 as this ensures the absene of autoorrelation and takes into aount
the within-week variation in trading patterns as well (Metiu, 2012). We use the same
number of lags to instrument the redit event indiators in eq. (3.2) and inlude seond
and third powers of the instruments to improve their strength to approximate the redit
event indiators, i.e. we set m = 3. We summarize the parameterization of eq. (3.1)  (3.3)
in Table 3.3 in the appendix.
Table 3.2 provides results from tests for the exogeneity of the redit event indiators
(Durbin-Wu-Hausman test), whih would imply the appliability of OLS, and for the power
of instruments (F -test). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is asymptotially χ2(k)-distributed
with k equalling the number of regressors tested for exogeneity. In eah ountry equation,
k = 6 suh that ritial values are 10.6446, 12.5916 and 16.8119 at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respetively. In most ases, the exogeneity of regressors is rejeted and the GIVE esti-
mation should lead to more onsistent results than OLS. The values of the F -test statistis
are low indiating that instruments are weak. Weak instruments usually lead to unreliable
test inferene. Pik (2007), however, showed that when weak instruments are used in the
anonial model for ontagion, the size of signiane tests on the ontagion oeients is
the nominal one, i.e. the test does not indiate ontagion too often when there is atually
no ontagion, and the power of the test is good.
Figures 3.1-3.7 display the time-varying oeients of ountry-spei bond yield deter-
minants as well as of the VSTOXX index to proxy the general risk aversion of market
partiipants. The gures provide three of the four fundamental determinants onsidered in
eah ountry equation. The respetive fourth variable was not signiant in any window
and is omitted to save spae. The graphs give the estimated oeient values at the end
date of eah window as well as their ondene intervals at the 5% level. There are signi-
ant hanges of parameter values over time as e.g. the oeients related to VSTOXX
in more reent years do not fall into the ondene interval belonging to points of time
further away.
59
59
If we examine the signiane of oeient hanges by heking whether ondene intervals overlap
(implying no signiant hange) or not, the number of suh hanges is mostly redued to oeients related
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Figure 3.1: Determinants of bond yields (Spain)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the returns of the loal stok market index
(from left to right)
We nd an inreasing inuene of the general risk aversion of market partiipants on the
risk priing of bonds of all seven ountries onsidered whih is in line with the ndings of
e.g. Bernoth and Erdogan (2012). There is a large rise in the VSTOXX oeient value
for all ountries sine May 2010 reeting rising premiums for general risk aversion, whih
is evidene for wake-up-all ontagion.
60
The timing of this development is likely to result
from the general distrust towards the Eurozone after unovering the true eonomi and
sal malaise in Greee at the beginning of 2010 and the fear of pro-ylial austerity
measures that ould further foster negative developments in the entire Eurozone. These
premiums are heterogeneous among ountries as oeient values dier signiantly from
eah other. As we use the same global fator in all ountry equations, we an diretly
infer a ranking of the relevane of this fator from individual oeient values. We observe
the largest premiums for general risk aversion for Greee and the smallest for Frane
and Belgium. This orresponds to the general pereption of the relative solvability of these
ountries. As the only ountries in our sample, Portugal and Ireland experiened a redution
in the premium for general risk aversion after Marh 2012 whih an be interpreted as a
positive reation of market partiipants to the resue programs for these ountries. The
width of ondene intervals remains relatively stable for most ountries whih underlines
the robustness of our results.
Country-spei redit risk measured by CDS spreads in relation to Germany was signi-
ant for Italy, Portugal, Greee and Ireland until 2010/2011 and is likely to have been
substituted by the inreased risk aversion in the Eurozone as a whole. CDS spreads of Spain
remain signiant for the entire sample, those of Frane and Belgium are only signiant
to VSTOXX.
60
This reasoning is possible sine the log-dierened series of the VSTOXX index is stationary and does
not ontain a signiant trend.
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Figure 3.2: Determinants of bond yields (Italy)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the returns of the loal stok market index
(from left to right)
Figure 3.3: Determinants of bond yields (Frane)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the lagged bid-ask spreads (from left to
right)
for smaller sub-periods.
Bid-ask spreads were mostly insigniant for all ountries. However, Greek bonds seem to
have ontained a liquidity premium between September 2011 and February 2012 (Figure
3.5), the period before the seond bailout program and the quasi-default for this ountry.
For Portugal a signiant liquidity premium an be observed for mid-2010 and from Fe-
bruary 2012 till the sample end (Figure 3.4). The ut of Portugal's sovereign bond rating
in spring 2010 reeted inreasing onerns about Portugal's ability to ope with its high
state debt and strutural deits and is likely to be the reason for the peaks of the bid-
ask spread oeient in 2010. The sub-period in 2012 that exhibits a signiant premium
for liquidity risk follows the downgrade of Portugal to a non-investment grade by S&P in
January 2012. Our results are in line with the ndings of e.g. Favero et al. (2010) who
show that liquidity premiums are only relevant for a subset of ountries and of Beber et al.
(2009) who onlude that a liquidity premium is only relevant during times of heightened
market unertainty what mathes our results as well.
To aount for prospets for the entire eonomy, we inluded ountry-individual stok
market returns in eq. (3.1). The oeients in the equations for Frane, Portugal, Greee,
Belgium and Ireland are insigniant. For Spain and Italy we nd periods with signiant
oeients from November 2010 and Otober 2012, respetively, till the sample end (Figu-
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Figure 3.4: Determinants of bond yields (Portugal)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the lagged bid-ask spreads (from left to
right)
Figure 3.5: Determinants of bond yields (Greee)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the lagged bid-ask spreads (from left to
right)
Figure 3.6: Determinants of bond yields (Belgium)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the lagged bid-ask spreads (from left to
right)
Figure 3.7: Determinants of bond yields (Ireland)
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Note: the panels ontain time-varying oeients and ondene intervals at the 5% level for the
log-dierened VSTOXX index, the lagged CDS spreads and the lagged bid-ask spreads (from left to
right)
res 3.1 and 3.2).
61
This observation shows that investors pereive the worsening situation
61
The inrease of the oeient for VSTOXX and the derease of the oeient for stok market returns
in the equations for Italy and Spain are not related to eah other, i.e. there are no disturbing eets from
multiollinearity. We obtain the same results for these variables when they are used as the only variable
besides the onstant and lagged dependent variables.
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of the eonomies of Italy and Spain, whih are the largest among the peripheral Eurozone
ountries, as relevant for the deepening of the risis. On the other hand, eonomi growth in
other peripheral ountries, indiated by rising stok market indies, is likely to not lead to
a signiant redution of bond yield spreads in these ountries if it is not aompanied by a
smaller premium for investor risk aversion. Among the fundamental fators explaining the
levels of bond yield spreads, only a redution of the premium for general risk aversion an
provide a systemati derease of spreads in all Eurozone ountries onsidered, et. par.
62
The anonial model for ontagion provides evidene of pure ontagion from ountry j
to ountry i when the orresponding ontagion oeient δi,j in eq. (3.1) is positive and
signiant. In Figure 3.8 we show the development of the sum of signiant ontagion
relationships between the seven ountries onsidered. The gure gives an overview of how
the intensity of pure ontagion evolved in the Eurozone during the years 2008-2012.
After the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, eonomi reessions hit almost
all European states leading to large output delines in 2009. The trust of banks into eah
other diminished and the inter-bank lending market ollapsed. The intensity of sovereign
risk ontagion was high in the last quarter of 2008 (see Figure 3.8). In the same time
resue measures were put in plae. In Otober 2008 the European Central Bank initiated
non-standard monetary poliy measures to provide liquidity to European banks. National
governments reated with support measures for banks in terms of bailouts and guarantees
and investment stimuli for the real eonomy. On the one side, this relaxed the pressure
on banks and the real eonomy during 2009 yielding somewhat lower degrees of sovereign
risk ontagion hannels during that year (see Figure 3.8). On the other side it also led to
further rises of budget deits and debt levels of European states.
During the rst months of 2010, the sal position of peripheral Eurozone member states
ame under loser srutiny. Rising doubts of bond market investors regarding the apa-
bility of Greee to resolve its debt issues led to new all-time highs of Greek bond yields.
Government bond yields of other ountries started to rise the more the Greek problems
beame transparent (Mink and de Haan, 2013). Figure 3.8 shows large rises in the intensity
of ontagion among the onsidered ountries in Marh and April 2010 as well. In May 2010
the rst bailout program for Greee was agreed by the other Eurozone members and the
62
Gerlah et al. (2010) also nd that an aggregate risk fator has by far the largest impat on sovereign
bond yield spreads.
78
Figure 3.8: Total number of ontagion hannels
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Sovereign debt crisis in peripheral Eurozone
ECB: Securities Markets Programme
Governments: Austerity measures
Post-Lehman Brothers recession period:
ECB: ‘non-standard’ monetary policy measures
Governments: Support measures
International Monetary Fund. Figure 3.9 provides insights into the ontributions made by
the single ountries to the total sum of signiant ontagion hannels. Considering the
graph for Greee, it beomes evident that the May 2010 bailout was followed by a onsi-
derable redution of ontagion from this ountry. Figure 3.10 allows the inspetion of the
reipient ountries of pure ontagion from Greee.
63
Right before the agreement on the
bailout of Greee in May 2010, there were signiant ontagion hannels from Greee to
all ountries onsidered exept Belgium. At the end of 2010, only ontagion to Portugal
remained. Sine May 2011 we annot nd evidene for ontagion from Greee anymore.
In May 2010 the European Finanial Stability Faility (EFSF) was established to provi-
de assistane to Eurozone member states in nanial distress. Its foundation as well as
announements for sal adjustments and labour market reforms by several ountries are
likely to have led to further redutions of sovereign risk ontagion till the end of 2010.
By the end of 2010 Portugal and Spain approved further austerity measures to aim for
a onsolidated state budget inluding the privatization of state assets, tax inreases and
wage uts in the publi setor. While these measures were intended to alm down nanial
markets, they also seem to have inreased the transfer of sovereign risk to other ountries
(see Figure 3.9) most likely by fearing diminishing export possibilities and larger amounts
63
In order to save spae we leave out the graphs for oeients of ontagion arising from other ountries.
They an be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.9: Number of ontagion hannels originating in the speied ountry
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of redit defaults in books of European banking groups. At the end of 2010 the number of
sovereign risk ontagion hannels again rose onsiderably (see Figure 3.8).
In the ourse of 2011 the intensity of ontagion shrinked in general and for Spain and
Portugal, the latter of whih was bailouted in May 2011, in partiular. It is likely that the
Seurities Markets Programme (SMP) of the ECB, whih was intensied heavily in August
2011 with bond purhases over EUR 10 billion eah week, also helped ontain redit events
and thus further redue ontagion eets in the Eurozone. Figure 3.9 reveals that Italy
beame the only soure of ontagion in the Eurozone during 2012 whih is likely due to
fears about a further worsening of eonomi prospets after austerity measures had been
80
Figure 3.10: Contagion oeients for ontagion from Greee to the speied ountries
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passed in September 2011 and due to politial turmoil around the Berlusoni government
at that time.
It is remarkable that there is no ontagion from Spain during 2012. In 2012 Spanish banks
required a bailout after inurring large losses from the burst of a property bubble (f.
the orresponding redit event to the Spanish banking risis in 2012/II in Table 3). Yet,
solvability problems of Spanish banks did not trigger an inrease of bond yield spreads in
the other Eurozone ountries onsidered. Investors thus either believed in the suess of
the reapitalization program for Spanish banks or SMP bond-purhases of the ECB ould
ounterat a possible shok-transmission to other Eurozone ountries.
64
3.4.4 Robustness heks
To further assess the robustness of our results besides the sensitivity heks mentioned
before, we run the following robustness heks. We summarize the results here and provide
details upon request:
(i) Investor risk aversion was found to be an important explaining variable for bond
yield spreads. Exhanging the VSTOXX index by the VIX index (as used by e.g.
64
Contagion from Belgium is only relevant in a few ases in 2010 and in 2011:H2 and 2012:H1 and is
likely to result from fears about its large state debt  the third largest in the Eurozone in 2010 after Greee
and Italy  and enormous guarantees provided for the banking group Dexia at the end of 2008 and for the
bad bank part of former Dexia after its breakup in Otober 2011. Dexia was one of the largest investors
in Greee and suered large losses from write-os of these investments. The appliation of guarantees by
the Belgian state hene beame more likely after the revelation of the sal situation in Greee in the rst
half of 2010. The absene of a ruling government from June 2010 till Deember 2011 may have further
inreased worries about Belgium's apabilities to resolve its debt and Dexia problems.
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2
whih is likely to ause inreasing sovereign bond yields as well (Gerlah et al., 2010).
Following Eihler (2012) we measure banking risis risk by an asset-weighted index
of 5-year CDS spreads of 24 banks from the ountries onsidered in our analysis.
We use lagged values to aount for potential endogeneity. There is a signiantly
positive relation between banking risis risk and the sovereign bond yields in sub-
periods of our sample for all ountries; see the results from three ountry equations
in Figure 3.13 for an illustration. The impat of banking risis risk on sovereign yield
spreads is the largest for Portugal and Spain, for whih it lasts from mid-2011 till
mid-2012 and therefore oinides with the period before the reapitalization program
for Spanish banks. For Ireland, the banking risis risk indiator was signiant after
the announement of state guarantees for Ireland's six largest banks in Otober 2008.
The ontagion relations deteted by the basis parameterization again remained robust
(see Figure 3.11).
(iii) In a further robustness hek we ontrol for the dynamis of German benhmark
yields in that we added innovations of German yields among the global variables gt
in eq. (3.1). Pure ontagion relations remain relatively unhanged (see Figure 3.11).
(iv) We set up a ontrol group onsisting of Japan and Canada, for whih we derive redit
events using the approah desribed in Setion 3.2.2. We then integrate the orre-
sponding indiator variables into eq. (3.1) for Eurozone ountries to examine whether
the anonial model for ontagion shows pure ontagion eets from the ontrol group
as well. There is no window for whih we ould nd suh eets. This result does not
ome as a surprise as Japanese and Canadian government bond yields dereased in
the period when the sovereign debt risis hit the Eurozone. Correspondingly, none of
the redit events in Japan or Canada are found to oinide with a redit event in the
seven onsidered Eurozone ountries in this period. Moreover, the integration of Ja-
pan and Canada does not hange the results for pure ontagion within the Eurozone
(see Figure 3.11).
3.5 Conlusions
We showed that the rise of bond yield spreads of several Eurozone ountries from 2008
till 2012 was fostered by both wake-up-all ontagion and pure ontagion. Wake-up-all
83
Figure 3.12: Coeients for BBB-rated US orporate bond yields
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ontagion is reeted in the hange of sovereign risk priing by market partiipants after
negative events in a single ountry or a group of ountries. Pure ontagion of sovereign risk
means the diret transmission of negative eets after a shok to a ountry whih are not
reeted in the risk priing of fundamental determinants of sovereign risk of the reipient
ountry. To investigate both kinds of ontagion in a unied framework, we applied the
anonial model for ontagion presented by Pesaran and Pik (2007) in rolling windows of
equal length. The onstany of oeient values in time as assumed in the original model
was dissolved here to trak the evolution of risk premiums inherent in sovereign yield
spreads (to investigate the presene of wake-up-all ontagion) and to allow for a time-
variation in pure ontagion eets. Pure ontagion of sovereign risk is unlikely to happen
in the same intensity over the whole sample period as it may have been interepted by
bailout programs or other poliy measures.
In the anonial model proposed by Pesaran and Pik (2007) ontagion is examined by
testing the signiane of oeients that represent shok-transmission after a redit event
in a single ountry to another ountry. Metiu (2012) suggests to derive redit events from
these trading days when the bond yield spread signiantly exeeds values expeted from
the urrent risk priing of market partiipants through global and ountry-spei fators
as well as bond yield spreads of the last ve trading days. In this paper we further inreased
the robustness of Metiu's (2012) approah. Our empirial results onrm the neessity to
allow for time-variation of the oeients in this model. Thanks to this modiation, the
approah may serve more easily as an early-warning system to monitor possible ontagion
84
eets from risis ountries.
To identify pure ontagion eets we ontrolled for the evolution of yield spreads of so-
vereign bonds of seven Eurozone ountries by ountry-spei indiators and an indiator
for general risk aversion. We found an inreasing relevane of general risk aversion towards
Eurozone ountries sine May 2010 what is likely to have replaed the ountry-spei re-
dit risk fator. Moreover, liquidity risk seems to have played a signiant role in the yield
spreads of Ireland, Greee and Portugal in times of heightened unertainty regarding the
solvability of these ountries. Lastly, as opposed to the smaller ountries Portugal, Ireland
and Greee, the (real) eonomi development in Spain and Italy has a signiant impat
on the evolution of their bond yield spreads  even in the ase of unhanged general risk
aversion of market partiipants towards the entire Eurozone.
Our analysis onrms the presene of pure sovereign risk ontagion in the Eurozone. The
existene of pure ontagion, however, is time-dependent. After peaking in 2010, its overall
intensity dereased in 2011 and 2012. We nd that ontagion of sovereign risk originating in
the three ountries mostly hit by the risis (Greee, Ireland and Portugal) to the other four
ountries onsidered (Frane, Italy, Spain and Belgium) terminated after the introdution
of bailout programs for these ountries. The poliy measures taken by the Eurozone member
states and the International Monetary Fund ould thus suessfully ontain redit events
within these three ountries after their bailouts.
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Appendix
Table 3.3: Parameterization of the anonial model for ontagion in eq. (3.1)  (3.3)
Variables and data origin
Dependent
variable yi,t
Yield spreads of 10-year benhmark gover-
nment bonds over Germany
Datastream
Global variables
gi,t
Returns of VSTOXX index STOXX
Returns of VIX index (for robustness
hek)
Chiago Board Op-
tions Exhange
Yields of BBB-rated US orporate bonds
over benhmark US government bonds (for
robustness hek)
Merrill Lynh
Asset-weighted index of 5-year redit
default swap spreads of 24 banks from
ountries onsidered (for robustness hek)
Datastream,
Bloomberg, own
alulations
Country-spei
variables csi,t
Spreads of 5-year maturity redit default
swaps (in relation to Germany)
Datastream
Bid-ask spreads of 10-year benhmark go-
vernment bonds (in relation to Germany)
Bloomberg
Market returns of main stok index (in re-
lation to Germany)
Datastream
Parameter settings
l = 1, . . . , q Lags of dependent variable to aount for
persisteny of yield spreads
q = 5
i = 1, . . . , N Countries onsidered in system to be esti-
mated
N = 7
r = 1, . . . ,m Powers of instruments to improve the qua-
lity of approximation of redit events
m = 3
p Condene level for one-step-ahead Value-
at-Risk
99%
ν Degrees of freedom of t-distribution of dai-
ly innovations
8
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Table 3.4: Desriptive statistis
Variable Country Mean value Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
Bond yield
spreads in
bp in
relation to
Germany
Belgium 56.06 30.81 -11.9 362.64 67.67
Frane 27.64 14.17 -11.87 203.84 39.52
Greee 605.28 99.86 7.05 5570.66 934.04
Ireland 198.59 97.6 -20.69 922.96 239.9
Italy 123.12 54.91 4.49 575.48 145.69
Portugal 259.35 45.34 -9.9 1458.76 368.97
Spain 120.25 38.21 -15 634.98 159.08
CDS spreads
in bp in
relation to
Germany
Belgium 35.61 11.57 -2.68 214.57 46.27
Frane 17.03 2.31 -3.34 103.20 25.62
Greee 3507.67 68.64 1.04 30655.60 8750.35
Ireland 143.37 73.83 -3.12 843.96 180.06
Italy 77.87 35.53 0.37 390.49 96.23
Portugal 181.31 23.68 -3.04 1157.27 273.91
Spain 81.63 32.17 -2.47 458.81 103.09
Stok
market
returns in
relation to
Germany
Belgium -0.0070 -0.0054 -0.1319 0.1240 0.0318
Frane -0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0885 0.0790 0.0206
Greee -0.0164 -0.0136 -0.3138 0.3179 0.0774
Ireland -0.0104 -0.0089 -0.1760 0.1397 0.0420
Italy -0.0107 -0.0104 -0.1280 0.1514 0.0323
Portugal -0.0083 -0.0064 -0.1441 0.1408 0.0414
Spain -0.0061 -0.0052 -0.1511 0.1534 0.0397
Bid-ask
spreads in
bp in
relation to
Germany
Belgium 0.78 0.40 -1.10 9.80 1.47
Frane 0.33 0.10 -0.80 5.30 0.60
Greee 37.41 0.80 -1.10 708.00 107.22
Ireland 9.42 0.20 -1.00 58.30 16.54
Italy 1.14 0.90 0.00 15.00 1.03
Portugal 13.57 1.00 -1.00 157.3 26.09
Spain 1.15 0.30 -1.00 12.3 2.19
VSTOXX 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.1082 0.1423 0.0257
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Table 3.5: Numbers of redit events in eah quarter of the sample period
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Sum
Quarter IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
Spain 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 16
Italy 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 14
Frane 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 9
Portugal 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 20
Greee 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 23
Belgium 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 18
Ireland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 15
Sum 1 4 2 7 2 8 5 5 10 7 1 2 8 1 9 2 10 0 0 10 12 4 1 2 2 115
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1
4 Credit risk-free sovereign bonds under Solveny II:
a ointegration analysis with onsistently estimated
strutural breaks
Abstrat
European insurane and reinsurane undertakings are faing the advent of a new
regulatory framework. In the urrent proposal for its tehnial speiations under
the pillar 1 standard formula, sovereign debt of EU member states is treated as risk-
free. This paper examines the validity of this assumption for 26 EU member states.
Taking into aount the possibility of multiple strutural breaks, we nd evidene for
the onvergene of government bond yields of several ountries with the yields of a
risk-free asset. For the majority of ountries, however, there is no suh evidene. A
detailed disussion of regime-shifts in relation to European bond market integration
is provided. Our ndings have important impliations for insurane ompanies, bond
investors and regulators alike.
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This hapter ontains the working paper version of Ludwig, A., 2014. Credit risk-free sovereign bonds
under Solveny II: a ointegration analysis with onsistently estimated strutural breaks, Applied Finanial
Eonomis 24, 811-823. Used with permission from Taylor & Franis.
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4.1 Introdution
Long before the reent nanial risis in Europe, a projet to reate a new regulatory
framework for insurane and reinsurane undertakings in the European Union  Solveny
II  was initiated. Solveny II aims at a harmonization of standards to measure apital
requirements for insurane undertakings in the EU, the introdution of a risk-based ap-
proah to better ensure solveny of insurers and thus to improve poliyholder protetion,
and at an inreased transpareny of a ompany's risk prole to investors, reinsurers and
poliyholders. In 2009, a rst EU diretive was adopted aording to the Level 1 of the
so-alled Lamfalussy proess. After a set of ve quantitative impat studies (QIS) and a
study fousing on long-term guarantees in 2013, however, there is still an ongoing debate
about the adequay of Solveny II speiations, their impat on the future market be-
havior of insurers and their interplay with inreased apital and liquidity requirements on
banks under Basel III (see e.g. BIS, 2011, Bundesbank, 2012, ECON, 2012, IMF, 2011,
Swarup, 2012).
To alulate the solveny apital requirement (SCR) under Solveny II, insurane under-
takings will be allowed to hoose to either apply a standard formula, whih implies the
use of pre-speied models and their parameterization, or to develop an internal model.
Aording to the most reent eld study regarding the Level 2 implementing measures of
Solveny II (f. EIOPA, 2013), sovereign debt of all member ountries of the EU shall be
onsidered to have zero default risk under the standard formula if it is issued in the loal
urreny. It shall also be exluded from the alulation of asset onentration risk. However,
for orporate bonds the apital requirement inreases with the duration and dereases with
the redit quality of the bond. Risk harges for equities are relatively large and depend on
the loation of the market on whih the equities are listed.
Returning to the aforementioned disussion regarding the impliations of Solveny II, the
preferential treatment of sovereign debt in relation to orporate debt is expeted to have
the following onsequenes:
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 higher funding osts for banks and orporate undertakings given the importane of
66
Sovereign debt is a key investment lass for insurane ompanies (BIS, 2011, Swarup, 2012). Insurane
Europe and OliverWyman (2013) report a value of EUR 2.4 trillion for government bonds held by insurane
ompanies per 31.12.2011.
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insurers for the funding of these rms (Bundesbank, 2012),
 higher interonnetedness with banks through onverging portfolio strutures with a
higher share of high-quality government bonds (and high-quality overed bonds) and
therefore an inrease of systemi risks (Bundesbank, 2012, IMF, 2011),
 inreasing pro-yliality of investment strategies when insurane undertakings are
fored to exhange equity to risk-free government bonds (aording to Solveny II
speiations) in times of distress to maintain solveny and vie versa in periods of
prosperity in order to benet from booming equity markets (BIS, 2011), and
 an artiial lowering of interest rates leading to an inrease in the present value of
market-onsistently valuated insurane liabilities and thus to a derease in solveny
apital (Swarup, 2012).
Although insurane ompanies may deide to develop an internal model whih seeks a
more realisti overage and evaluation of ompany-spei insurane business and nanial
market risks, the hallenging development and supervisory appliation proess are likely to
lead to a widespread use of the standard formula (Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman,
2013). However, insurane ompanies will be obliged to perform an Own Risk and Solveny
Assessment (ORSA) making it neessary to ritially assess the model used to derive their
SCR. In either ase, an evaluation of the zero default risk property of sovereign debt of EU
member states will be required from all insurane ompanies. Yet, the literature on Solveny
II does not ontain an empirial testing of the hypothesis of risk-freeness of sovereign debt
so far.
This paper ontributes to the Solveny II literature addressing this question by an exami-
nation whether long-term sovereign bond yields of EU member states are in a long-run
equilibrium, i.e. in a ointegration relationship, with a risk-free asset. If a spei bond is
in a long-run equilibrium with a risk-free asset, the same stohasti trend underlies both
assets and the bond an thus be onsidered as risk-free as well. We use German government
debt as the risk-free asset as markets onsider these bonds as (at least lose to) risk-free.
This paper also ontributes to the literature on bond market onvergene (bond market
integration) in several aspets. First, our analysis overs long-term sovereign bond yields of
26 EU member states. There is no examination of bond market onvergene for this large
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set of EU ountries in the literature so far. Seond, using data for the interval 1995/01 till
2012/12, we inlude pre-EMU onvergene proesses as well as the reent nanial risis in
Europe in our sample. Testing for the statistial signiane of strutural breaks, we show
whih ountries signiantly improved their osts of serviing debt by entering the EMU
and whih ountries were aeted negatively by the reent rises.
Third, we use the sequential testing framework proposed by Kejriwal and Perron (2008,
2010) to estimate the number and loation of breaks onsistently. This allows us to evaluate
the timing relations of strutural breaks in dierent ountries. To the author's best know-
ledge, this approah has not been applied to examine regime-shifts in bond market relations
yet. The estimated break dates are then integrated into the ointegration test suggested
by Arai and Kurozumi (2007) and Kejriwal (2008) whih allows multiple strutural breaks
in the ointegration relationship. Subsequently, if ointegration is present, we distinguish
for eah regime whether onvergene has already taken plae (long-run onvergene), is
about to take plae (athing-up) or does not happen at all (divergene). We argue that
long-run onvergene with a risk-free asset is a suient ondition for the inheritane of
the risk-free property to the asset under onsideration. Cathing-up, in general, is only a
neessary ondition for suh an inheritane. However, in onnetion with yield spreads of
the assets under examination around zero at the most urrent dates, this is also evidene
for full onvergene and hene the risk-free assumption for these assets an be aepted as
well.
The paper is strutured as follows. A literature review on bond market onvergene is
provided in Setion 4.2 and a brief disussion of methodologial approahes to identify
break points in ointegration relationships is given in Setion 4.3. Setion 4.4 desribes
the approah applied in this paper in more detail. Empirial results of our analysis are
olleted in Setion 4.5. Setion 4.6 provides our onlusions whih ontain impliations
for insurane ompanies, poliymakers and bond investors.
4.2 Literature review
Empirial researh on bond market onvergene has been onduted using various metho-
dologial approahes. These an be divided into two strands. The rst strand is devoted
to the analysis of possibly time-varying ointegration relationships between interest rates,
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spreads or bond market return indies. Allowing for strutural breaks was a neessary de-
velopment in ointegration analysis as early ontributions found surprisingly little evidene
for ointegration between markets of dierent ountries. As one of the rst researhers to
apply the Engle and Granger (1987) ointegration approah to interest rate linkages, Kar-
fakis and Moshos (1990) annot rejet non-stationarity of the interest rate dierential (i.e.
no rejetion of non-ointegration) of short-term interest rates of Belgium, Frane, Ireland,
Italy and the Netherlands with the German rate in the period 1979:04-1988:11. Katsimbris
and Miller (1993) argue that the lak of ointegration with the German rate may be a
spurious test result as the interest rate dierentials were likely to be inuened by ur-
reny realignments, i.e. strutural breaks, within the European Exhange Rate Mehanism
(ERM) in the period under examination.
Fountas and Wu (1998) made the rst ontribution in the ontext of ointegration with
a strutural break using the test proposed by Gregory and Hansen (1996). For the period
1979Q2 to 1995Q4, they nd ointegration for overnight money market interest rates of
ve EU ountries with the German rate. A broader denition of bond market onvergene
is given by Camarero et al. (2002) who distinguish between bond markets whih have
already onverged (long-run onvergene) and bond markets about to onverge (athing-
up). They relate the former to the stationarity of the spread of a ountry's interest rate over
the Maastriht riterion without trend and the latter to stationarity of the spread around a
deterministi trend. Performing a stationarity analysis whih allows for strutural breaks in
the spread as well, they nd onvergene with the interest rates aording to the Maastriht
riterion in 1980-1996 for thirteen EU ountries but not for Italy.
Yang (2005) also nds instabilities in ointegration relationships of government bond in-
dies of six major EU bond markets. Based on foreast error variane deompositions he
argues that European markets are generally independent. Barassi et al. (2005) provide
evidene for pair-wise ointegration of the 3-month Treasury bill rates of all G-7 ountries.
They further estimate time-varying speed of adjustment oeients in bivariate vetor
error orretion models (VECM) with data from 1980-1998 using state-spae modeling
tehniques (Kalman lter). They obtain strutural breaks in the ausal relationships bet-
ween G-7 short term rates whih inlude a break in the ausality between UK and other
EU ountries after the withdrawal of the UK from the ERM in September 1992.
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Jenkins and Madzharova (2008) investigate the ointegration of nominal and real interest
rates, respetively, of thirteen EU ountries with the orresponding German rate using
Johansen's (1988) trae and λmax-test, i.e. tests whih do not onsider strutural breaks.
They obtain ointegration relations for ve EU ountries with Germany when nominal
rates are used but only two in the ase of real rates, a nding whih is likely to be a
result of strutural breaks in the ointegration relations whih are not onsidered by the
tests used. Basse (2013) nds ointegration between German vis-à-vis Belgian, Finish and
Duth bond yields using the standard Johansen (1988) trae test as well as ointegration
between German and Frenh and Austrian yields, respetively, when inluding a dummy
for a strutural break whih was obtained with Hansen and Johansen's (1999) utuation
test.
The seond strand of literature investigates determinants of bond yield spreads over a
referene ountry (typially, the US or Germany) and their time-dependene. The literature
distinguishes these determinants into ommon international fators whih proxy the general
risk aversion of market partiipants and ountry-spei fators suh as redit risk, liquidity
risk (relevant in markets that are not suiently deep or broad), foreign exhange rate risk
(for ountries whose urreny is not pegged to the urreny of the referene ountry) and
dierenes in tax regimes (see the disussions in e.g. Barrios et al., 2009, Codogno et al.,
2003, Favero et al., 2010, Gomez-Puig, 2009). The relevane of these risk fators has been
shown to be time-dependent (see the evidene provided by e.g. Beirne and Fratzsher, 2013,
Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012, Giordano et al., 2013, Ludwig, 2013a, Pozzi and Wolswijk,
2012). Bond market onvergene takes plae when (i) bond yields do not depend on ountry-
spei fators and (ii) ountry-spei sensitivities to the ommon international fator
onverge (Pozzi and Wolswijk, 2012).
As the purpose of this study is to nd ommon stohasti trends in the movement of bond
yield series as well as regime-shifts in ointegration relations, it is not primarily relevant
for this study whih of the fundamental fators determined the yield spreads in a spei
regime and hene may be the reason for the ommon stohasti trend. However, we will
disuss regime-shifts in the relation of bond yields with respet to Germany to provide
eonomi interpretations of breaks and thereby also take into aount ndings from the
seond strand of literature desribed above.
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4.3 Methodology review: ointegration under strutural breaks
This setion summarizes methods frequently used to test for ointegration with regime-
shifts as well as for the timing of breaks in ointegration relationships.
Haldane and Hall (1991) and Barassi et al. (2005) suggest the use of the Kalman lter
to identify breaks in the ointegration oeients and the rolling speed of adjustment
oeients, respetively, in vetor error-orretion models (VECM). In both approahes
results are inferred from graphial inspetion of plots of the respetive state variables. In
general it is possible to detet more than one break, whereas the lak of inferene from
hypothesis testing is a disadvantage of these approahes. The utuation test proposed by
Hansen and Johansen (1999) is designed to test the parameter onstany in a VECM. The
test aepts the null of stability too often (Juselius, 2006) and it is not possible to test
for more than one break. Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose tests for ointegration with
a strutural break whih possess good power properties for the one break ase. Yet, the
test does not provide onsistent estimates of the true break loation (Gregory and Hansen,
1996) and it is not appliable to ases with two or more breaks.
Strutural breaks obtained from the appliation of statistial proedures an only be rea-
sonably interpreted from an eonomi point of view when the statistial inferene provides
onsistent estimates of the timing of breaks. The approahes mentioned before do not inlu-
de a statistial test for multiple breaks with a onsistent estimation of the break loations.
As we have to take into aount possibly multiple strutural breaks in the ointegration
relation resulting from e.g. the introdution of the Euro as a single urreny and the reent
nanial and eonomi rises, we need to apply a dierent method. The approah presented
in the following setion yields onsistent estimates of the number and loation of multiple
breaks and hene serves best the needs of our researh target. We will therefore present it
in more detail.
4.4 Eonometri framework
Testing for strutural breaks
In this paper, we apply a sequential testing proedure reently developed by Kejriwal and
Perron (2008, 2010). Their work extends the results of Bai and Perron (1998), who provide
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a onsistent testing proedure for the number and timing of breaks in the ase of stationary
time series, to the ase of non-stationary time series. The tests are based on the seletion
of up to M strutural breaks in the linear regression
yt = cj + β
′xt + δ
′
jzt + εt (4.1)
where t = Tj−1 + 1, . . . , Tj and j = 1, . . . ,M + 1; T0 = 0 and TM+1 = T .
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In this
setting, it is possible to distinguish the regressors into p regressors whose oeients (β)
are not subjet to hange, and q regressors whose oeients (δj) are allowed to hange
aross regimes. Using the sum of squared residuals (SSR) as the target funtion of the
optimization, Kejriwal and Perron (2008) show that estimated break frations λˆj = Tˆj/T
are also onsistent for the true break frations in the ase of time series integrated of order
one.
Kejriwal and Perron (2010) propose a sequential proedure to test for the number of breaks.
First, the UDmax test is applied to test whether at least one strutural break is present.
The UDmax tests the null of no break against the alternative of k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} breaks. It
is a double maximum test as the test statisti is alulated as the maximum of M values
eah of whih is a sup-Wald statisti testing for the presene of exatly k breaks where
k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}:68
UDmax = max
1≤k≤M
sup
T1,...,Tk:
Tj+1−Tj≥ǫT
SSR0 − SSRk(T1, . . . , Tk)
σˆ2
(4.2)
Here, SSRk denotes the sum of squared residuals in the OLS regression with k breaks
at the break dates T1, . . . , Tk. The supremum yields the optimal redution of the sum of
squared residuals given k breaks. We searh for the supremum by a standard grid-searh.
We desribe the estimation of the variane σ2 below. The UDmax statisti was shown to
have better power properties than the single sup-Wald tests for exatly k breaks (Kejriwal
and Perron, 2010).
In a seond step, a sequential test of the null of a model with k breaks against the alternative
67
The maximum number of breaks M whih an be aounted for is a result of the hoie of the
trimming parameter ǫ. All partitions [Tj−1 + 1, Tj] need to be at least of length ǫT . A standard setting in
the literature is ǫ = 0.15.
68
We present the UDmax and SEQ(k + 1|k) test statistis in the notation of Kejriwal (2008).
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of a model with k+1 breaks is performed for k = 1, . . . ,M −1. To this end, a new break is
inluded in eah of the k+1 partitions of the model with k breaks running the optimization
algorithm and obeying the onstraint on the minimum length of eah partition. The break
dates Tˆ1, . . . , Tˆk are those whih minimize the sum of squared residuals in the model with k
breaks. For eah partition, one performs a Wald test for the signiane of the redution of
the sum of squared residuals under the model with a new break T ∗ and takes its supremum.
The SEQ(k + 1|k) statisti is the maximum of these k + 1 sup-Wald statistis:
SEQ(k+1|k) = max
1≤j≤k+1
sup
T ∗:
Tj−T ∗≥ǫT,
T ∗−Tj−1≤ǫT
SSRk(Tˆ1, . . . , Tˆk)− SSRk+1(Tˆ1, . . . , Tˆj−1, T ∗, Tˆj, . . . , Tˆk)
σˆ2k
(4.3)
The sequential testing proedure does not suer from a non-monotone power funtion
against the extent of the break as do standard LM tests (Kejriwal and Perron, 2010).
The tests are made robust with regard to serial orrelation and heterosedastiity by a
onsistent estimation of the long-run varianes:
σˆ2e =
∑h
i=−h
w(i, h)
1
T
∑T−i
t=1
eˆteˆt+i (4.4)
For the kernel funtion w(i, h), Kejriwal and Perron (2010) propose the quadrati spe-
tral kernel with Andrews' (1991) automated bandwidth estimator hˆ = 1.3221(aˆ(2)T )1/5 in
ombination with aˆ(2) = 4ρˆ2/(1− ρˆ)4, where ρˆ is the rst order autoorrelation oeient
of the residuals eˆt from eq. (4.1). To inrease the power of the tests, the estimator of the
bandwidth h makes use of residuals under the alternative whih leads to smaller band-
widths. To irumvent size distortions, residuals eˆt are taken from eq. (4.1) under the null
of the respetive test.
Further, potential endogeneity is addressed by the dynami OLS approah suggested by
Stok and Watson (1993), i.e. eq. (4.1) is augmented with leads and lags of the regressors.
We determine the number of leads and lags using a general-to-spei-approah as in Arai
and Kurozumi (2007). Lastly, Kejriwal and Perron (2010) point out that the test may
also rejet the null of no break in the ase when there is atually no strutural break
and no ointegration. Running simulation experiments, they nd that the estimation of
a number of signiant breaks lower than the maximum number of breaks allowed (M)
is indiative of a non-spurious regression. To omplement this argument, we perform two
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tests for ointegration whih take into aount multiple strutural breaks (see the following
subsetion).
Testing for ointegration under strutural breaks
Kejriwal (2008) develops a test for the null of ointegration with multiple strutural breaks
against the alternative of no ointegration. He extends the approah suggested by Arai and
Kurozumi (2007) to the ase of k breaks. The test statisti is based on the residuals of the
dynami OLS regression with k breaks
yt = cj + δ
′
jzt +
I∑
i=−I
(πij)
′∆zt−i + et if Tj−1 < t ≤ Tj (4.5)
for j = 1, . . . , k + 1 and T0 = 0, Tk+1 = T where I leads and lags of the regressors are
inluded in order to orret for potential endogeneity. Arai and Kurozumi (2007) propose to
determine the number I of leads and lags of the regressor by a general-to-spei approah,
i.e. I is rst set to l4 = ⌊4 ∗ (T/100)1/4⌋ and dereased sequentially until an F -test shows
signiane of the lead and lag with the highest order at the 10% level. The test statisti
is then alulated from the residuals of eq. (4.5) as
V =
1
T 2
T∑
i=1
S˜2i /σ˜
2
e (4.6)
where S˜i = e˜1 + . . .+ e˜i is a sequene of partial sums of errors and σ˜
2
e is a heterosedasti
and autoorrelation onsistent estimator of the long-run variane as in eq. (4.4). We apply
the QS kernel with Andrews' (1991) automated bandwidth estimator. Arai and Kurozumi
(2007) show that an inrease in power of the test is ahieved when the bandwidth estimator
is adjusted restriting the rst order autoorrelation oeient of the residuals from eq.
(4.5) to a value of 0.9. We apply this restrition also for the ase of more than one break.
Considering the ndings of Ludwig (2013b), we also apply the KPSS unit-root test to the
residuals of eq. (4.5) separately in eah regime in order to hek the robustness of our
results.
Denition of onvergene to the risk-free asset
Following Camarero et al. (2002), we will distinguish two types of onvergene: long-run
onvergene and athing-up (see Setion 4.2). Long-run onvergene of two series means
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that onvergene has already taken plae. It is present if the dierential of two series
is a stationary proess with onstant mean. In other words, to be in the state of long-
run onvergene, the series have to be ointegrated with ointegration vetor (1,-1) and a
possibly non-zero spread. In this ase, the spread between both series returns to its mean,
the risk premium, after eah short-run deviation. The fat that the yield spreads of the
asset under onsideration hene follow the evolution of the yields of the risk-free series in
the long-run an be pereived as a suient ondition for the inheritane of the risk-free
property to the other asset.
However, the proess of onvergene may still be ongoing whih would likely lead to a
rejetion of ointegration if one does not allow for suh trending behavior. Camarero et
al. (2002) therefore dene the athing-up between two series as the situation when their
dierential is a trend-stationary proess whose absolute value dereases in the ourse of
time. In both ases long-run onvergene and athing-up, the two series are driven by the
same stohasti trend. Cathing-up, in general, an only be a neessary ondition for the
inheritane of the risk-free property, unless the athing-up has already nished, i.e. the
spread over the risk-free asset attains values around zero at the most reent sample dates.
We use German government bonds as the risk-free asset in this paper. In the following we
provide three observations whih serve as an indiative support of this setting.
First, sine the last quantitative impat study on Solveny II (QIS 5), the term struture of
the risk-free interest rate is derived from interbank swap urves in the respetive urreny
and adjusted for redit risk inherent in swap rates whih are not settled overnight (see,
for details, CFO-Forum and CRO-Forum, 2010). For EUR ountries, risk-free rates were
determined to be 1.786%, 2.757% and 3.605%, respetively, for maturities of 2, 5 and 10
years at the end of Deember 2009 (the reporting date for QIS 5). Aording to Bloomberg
data, on the other hand, market yields for German government bonds for the same date
were at least 20 basis points lower, i.e. 1.329%, 2.422% and 3.387%, respetively, for the
same maturities. In the Solveny II long-term guarantee assessment in 2013, risk-free rates
of 0.962%, 1.382% and 2.075% for maturities of 2, 5 and 10 years are provided for the
reporting date 31.12.2011. For end Deember 2011, market yields for government bonds
are again at least 20 basis points lower as they were reorded at 0.160%, 0.791% and
1.842%, respetively. Hene, nanial markets seem to evaluate German bonds  at least to
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maturities of up to 10 years  as risk-free. Of ourse, unertainty remains in the appropriate
derivation of the risk-free rate.
Seond, aording to Bloomberg data, market yields for German government bonds with
a maturity of 2 years were negative for a longer period in the seond half of 2012 as well
as at the end of the rst quarter in 2013. Hene, markets seem to not ask for a default risk
premium for German government bonds at this maturity.
Third, using the same data as in our empirial analysis in Setion 4.5, we nd that the series
of market yields of German 10-year government bonds is ointegrated with an artiial
series of point-wise minimal yields of all other ountries in our sample, and this with
vetor (1, -1) and a zero spread.
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Hene, German 10-year government bonds have the
smallest market yields in the European Union in the long-run. This makes German bonds
the natural andidate for a risk-free asset within the EU.
As the interest rate series of Germany iG,t (base series) possesses a negative deterministi
trend in our sample interval 1995-2012, the denition of athing-up of another interest rate
series iC,t of ountry C to the base series is fullled in the following situation: if iC,0 > iG,0
(iC,0 < iG,0) holds at the beginning of the respetive time interval, there is athing-up
when the series are ointegrated with a ointegration vetor (1,-δ) with δ > 1 (δ<1). Due
to the observation that the German series is ointegrated with the point-wise minimum of
all other series with ointegration vetor (1, -1) and zero spread, the ase iC,0 < iG,0 is not
relevant. Hene, there is athing-up between a ountry C and Germany if δ > 1, long-run
onvergene if δ = 1 and divergene if δ < 1.
4.5 Empirial evidene
Data
To assess bond market onvergene within the European Union, we use the Eurostat da-
taset for long-term sovereign bond seondary market yields, whih are the basis for the
evaluation of the Maastriht Treaty EMU riterion of interest rate onvergene. The da-
taset ontains interest rate series at onstant 10 year maturity, whih requires a regular
69
For reasons of data quality (see Setion 4.5), the interest rate series of Luxembourg was exluded
from this analysis.
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replaement of bonds, for all EU member ountries exept Estonia.
70
For Estonia, neit-
her harmonized interest rates nor a suitable proxy indiator are urrently available. No
observations from the Eurostat dataset were exluded, i.e. there is data from 1995:01 till
2012:12 for all ountries exept for the Czeh Republi (sine 2000:04), Cyprus, Hunga-
ry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia (sine 2001:01), Slovenia (sine 2002:03),
Bulgaria (sine 2003:01) and Romania (sine 2005:04).
These series are espeially valuable to the analysis in this paper as they are already oi-
ally used to assess whether a member state of the European Union fulls the Maastriht
Treaty riterion of interest rate onvergene. This riterion stipulates that yields of 10-
year government bonds must not exeed the sum of the unweighted average of yields of
the three ountries with the lowest onsumer prie ination rates and 200 basis points.
The approah followed in this paper uses advaned eonometri tehniques as we test for
ommon stohasti trends to justify bond onvergene.
Unit root analysis
Cointegration analysis is only appliable if the relevant time series are non-stationary. If
the relevant time series are stationary, a vetor autoregressive model in levels should be
used instead. To test for the non-stationarity of the interest rate series, we apply the KPSS
test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) and the unit root test proposed by Breitung
(2002). The KPSS test is robust against autoorrelation as well as heterosedastiity and
does not require the seletion of an appropriate lag length as is the ase for the ADF test.
The Breitung (2002) test serves as an appropriate omplement to the KPSS test as it has
the opposite null and alternative. Moreover, it is an entirely non-parametri test applied
to demeaned as well as possibly detrended series and has good properties with respet to
non-linearity in time series (Breitung, 2002).
The tests indiate non-stationarity for all series exept Hungary (see Table 4.1). As we will
see in Setion 4.5, there is no onvergene of the Hungarian yield series with the risk-free
asset suh that we do not enter the eld of spurious regression results here.
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All data fulll the seletion guidelines related to the Maastriht Treaty onvergene riteria as sum-
marized before with the following exeptions: primary market yields are used for Cyprus (whole sample),
Bulgaria and Romania (both till 2005:12), Slovenia (till 2003:10) and Lithuania (till 2007:10). As there
was no outstanding long-term sovereign debt for Luxembourg till 2010:05, long-term bonds issued by a
private redit institution were used for the time before 2010:05 instead.
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Table 4.1: Unit root tests for bond yield series
Country KPSS
test
Breitung
test
Country KPSS
test
Breitung
test
Austria 0.13864* 0.00496 Latvia 0.16243** 0.00890
Belgium 0.20180** 0.00714 Lithuania 0.13260* 0.00670
Bulgaria 0.17023** 0.01039 Luxembourg 0.19862** 0.00801
Cyprus 0.28125*** 0.01460 Malta 0.25100*** 0.01282
Czeh Republi 0.20045** 0.00955 Netherlands 0.12244* 0.00428*
Denmark 0.17105** 0.00624 Poland 0.22857*** 0.01174
Finland 0.20768** 0.00744 Portugal 0.37841*** 0.01567
Frane 0.16882** 0.00600 Romania 0.18328** 0.01157
Germany 0.13045* 0.00453 Slovakia 0.28038*** 0.01485
Greee 0.43864*** 0.01799 Slovenia 0.28105*** 0.01569
Hungary 0.07380 0.00295** Spain 0.38638*** 0.01553
Ireland 0.36722*** 0.01468 Sweden 0.22190*** 0.00824
Italy 0.37035*** 0.01500 United Kingdom 0.23141*** 0.00867
Note: the KPSS test rejets the null of I(0) if the test statisti exeeds the ritial value, whereas the
Breitung (2002) test rejets the null of I(1) if the test statisti assumes a smaller value than the ritial
value. Both tests inlude a deterministi time trend. For the KPSS test, the bandwidth parameter was
seleted to be h = ⌊8 ∗ (T/100)1/4⌋ as proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Critial values are taken
from Sephton (1995) for the KPSS test and from the original paper by Breitung (2002). ***, ** and *
denote signiane at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Identiation of strutural breaks
Aording to the German leadership hypothesis (e.g. Barassi et al., 2005, Yang, 2005),
German interest rates are thought to be exogenous with respet to interest rate series of
other European ountries. We therefore use the German interest rate iG,t as an explanatory
variable for the interest rate of another ountry iC,t in eq. (4.1) and estimate
iC,t = cj + δjiG,t + εt if Tj−1 < t ≤ Tj (4.7)
taking into aount the strutural breaks j = 1, . . . , k. Yet, German market yields may
be inuened by bond markets outside the EU (e.g. the USA) or externalities from other
European bond markets whih suer from the deterioration of their redit-worthiness, so
endogeneity should not be exluded a-priori. To ontrol for the ase that the German
interest rate series happens to be endogenous, we apply a dynami OLS estimation to eq.
(4.7) as proposed by Stok and Watson (1993).
Table 4.2 ontains the results of the sequential testing proedure for strutural breaks
proposed by Kejriwal and Perron (2010). The maximum number of breaks allowed isM = 5.
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As the table shows at most three signiant break dates for eah ountry, we have strong
support for the fat that the test results of the sequential testing proedure are not spurious.
For Poland and the Czeh Republi, the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) tests do not rejet the
null of no regime-shifts. As Poland an be pereived as one of the eonomies oping best
with the maroeonomi environment during the nanial risis  it only suered a GDP
deline in the fourth quarter of 2008  a stable relationship between the Polish and the
German bond yield series is plausible. Moreover, the long-run onvergene of Polish and
Czeh bond yields explains the stability result for the Czeh Republi.
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The break dates estimated an be attributed to several olletive events in the European
and world eonomy as well as individual events in the respetive ountries. We will disuss
these events in the following onsidering results for the oeients δj of eq. (4.7) whih
allow us to dierentiate into periods of long-run onvergene (δj = 1), athing-up (δj > 1)
and divergene (δj < 1) with respet to German yields. For eah regime j, the signiane
of the oeients δj of eq. (4.7) is tested by a Wald test (Stok and Watson, 1993). If δj
is signiantly dierent from zero, we further test for the null of long-run onvergene.
Third stage of the EMU in 1999/2001. The third stage of the European Eonomi
and Monetary Union (EMU), whih brought the introdution of the Euro as a real urren-
y, took plae on 1 January 1999. Eleven EU member states joined on this day: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Frane, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal and Spain. Table 2 shows regime-shifts in the behavior of government bond yields of
Finland, Frane, Italy, Portugal and Spain in relation to Germany in August 1997. This
shift was most likely indued by the introdution of the Euro in these ountries.
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In on-
trast to large dereases in observed bond yield spreads over Germany, foreign exhange
rate risk-adjusted spreads inreased for this set of ountries in 1999-2001 in relation to the
pre-Euro period 1996-1998 (Gomez-Puig, 2009). This allows the onlusion that primarily
the elimination of foreign exhange rate risk by the introdution of the Euro led to the
onvergene of nominal interest rates and hene to the strutural break observed for Fin-
land, Frane, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Convergene tendenies were further supported
71
Test results for the relation Poland vis-à-vis the Czeh Republi were derived using Johansen's (1988)
standard trae test and are spared here to save spae. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4.3 reports a onvergene of oeients from large δ1 ≫ 1 to values around δ2 ∼= 1 for these
ountries whih supports the argument for loser ties of bond yields after the introdution of the Euro.
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Table 4.2: Kejriwal and Perron (2010) tests for strutural breaks
Country
Kejriwal and Perron tests Signiant breaks
UDmax SEQ(2|1) SEQ(3|2) SEQ(4|3) Number Break 1 Break 2 Break 3
Austria 19.831*** 7.8248 1 2008/01
Belgium 17.281** 3.5770 1 2008/03
Bulgaria 12.169* 5.1604 1 2008/11
Cyprus 12.325** 6.9450 1 2002/10
Czeh Republi 9.8926 0
Denmark 17.938*** 5.4028 1 1998/04
Finland 20.581*** 10.887 1 1997/08
Frane 19.443*** 13.141* 5.4988 2 1997/08 2008/04
Greee 35.152*** 18.160** 17.493** 1.2539 3 1999/08 2007/08 2010/04
Hungary 13.253** 2.6892 1 2008/02
Ireland 16.276** 15.646** 2.9767 2 2007/08 2010/04
Italy 21.857*** 15.601** 2.5326 2 1997/08 2008/10
Latvia 14.088** 0.7086 1 2008/11
Lithuania 19.489*** 7.7016 1 2008/10
Luxembourg 12.327** 6.1962 1 2007/03
Malta 13.508** 10.155 1 2003/07
Netherlands 16.973** 7.0296 1 2008/05
Poland 6.9754 0
Portugal 18.644*** 17.744** 9.7587 2 1997/08 2010/04
Romania 15.024** 12.103* 5.2050 2 2008/12 2010/02
Slovakia 11.672* 6.7649 1 2006/11
Slovenia 17.474*** 12.674* 12.902 2 2003/12 2010/12
Spain 24.337*** 15.108** 3.3883 2 1997/08 2008/12
Sweden 16.356** 8.6846 1 1997/11
United Kingdom 11.341* 8.8368 1 1998/11
Note: the table states results of the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) tests for strutural breaks. The UDmax
statisti tests a null of zero breaks against an alternative of one or more breaks. The SEQ(k+1|k) statisti
tests the null of k breaks against the alternative of k + 1 breaks. It is only appliable if the presene of k
breaks was shown before. A trimming value of ε = 0.15 allowing for a maximum of M = 5 breaks is set.
Critial values are given in Kejriwal and Perron (2010), Tables 1a and 3a. ***, ** and * denote signiane
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
by the abolishment of signiant dierenes in tax regimes during the 1990's (Codogno et
al., 2003, Gomez-Puig, 2009) and the inreasing relevane of international risk fators as
opposed to ountry-spei risk fators sine 1999 (Pozzi and Wolswijk, 2012). The shift
towards a loser integration of these bond markets ourred about 15 months before the
rise of the single monetary poliy area. Finanial market investors apparently antiipated
this fat already before the deision of the European Counil in May 1998 to launh the
EMU in January 1999 with the eleven ountries mentioned before. This date was in aor-
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Table 4.3: Tests for ointegration and dynami OLS estimation
Country
AKK
test
a
KPSS test on subsamples
b
DOLS slope oeients

Period Period Period Period
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4
1 2 3 4
Austria 0.068 0.226 0.090 1.05*** 0.82***
Belgium 0.038 0.141 0.119 1.09*** 0.42***
Bulgaria 0.161** 0.589** 0.503** 1.00*** 1.00***
Cyprus 0.146 0.324 0.314 1.26 -0.48**
Czeh Republi -
#
0.303 1.00***
Denmark 0.078 0.104 0.194 1.65*** 1.10***
Finland 0.086 0.139 0.247 2.24*** 0.95***
Frane 0.029 0.138 0.117 0.131 1.70*** 1.03*** 0.64***
Greee 0.035 0.134 0.212 0.120 0.219 3.77*** 1.34*** -0.96*** -10.4***
Hungary 0.081 0.099 0.140 0.56*** 0.34
Ireland 0.038 0.277 0.142 0.205 1.40*** -0.54** 1.13
Italy 0.035 0.131 0.226 0.128 5.09*** 1.00*** -0.81***
Latvia 0.076 0.184 0.245 1.72*** 3.65***
Lithuania 0.167** 0.366* 0.239 2.26*** 3.19***
Luxembourg 0.081 0.300 0.164 1.33*** 1.00***
Malta 0.046 0.196 0.065 1.00*** 0.23***
Netherlands 0.090 0.317 0.098 1.00*** 1.00***
Poland -
#
0.282 1.00***
Portugal 0.172** 0.138 0.562** 0.202 4.87*** 1.00*** -2.86***
Romania 0.076 0.270 0.348 0.117 0.12 6.65** 0.31***
Slovakia 0.067 0.244 0.087 2.69*** 0.11
Slovenia 0.150** 0.113 0.308 0.122 4.64*** 0.60*** -0.90***
Spain 0.039 0.135 0.207 0.14 4.70*** 1.12*** -1.25***
Sweden 0.117 0.136 0.330 3.00*** 1.11***
United Kingdom 0.086 0.163 0.259 1.21*** 1.00***
Note: a) Results for the Arai and Kurozumi (2007) and Kejriwal (2008) test for ointegration under
strutural breaks. See details in the text in Setion 4.4. Critial values were simulated using 500 steps
and 10,000 repliations and Wiener proesses were approximated by partial sums of i.i.d. normal random
variables. b) Results for the KPSS test are given for eah sub-sample. For details regarding the KPSS
test, see the text in this setion. ) The slope oeients δj from eq. (4.7) are given for eah sub-sample.
Separate Wald tests are applied to test for signiane and for δj = 1. Following Stok and Watson (1993),
we use a Bartlett kernel with bandwidth 5 to estimate robust standard errors. # denotes that the test is
not appliable in this ase. ***, ** and * denote signiane at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
dane with the Maastriht Treaty already signed in 1991 whih ontained a timetable for
the introdution of the Euro.
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Greek government bonds entered a new relation to German
bonds in August 1999 whih is about two years after the strutural breaks identied for the
aforementioned set of ountries. This reets the fat that Greee was aepted to beome
73
Aording to Lund (1999), before the deision of the European Counil in May 1998 unertainty
remained regarding the seletion of member ountries and a possible postponing of the Monetary Union.
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a Eurozone member about two years after the rst deision of the European Counil.
Bond yields of Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands did not exhibit
a statistially signiant regime-shifts in the ourse of the introdution of the Euro whih
likely results from already tight onnetions between their bond markets and the German
market in the 1990's (Camarero et al., 2002, Lund, 1999).
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Indeed, the regression oeient
δ1 from eq. (4.7) equals 1 for the Netherlands implying long-run onvergene already before
the introdution of the Euro and lies in the relatively small interval (1, 1.4] for the four
other ountries implying athing-up to German yields (see Table 4.3).
EU member states that did not join the Eurozone on 1 January 1999 seem to also have been
aeted by its establishment. Sine 1997/98, government bond yields of Sweden, the United
Kingdom and Denmark are muh loser linked to the evolution of German yields (see the
delta oeients for these ountries in Table 3 moving towards 1). For the United Kingdom,
the period of long-run onvergene of bond yields with Germany began in November 1998,
following a period of athing-up (see δ1 > 1 = δ2 for the UK in Table 4.3). Sweden, the
United Kingdom and Denmark seem to have beneted from staying outside the Monetary
Union as they kept their monetary autonomy and hene ould attrat investors who seek
risk diversiation in their portfolios. As one of the largest European debt markets, the
UK espeially beneted from this new position as it ould attrat signiant volumes of
funds and hene redue its refunding osts (Gomez-Puig, 2009). This orresponds to the
long-run onvergene of British bond yields with German yields sine November 1998.
Country-spei events between 2002 and 2006. Only few regime-shifts ourred
between 2002 and 2006, and they only took plae in smaller ountries whih did not belong
to the Eurozone in this period. These regime-shifts an therefore hardly be related to
olletive events on an international sale and are rather attributable to loal events. In
Slovenia, for example, the aession to the European Union in May 2004 led to investment
euphoria in subsequent years whih was mainly naned by international borrowing. These
years saw also a rise in government spending and an inrease of interest rates from about
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Camarero et al. (2002) even nd long-run onvergene between Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg with the Maastriht riterion for interest rate onvergene for the period 1980-1996. Ireland
and Belgium were still in the proess of athing-up in the period 1980-1996 whih is not a ontradition
to our results. The ndings obtained by Lund (1999) are also onsistent with our results as he showed
that market-implied EMU membership probabilities for the Benelux ountries were already 100% for the
period 1995-1998 whih results from narrow yield spreads with Germany already before the introdution
of the Euro. Austria and Ireland were not onsidered in his analysis.
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3.5% to 5% after 2005. In Slovakia, the June 2006 eletions ended a period of eonomi
reform programs that had brought a boost in foreign diret investment. Eonomi growth
in this period fostered dereasing debt-to-GDP ratios and hene dereasing premiums for
ountry-spei redit risk (Barrios et al., 2009) and thus led to shrinking sovereign bond
yields till 2006. After June 2006 Slovak bond yields stayed onstantly in a range of 4 to
5% whih orresponds to the non-signiant oeient δ2 for Slovakia in Table 4.3.
Global nanial risis 2007/2008. As a onsequene of the US subprime mortgage
risis in the years 2007 and 2008, a reession reahed most European ountries at the
latest in the fourth quarter of 2008. Aording to our ndings denoted in Table 4.2, the
rst regime-shifts happened in Ireland in August 2007, whih is related to the breakup of
the Irish property setor in 2007/2008, and in Greee in the same month. The latter break
is likely to result from the onentration on pro-ylial industries suh as tourism and
shipping whih made Greee vulnerable to the rst waves of unertainty regarding global
eonomi prospets. These events were relevant for the evolution of Irish and Greek bond
yield spreads as risk premiums for the general risk aversion of market partiipants towards
Eurozone ountries and for ountry-spei redit risk started to inrease again in 2007
(Beirne and Fratzsher, 2013, Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012, Pozzi and Wolswijk, 2012).
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania suered severe eonomi rises that emerged in the fourth
quarter of 2008. Having a large share of debt denominated in foreign urrenies, the eono-
mi troubles of these ountries were aelerated by deteriorating exhange rates. A speu-
lative attak on the Hungarian Forint in Otober 2008 triggered the need for an emergeny
measure by the IMF, World Bank and the EU in November 2008. The break date for
Bulgaria oinides with its rating downgrade by Fith. For Romania, the Deember 2008
break omes about the beginning of the reession whose strength prompted the neessity
of an emergeny measure by the IMF, World Bank and the EU in May 2009. The seond
break for Romania in February 2010 marks its eonomi reovery whih started in the
same year yielding lower interest rates for this ountry in the following. After years of
eonomi boom, Lithuania and Latvia saw dereases of GDP by more than 10% in 2009.
Break points depited in Table 4.2 mark the beginning of the reession whih led to rating
downgrades in both ountries in the proximity of the break dates. For Latvia, the break
also oinides with the appliation of an emergeny measure by the IMF, World Bank and
the EU in Deember 2008. Relative to Germany, these ountries were hit harder by the
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reession whih triggered rating downgrades and is thus likely to have led to larger redit
risk premiums in bond yields. Moreover, Hungary and Romania experiened depreiations
of their loal urrenies in relation to the Euro of 25% and 15%, respetively, between
Otober 2008 and Marh 2009 whih  aording to the unovered interest rate parity 
should be reeted in inreasing bond yield spreads as well (see e.g. Barassi et al., 2005,
Camarero et al., 2002, Fountas and Wu, 1998).
Slovenia entered a reessive period in the last quarter of 2008. The Kejriwal and Perron
(2010) test does not show this break. This may be beause this event did not lead to a
hange in the diverging tendenies between Slovenian and German market yields whih
had already been present sine 2003. However, the double-dip of the Slovenian reession in
2011 is indiated by the test in terms of the seond regime-shift for Slovenia at the end of
2010. In the last regime, the divergene from German yields is even stronger than before
(see 1 > δ2 > 0 > δ3 in Table 4.3). In Spain the nanial risis triggered the burst of
the housing bubble in 2008 whih explains the break estimated to be in Deember 2008.
The beginning of the reession in Italy in the last quarter of 2008 also oinides with the
break point provided by the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) test proedure. The divergene
from German yields was onsiderably hereafter shown by negative oeients δ3 for Italy
in Table 4.3.
For Frane, Austria and the Netherlands, the test gives strutural breaks in the rst half of
2008. Aording to OECD data, however, there was still positive growth in these ountries
and Germany in the rst quarter of 2008. Negative growth was rst observed in Frane,
the Netherlands and Germany in the seond quarter and in Austria in the third quarter
of 2008. The break points observed an thus hardly be attributed to fundamental fators
but rather seem to be generated by the ight-to-quality or safe haven- eet assigned
to German government bonds (Barrios et al., 2009, Favero et al., 2010, von Hagen et al.,
2011).
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Sovereign debt risis sine 2009. In April 2010, further regime-shifts ourred in rela-
tion to bond yields of Ireland, Greee and Portugal (see Table 4.2), whih implied an even
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After the regime-shift, there is still long-run onvergene between Germany and the Netherlands as
δ1 = δ2 = 1 for the Netherlands (see Table 4.3). The break obtained from the test ours in the mean
spread between these ountries that rises from 6 basis points to 36 basis points after the break. For Austria
and Frane, however, divergene from German yields is indiated by delta oeients signiantly smaller
than 1 (see Table 4.3).
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stronger divergene from German yields for Greee and Portugal (f. their negative delta
oeients for the last regime in Table 4.3). In April 2010, the Greek government asked for
nanial support from the IMF and the EU to remain solvent until the end of 2010. At the
end of this month, Standard & Poor's downgraded Greek bonds to junk status. A rst
emergeny measure for Greee was launhed in May 2010 whih ame with requirements
to ondut several austerity measures.
Sine 2008 the Irish state guaranteed deposits at the main Irish banks, whih were even-
tually ashed in during 2009 and 2010. In mid-2010 this led to sharply rising yields on
government bonds and the launh of a resue pakage in November 2010. After the almost-
default of Greee in the seond quarter of 2010, Portugal adopted austerity measures to
derease its high debt burden. The raise of taxes and uts in spending inreased fears of
further eonomi downturn leading to a rating downgrade of Portuguese bonds by Moody's
in July 2010. Besides inreasing risk premiums for redit risk and the general risk aversion
of market partiipants, bond yields of Greee, Ireland and Portugal were also pushed up-
wards by the re-emergene of a liquidity risk premium after bond yields of these ountries
had beneted from the substitutability with bonds from other Eurozone members sine
1999 (Ludwig, 2013a).
Convergene assessment
In Setion 4.4 we presented the onept of onvergene of bond yields. Convergene of a
ountry's interest rate series to the German one is present if (i) ointegration of these series
is given, i.e. both interest rate series are driven by the same stohasti trend, and (ii) the
respetive oeient δj in eq. (4.7) is either 1 (long-run onvergene) or greater than 1
(athing-up). In the left part of Table 4.3, the results of the Arai-Kurozumi-Kejriwal test
for ointegration with strutural breaks and of the KPSS test for stationarity of residuals
in eah regime are presented. The null of ointegration with strutural breaks is rejeted for
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia. Hene, there is no ommon stohasti trend
of the bond yields of these ountries with German yields. This nding is supported by
the results of the KPSS test applied in eah regime. Using the oeient values for δj as
olleted in Table 4.3, the ountries fullling the ointegration ondition an be further
grouped into ategories as summarized in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Convergene assessment
Nr. Category Countries
1 Countries without ointegration to German yields Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal,
Slovenia
2 Countries with no tendenies to onverge in any sub-period Cyprus, Hungary
3 Countries with onvergene rst then divergene Greee, Ireland, Italy, Spain
4 Countries with onvergene rst then stagnation Malta, Romania, Slovakia
5 Countries with oeients lose to 1 but tendenies to di-
verge sine 2008
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Fran-
e
6 Countries with athing-up, shok, and again athing-up Latvia
7 Countries with athing-up (with regime-shift) Denmark, Sweden
8 Countries with long-run onvergene (with regime-shift) Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK
9 Countries with long-run onvergene (without regime-shift) Czeh Republi, Poland
4.6 Conlusions
To assess the zero default risk assumption for sovereign debt of EU member states, we
performed a omprehensive ointegration analysis of market yields for 10-year government
bonds with a risk-free asset. We found evidene for the eets of the introdution of the
Euro, the global nanial risis as well as the reent European sovereign debt risis on the
relations of bond market yields in the EU. A thorough methodologial preparation inluding
a disussion of dierent approahes to ointegration with strutural breaks preeded our
empirial analysis.
Currently, there is long-run onvergene between Germany and the Netherlands, the Uni-
ted Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Czeh Republi and Poland with ountry-dependent risk
spreads. Moreover, bond yields of Denmark, Latvia and Sweden are in the proess of onver-
gene with German rates (athing-up) of whih, however, only yield spreads of Denmark
and Sweden attain values around zero at the most reent sample dates. Our approah thus
provides a motivation for the zero default risk property of debt of these sovereigns exept
Latvia.
For Austria and Finland, there is a slight but still statistially signiant tendeny to
diverge from German yields after a long period of lose ties, whereas for Belgium and Frane
divergene is more pronouned. Thus, a rejetion of the zero default risk assumption of the
Solveny II standard formula in its urrent shape would be more tentative for Austria and
Finland than for Belgium and Frane.
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For all other ountries, there is either a lak of ointegration with German market yields or a
lear divergene in the long-run whih inludes even inreasing market yields for ountries
suh as Cyprus, Greee, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain as opposed to dereasing
German yields. In the ase of long-run divergene, bonds should not be onsidered as risk-
free. The same holds for ountries that do not exhibit any long-run relation with the risk-
free asset. The sovereign risk assoiated to these ountries is likely to be under-estimated
by the urrent Solveny II proposal.
Our results are of importane for insurane undertakings, poliymakers as well as bond
traders. Insurane undertakings an make use of the methods proposed and the results
provided in this paper when they perform internal risk modeling or ondut the Own
Risk and Solveny Assessment (ORSA) required under the seond pillar of Solveny II.
Undertakings whih primarily fous their sovereign bond investments on the ountries that
an be onsidered in a long-run equilibrium with the risk-free asset an also valuate their
sovereign bond portfolio as risk-free in their internal model and in the ORSA, respetively.
Yet, if the risk-free property of sovereign debt of a spei ountry is eonomially invalid,
spread risks related to this ountry as well as tail orrelations between suh ountries
should be quantied as well. Regulators and poliymakers might onsider the ndings of
this paper to obtain a list of bond issuing ountries for whih a revision of the Solveny II
standard formula would lead to a more aurate reetion of the riskiness of government
bond investments.
Lastly, our results provide bond investors with valuable information regarding the long-
run behavior of bond investments from whih they an derive expetations about future
diversiation possibilities. We found that there is a long-run equilibrium between German
bonds and bonds issued by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Czeh Repu-
bli and Poland whih is equivalent to faing onstant mean spreads between the bond
yields of these ountries and Germany: an inrease of German bond yields by one basis
point oinides with  on average  an inrease of the yields of these other ountries by also
one basis point. Mean spreads were the largest for Poland and the Czeh Republi. Short-
run deviations from this mean spread are of ourse possible, while our ndings imply that
every short-run departure from equilibrium is balaned in a longer run for these ountries.
As a large set of the sovereign bonds examined does not seem to be in the state of long-run
onvergene or athing-up with German bonds, there are possibilities to long-run diversify
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sovereign bond investments in the European Union in general and within the Eurozone in
partiular (f. similar onlusions by e.g. Abad et al., 2010, Laopodis, 2008).
Referenes:
Abad, P., Chulia, H., Gomez-Puig, M., 2010. EMU and European government bond market
integration, Journal of Banking and Finane, 34, 2851-2860.
Andrews, D.W.K., 1991. Heteroskedastiity and autoorrelation onsistent ovariane ma-
trix estimation, Eonometria 59, 817-58.
Arai, Y., Kurozumi, E., 2007. Testing for the null hypothesis of ointegration with a stru-
tural break, Eonometri Reviews 26, 705-39.
Bai, J., Perron, P., 1998. Estimating and testing linear models with multiple strutural
hanges, Eonometria 66, 47-78.
Barassi, M.R., Caporale, G.M., Hall, S.G., 2005. Interest rate linkages: a Kalman lter
approah to deteting strutural hange, Eonomi Modelling 22, 253-84.
Barrios, S., Iversen, P., Lewandowska, M., Setzer, R., 2009. Determinants of intra-euro area
government bond spreads during the nanial risis, European Eonomy  Eonomi
Papers 388, European Commission.
Basse, T., 2013. Searhing for the EMU ore member ountries, European Journal of Po-
litial Eonomy, Artile in Press.
Beirne, J., Fratzsher, M., 2013. The priing of sovereign risk and ontagion during the
European sovereign debt risis, Journal of International Money and Finane, 34,
60-82.
Bernoth, K., Erdogan, B., 2012. Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time varying oeient
approah, Journal of International Money and Finane, 31, 639-656.
BIS, 2011. Fixed-inome strategies of insurane ompanies and pension funds, CGFS Pa-
pers no 44, Bank for International Settlements, Basel.
Breitung, J., 2002. Nonparametri tests for unit roots and ointegration, Journal of Eo-
nometris 108, 343-63.
Bundesbank, 2012. Finanial Stability Review 2012, Deutshe Bundesbank, Frankfurt.
Camarero, M., Ordonez, J., Tamarit, C.R., 2002. Tests for interest rate onvergene and
strutural breaks in the EMS: further analysis, Applied Finanial Eonomis 12,
447-56.
115
Codogno, L., C. Favero, Missale, A., 2003. Yield Spreads on EMU Government Bonds,
Eonomi Poliy, 18, 505-532.
Committee on Eonomi and Monetary Aairs (ECON), European Parliament, 2012.
Committee Report Tabled for Plenary, 1st Reading/Single Reading  A7-0077/2012.
CFO-Forum and CRO-Forum, 2010. QIS 5 Tehnial Speiation Risk-free interest rates.
Engle, R.F., Granger, C.W.J., 1987. Co-integration and error orretion: representation,
estimation and testing, Eonometria 55, 251-76.
EIOPA, 2013. Tehnial Speiation on the Long Term Guarantee Assessment, European
Insurane and Oupational Pensions Authority, Frankfurt.
Favero, C., Pagano, M., von Thadden, E.L., 2010. How does liquidity aet government
bond yields?, Journal of Finanial and Quantitative Analysis, 45, 107-134.
Fountas, S., Wu, J.-L., 1998. Tests for interest rate onvergene and strutural breaks in
the EMS, Applied Finanial Eonomis 8, 127-32.
Giordano, R., M. Perioli, Tommasino, P., 2013. Pure or wake-up all ontagion? Another
look at the EMU sovereign debt risis, Bana di Italia Working Paper.
Gomez-Puig, M., 2009. The immediate eet of monetary union over EU-15's sovereign
debt yield spreads, Applied Eonomis, 41, 929-939.
Gregory, A., Hansen, B., 1996. Residual-based tests for ointegration in models with regime
shifts, Journal of Eonometris 70, 99-126.
Haldane, A. G., Hall, S.G., 1991. Sterling's relationship with the Dollar and the Deutshe-
mark: 1976-89, Eonomi Journal 101, 436-43.
Hansen, H., Johansen, S., 1999. Some tests for parameter onstany in ointegrated VAR
models, Eonometris Journal 2, 306-33.
Insurane Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013. Funding the future: Insurers' role as institu-
tional investors, Brussels and London.
International Monetary Fund, 2011. Possible Unintended Consequenes of Basel III and
Solveny II, Working Paper No. 11/187, Washington, DC.
Jenkins, M.A., Madzharova, P., 2008. Real interest rate onvergene under the euro, Ap-
plied Eonomis Letters 15, 473-76.
Johansen, S., 1988. Statistial analysis of ointegrating vetors, Journal of Eonomi Dy-
namis and Control 12, 213-54.
116
Juselius, K., 2006. The Cointegrated VAR Model: Methodology and Appliations, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, England.
Karfakis, C., Moshos, D., 1990. Interest rate linkages within the European Monetary
System: a time series analysis, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 22, 388-94.
Katsimbris, G., Miller, S., 1993. Interest rate linkages within the European Monetary Sys-
tem: further analysis, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25, 771-79.
Kejriwal, M., 2008. Cointegration with strutural breaks: An appliation to the Feldstein-
Horioka Puzzle, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamis & Eonometris 12, 1-37.
Kejriwal, M., Perron, P., 2008. The limit distribution of the estimates in ointegrated
regression models with multiple strutural hanges, Journal of Eonometris 146,
59-73.
Kejriwal, M., Perron, P., 2010. Testing for multiple strutural hanges in ointegrated
regression models, Journal of Business and Eonomi Statistis 28, 503-22.
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P.C.B., Shmidt, P., Shin, Y., 1992. Testing the null of statio-
narity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that eonomi time
series have a unit root?, Journal of Eonometris 54, 159-78.
Laopodis, N.T., 2008. Government bond market integration within European Union, In-
ternational Researh Journal of Finane and Eonomis, 19, 56-76.
Ludwig, A., 2013a. Sovereign risk ontagion in the Eurozone: a time-varying oeient
approah, Dresden Disussion Paper Series in Eonomis 02/13, Dresden University
of Tehnology, Faulty of Business and Eonomis, Germany.
Ludwig, A., 2013b. Testing the null of ointegration with a strutural break: optimal kernel
and bandwidth seletion, Eonomis Bulletin, 33, 2828-2839.
Lund, J., 1999. A model for studying the eet of EMU on European yield urves, Review
of Finane, 2, 321-363.
Pozzi, L., Wolswijk, G., 2012. The time-varying integration of euro area government bond
markets, European Eonomi Review 56, 36-53.
Sephton, P.S., 1995. Response surfae estimates of the KPSS stationarity test, Eonomis
Letters 47, 255-61.
Stok, J.H., Watson, M.W., 1993. A simple estimator of ointegrating vetors in higher
order integrated systems, Eonometria 61, 783-820.
Swarup, A., 2012. A Well-Intentioned Folly: The Maroeonomi Impliations of Solveny
II, Eonomi Aairs 32, 17-23.
117
von Hagen, J., Shukneht L., Wolswijk, G., 2011. Government bond risk premiums in
the EU revisited: The impat of the nanial risis, European Journal of Politial
Eonomy, 27, 36-43.
Yang, J., 2005. Government bond market linkages: evidene from Europe, Applied Finan-
ial Eonomis 15, 599-610.
118
5 A simplied utuation test statisti for multiple oin-
tegration break points: an appliation to bond market
onvergene
Abstrat
This paper suggests a graphial proedure based on a simplied and easy-to-
implement version of the Hansen-Johansen utuation test statisti for breaks in
ointegration relationships. Like the original test it is based on the reursive estimati-
on of eigenvalues in Johansen's maximum likelihood approah. The original test was
designed to distinguish between zero and one break in the ointegration relationship.
We provide evidene from Monte Carlo simulations that the simplied statisti may
serve as a graphial devie to detet even multiple breaks. Its performane depends
on the break height and the sign of hange in ointegration parameters. We nd that
estimates of the break dates, if observable, are unbiased.
We apply the graphial proedure to assess the stability of ointegration of bond
yields of Spain, Italy and Portugal with German yields for the period 1995-2013
whih is supported by the standard trae test for ointegration. Yet, the simplied
utuation test statisti shows that a stable relationship with German yields is only
present for sub-periods between the introdution of the Euro and the global nanial
risis. The statistial robustness of our results is supported by a forward and bakward
appliation of the ointegration breakdown test by Andrews and Kim (2003).
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5.1 Introdution
Cointegration analysis is one of the most intensely used eonometri tehniques in eono-
mis. Cointegration implies the existene of ommon stohasti trends whih, after a shok,
move the onsidered time series bak to a long-run equilibrium relationship. The inferene
of ointegration requires long sample periods. Due to their length, however, relationships
between suh series are likely to be inuened by events suh as poliy hanges or rises.
The time-varying relations of maroeonomi variables are often addressed by the reursive
appliation of the ointegration tehniques proposed by Johansen (1988, 1991).
76
Enlarging
the information set in eah time step, the onvergene behavior of one variable to another,
the degree of onvergene in a system of more than two variables or the ourrene of
strutural breaks an be inferred. This approah is used in various eonomi disiplines,
e.g. to examine the stability of a long-run exhange rate model (Hunter and Ali, 2014), of
the relation between domesti and imported ethanol pries (Zhang et. al, 2014), of loan
demand and supply funtions (De Mello and Pisu, 2010) and money demand funtions
(Bruggeman et.al, 2003, Carstensen, 2006) as well as to test the ability to ondut interest
rate foreasts in times of nanial risis (Kunze et. al, 2013). Further, reursive trae tests
are used to estimate the number of ommon stohasti trends and thus to evaluate the
onvergene of e.g. stok markets (Rangvid, 2001) or bond markets (Yang, 2005).
In all appliations mentioned above, eigenvalues from the ore of Johansen's (1988, 1991)
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation approah were determined in eah iteration of the
reursive approah. Rangvid (2001) and Yang (2005) evaluate the trae test statisti, whih
is a funtion of these eigenvalues. The other authors mentioned above apply the utua-
tion test proposed by Hansen and Johansen (1999), whih ompares reursively updated
eigenvalues with the eigenvalue estimated on the full sample period. If their dierene,
suitably normalized, exeeds a ritial value for the rst time, stability of the ointegration
relationship is rejeted. Test inferene about further strutural breaks after this point of
time is invalid by nature as the distribution of test statisti is derived under the null of
onstant parameters.
Despite the utuation test's design to distinguish between zero and only one break in the
76
See Perron (2006) for a survey of methods related to testing for strutural breaks.
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ointegration relationship, we examined under whih onditions the reursively updated
estimates of the eigenvalue an yield a graphial devie to detet even multiple break
points. To our best knowledge, suh a study has not been undertaken yet. For our purpose,
it sues to fous on the time-varying elements of the utuation test statisti whih gives
a simplied and easy-to-implement version of the utuation test. It turns out that this
approah may serve as a suitable graphial devie to loate multiple strutural hanges in
ointegration relations. We nd that breaks an even be deteted at the orret loation if
they are at the beginning or end of the sample. There are ases, however, in whih a break
is hardly observable at all.
To omplement the ndings from the graphial devie, we further reommend the appli-
ation of the ointegration breakdown tests proposed by Andrews and Kim (2003). Their
tests are designed to rejet stability of the ointegration relationship when the period of
instability is short suh as at the beginning or end of a sample.
Moreover, we provide evidene that the results of Johansen's (1988) trae test might be
misleading when assessing the ointegration of the bond markets of Spain, Italy and Por-
tugal with the German bond market in the period 1995 - 2013. Instead, a ombination of
the simplied utuation test statisti and the forward and bakward appliation of the
test proposed by Andrews and Kim (2003) enables us to loate strutural breaks aused
by the introdution of the Euro as well as the reent nanial risis. This proedure yields
estimates for periods of stable ointegration relationships whih are shown to last from
1999:10 to 2008:01 for Italy, from 1999:05 to 2008:09 for Portugal and from 1999:10 to
2008:05 for Spain. Lastly, we ompare these results with results obtained from a sequential
testing framework for multiple breaks proposed by Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010).
The paper is strutured as follows. Setion 5.2 provides the tehnial bakground of our
analysis as well as our main results for the break-detetion performane of the Hansen-
Johansen approah. Bond market onvergene between Spain, Italy, Portugal and Germany
is examined in Setion 5.3 and Setion 5.4 ontains our onlusions.
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5.2 Testing the stability of ointegration relations
In the following, we provide a brief desription of the ML estimation approah and the issues
that need to be onsidered when setting up a vetor error orretion model (Setion 5.2.1).
Setion 5.2.2 summarizes standard ointegration tests. We then provide results of a Monte
Carlo study examining the reursive estimation approah by Hansen and Johansen (1999)
in Setion 5.2.3. Setion 5.2.4 highlights the essentials of the ointegration breakdown test
by Andrews and Kim (2003).
5.2.1 Vetor error orretion model
Setup
Johansen (1988, 1991) proposes a statistial framework to model long-run relationships
between non-stationary time series whih allows the estimation of equilibrium relations as
well as the series' adjustment behavior to shoks on equilibriums. We will desribe this
framework briey here.
Letting Xt be an n-dimensional vetor of time series, a vetor error orretion model
(VECM) of order p is set up as
∆Xt = µt +ΠXt−1 +
p−1∑
j=1
Γj∆Xt−j + εt (5.1)
where Π is an n × n-matrix of rank r, µt is a vetor of deterministi terms and Γi are
n × n-matries. Cointegration is present if and only if 0 < r < n holds. In the ase
r = 0, a VAR(p-1) model in rst dierenes is suitable. In the ase r = n, eq. (5.1) an
be transformed into a standard VAR(p) model in levels. Hene, testing for ointegration
means testing for a redued rank of Π. If Π has redued rank, it an be written as
Π = αβ ′ (5.2)
where α and β are n× r-matries. The matrix β ontains ointegration oeients whih
lead to stationary residuals et−1 = β
′Xt−1 (deviations from equilibrium). The matrix α =
(αi)i=1,...,n is a loading matrix whih ontains speed of adjustment oeients. The vetor
αi desribes the extent to whih a series (Xt)i reats to deviations from the long-run
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equilibrium.
The deterministi omponent µt an be set using one of ve ases whih allow modeling
linear and quadrati trends as well.
77
The test results on the ointegration rank r depend
on the number of lags p as well as on the hoie of the deterministi terms.78 Hene, only
after nding an appropriate parameterization of the VECM, one an properly test for
ointegration using the test statistis proposed by Johansen (1988, 1991).
A suggestion for the lag parameter p is usually obtained by information riteria. However,
this may be inappropriate for the following reasons. In many ases it turns out that the
residuals εt in eq. (5.1) still exhibit serial orrelation. Cheung and Lai (1993) show that
standard information riteria are not well-performing in nding the orret lag number p
and tend to under-parameterization. Sine a model with a lower than the true number of
lags may spuriously detet ointegration (Gonzalo, 1994), we instead inrease the number
of lags p sequentially until there is no serial orrelation in the errors. To test for serial
orrelation, we apply the Ljung-Box Q-statistis with orders 1 to 30.
Estimation
Dening Z0t = ∆Xt, Z1t = Xt−1 and Z2t = (∆X
′
t−1, . . . ,∆X
′
t−(p−1), 1)
′
, (5.1) in ombination
with (5.2) an be written as
Z0t = αβ
′Z1t + ΓZ2t + εt (5.3)
where Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γp−1, µt). Regressing Z0t on Z2t and Z1t on Z2t gives residuals R0t and
R1t, respetively. Aording to the Frish-Waugh theorem, estimation of αβ
′
in eq. (5.3) is
equivalent to its estimation in
R0t = αβ
′R1t + et (5.4)
Johansen (1988, 1991) shows that solving eq. (5.4) using maximum likelihood an be re-
dued to the generalized eigenvalue problem
∣∣λS11 − S10S−100 S01∣∣ = 0 (5.5)
77
Regarding seletion riteria for these ases, we refer to Juselius (2006).
78
For a disussion of this point, see Cheung and Lai (1993) and Ahking (2002).
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with Sij = T
−1
∑
tRitRjt. The solution of eq. (5.5) gives estimates λˆ1 > · · · > λˆn for the
eigenvalues. These estimates are used to test for the ointegration rank r (see Setion 5.2.2),
whih is equal to the number of eigenvalues signiantly greater than zero. Eigenvetors
orresponding to these r largest eigenvalues provide  after a suitable normalization  the
matrix of ointegration vetors β. Lastly, speed of adjustments α and short-run oeients
Γi an be obtained using standard OLS.
5.2.2 Testing for ointegration
Johansen (1988, 1991) proposes two test statistis for the ointegration rank of Π. The
trae statisti tests the null of a rank smaller or equal to r and is dened as
λtr = −T
n∑
i=r+1
ln(1− λˆi) (5.6)
where (λˆi)i=1,...,n denote the estimated eigenvalues in dereasing order. The λmax statisti
tests the null of a rank equal to r and is dened as
λmax = −T ln(1− λˆr+1) (5.7)
Aording to Cheung and Lai (1993), the trae statisti is preferable to the λmax statistis
as it is more robust to deviations from the assumption of normally distributed errors.
Moreover, Rahbek et al. (2002) shows that the trae statisti is robust to moderate ARCH
eets. Hene, we fous solely on the trae test in the following. Throughout this paper,
we use nite sample size-orreted p-values of the trae test by Doornik (1998).
As an example, onsider a bivariate model, i.e. n = 2. Cointegration an only our if the
estimated ointegration rank is equal to one. Hene, irrespetive whih of the test statistis
mentioned above we use, the null of r = 0 has to always be rejeted, whereas the null of
either r ≤ 1 (when the trae statisti is used) or r = 1 (when the λmax statisti is used)
has to be aepted.
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5.2.3 The Hansen-Johansen (1999) approah
Hansen and Johansen (1999) propose a test (utuation test) for the null of onstant
ointegration oeients β and speeds of adjustment α in a VECM (see eq. (5.1)).
Their test statisti H is able to give information about the stability of ointegration rela-
tions and is based on the evolution of eigenvalues λˆi,t in reursively growing subsamples
[1, t] in relation to the eigenvalue λˆi,T = λˆi determined from the entire sample:
H = sup
1≤t≤T
τi(t) (5.8)
with
τi(t) =
t√
T
Σ
−1/2
ii
∣∣∣λˆi,t − λˆi,T ∣∣∣ (5.9)
Here, Σii denotes the variane of λi (see Hansen and Johansen, 1999). Sine the eigenvalues
an be shown to be quadrati funtions of α and β (Juselius, 2006), stable parameters α and
β imply stable eigenvalues. In reverse, the non-onstany of the eigenvalues has to result
from the instability of α or β. The null of onstant parameters is rejeted if H exeeds a
ritial value derived from the limiting distribution whih is the supremum of the absolute
value of a univariate Brownian Bridge (Hansen and Johansen, 1999). If the null is rejeted
at some time T1, the subsequent omparison of τi(t) where t > T1 with the ritial value
is not possible anymore as the limiting distribution of the test is derived under the null of
parameter onstany for the entire interval [1, T ] (Juselius, 2006).
In the following we examine the question whether the utuation test  negleting the
original purpose of Hansen and Johansen (1999) to distinguish between the null of zero
breaks and the alternative of one break  an also be a good graphial devie to determine
the existene and loation of multiple breaks. For this purpose, it is suient to only
onsider the time-varying elements in eq. (5.9), whih gives
τ¯i(t) := t
∣∣∣λˆi,t − λˆi,T ∣∣∣ (5.10)
We all this quantity the adjusted utuation test statisti. Next, we model a data genera-
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ting proess (DGP) of a bivariate VECM of order p = 2:
∆X1,t
∆X2,t
 =
α1
α2

β1
β2

′X1,t−1
X2,t−1
+
γ11 γ12
γ21 γ22

∆X1,t−1
∆X2,t−1
+
ε1t
ε2t
 (5.11)
where Xj,0 = 0 and εj,t are i.i.d. N(0, 1)-distributed for j = 1, 2 and t = 1, . . . , 200. The
short-run oeients are modelled as γ11 = 0.3, γ12 = −0.1, γ21 = 0.1 and γ22 = 0.3. β1
is normalized to 1. In a bivariate VECM, there an be only one ointegration relation (see
Setion 5.2.2), whih orresponds to the non-zero eigenvalue λ1. Hene, it sues to fous
solely on τ¯1(t).
We will onsider one break and two break ases in both parameters α and β. Aording to
further experiments (not reported), the results an be generalized to ases with more than
two breaks. Eah experiment is repliated 1,000 times. The reursion starts at a window
size of 20. Mean values and 90% ondene intervals for τ¯1(t) are reported in eah ase.
1) Cases with one break in β
First, let α = (−0.05, 0)′ and β2 = −1.5 for t = 1, . . . , 100 and β2 = −1.0 for t =
101, . . . , 200 (ase 1a), whih is a moderate break.79 Figure 5.1a shows a distint kink at
t = 100 as desired. However, if one hanges the setup to β2 = −1.0 for t = 1, . . . , 100
and β2 = −1.5 for t = 101, . . . , 200 (ase 1b), the break annot be deteted (Figure 5.1b).
This observation is in line with Juselius (2006) who argues that the utuations test is
likely to be rather onservative with respet to the null hypothesis of onstany. The
weak performane of τ¯1(t) to detet the break in the latter ase is a result of the following
two properties:
 estimated eigenvalues onverge: λˆi,t → λˆi,T for t→ T ; and
 as all eigenvalues are a quadrati funtion of β, the larger β2, the larger the eigenvalues
λi beome
Table 5.1 gives an empirial illustration of these two properties for the DGPs under onsi-
deration.
79
We an set α2 = 0 without loss of generality. Results remain unhanged when setting this parameter
dierently from zero.
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Figure 5.1: Adjusted utuation test: ases with one break in beta
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Note: a) the upper left panel shows the ase of a dereasing β2 at the break (t = 100), b) the upper right
panel shows the ase of an inreasing β2 at the break (t = 100), ) the middle left panel is equivalent to
ase a) with break loation t = 190, d) the middle right panel is equivalent to ase b) with break loation
t = 190, e) the lower left panel is equivalent to ase a) with break loation t = 40, f) the middle right
panel is equivalent to ase b) with break loation t = 40
In ase 1a the dierene |λˆ1,t − λˆ1,T | is large enough for t < 100 that the onvergene
λˆ1,t → λˆ1,T has a smaller eet on τ¯1(t) than the expansion of t. We therefore observe an
upward-slope of τ¯1(t). For t > 100, the dierene |λˆ1,t − λˆ1,T | is relatively small due to
the onvergene of the reursively determined eigenvalue. This onvergene has a larger
impat than the expansion of t, so we observe a downward-slope of τ¯1(t). In ase 1b the
same eet for t < 100 annot our as the dierene |λˆ1,t− λˆ1,T | is relatively small. This is
reeted in the small eigenvalue λˆ1,100 relative to the eigenvalue of the entire sample λˆ1,200
(see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Mean eigenvalues
Case λˆ1,200 λˆ1,100 λˆ1,101:200
1a 0.0838 0.1321 0.1098
1b 0.0938 0.1011 0.1436
Note: the table provides the mean eigenvalue for the entire sample (olumn 1) as well as the mean eigen-
values for the rst and seond half of the sample (olumns 2 and 3) for the ases 1a and 1b. Numbers in
bold highlight periods with larger β2 in the DGP.
Next, we onsider DGPs with the same regime-shifts as in ases 1a and 1b but hange the
loation of the break point to t = 190 (ases 1 and 1d), whih orresponds to a break
fration of 0.95, and to t = 40 (ases 1e and 1f), whih orresponds to a break fration of
0.2. As the reursion starts at t = 20, setting a lower break fration than 0.2 would imply
an inrease in the volatility of results due to a low number of degrees of freedom in the
estimation at the beginning of the sample. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.1d display kinks in the
graph of τ¯1(t) at the expeted position t = 190. Even in the ase of an inreasing value of
β2 the break is observable as opposed to the ase with the same regime-shift in the middle
of the sample. For the DGPs with break at t = 40, the break is again only observable for
dereasing values of β2 (see Figure 5.1e) but not for inreasing values of β2 (see Figure
5.1f).
To onlude, the break detetion performane of the reursive eigenvalue approah does
not suer from a hange of the break fration away from the middle of the time period
under investigation. A restrition of our examination to ases with breaks in the middle of
the sample (for one break DGPs) and at one and two thirds of the sample (for two break
DGPs) is hene feasible.
2) Case with one break in alpha
Now let β2 = −1.0 and α2 = 0 for the entire period and α1 = −0.10 for t = 1, . . . , 100
and α1 = −0.05 for t = 101, . . . , 200 (ase 2a). Figure 5.2a shows a kink at t = 100 as
desired. If we hange the values of α1 in the sub-periods, the kink disappears (see Figure
5.2b). Sine the eigenvalues are also a quadrati funtion in α, the same argument as in
the ase of one break in β applies. Due to the symmetry of α and β in the eigenvalue, we
will restrit our analysis to ases whih inlude at least one break in β.
3) Case with two breaks in beta
We now let α = (−0.05, 0)′ and β2 = −1.5 for t = 1, . . . , 66 and β2 = −1.0 for t =
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Figure 5.2: Adjusted utuation test: ases with one break in alpha
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Note: a) the left panel shows the ase of a dereasing α1 at the break, b) the right panel shows the ase of
an inreasing α1 at the break.
67, . . . , 133 and β2 = −1.5 for t = 134 . . . , 200 (ase 3a). Figure 5.3a shows a kink at the
rst break whose mean loation is exatly estimated to be at t = 66. However, the seond
break annot be deteted. As β2 is dereasing at the rst and inreasing at the seond
break, this pattern follows from our ndings for the ase with one break in β2. Strutural
breaks seem to always be observable when the absolute values of β (or α) derease. If the
hanges in β2 happen in the reverse order as in ase 3a, the seond break is visible (see
Figure 5.3b).
If hanges in β2 our in a monotonously dereasing order, the break points seem to be
identiable using this method. To show this, we now let β2 = −1.5 for t = 1, . . . , 66 and
β2 = −1.0 for t = 67, . . . , 133 and β2 = −0.5 for t = 134, . . . , 200 (ase 3). Both breaks are
visible at the orret loation. In the ase of inreasing β2 (ase 3d), however, we annot
observe any lear kink marking a break.
4) Case with one break in beta and one in alpha
Eventually, we let α2 = 0 for the entire period, α1 = −0.10 and β2 = −2 for t = 1, . . . , 66,
α1 = −0.05 and β2 = −2 for t = 67, . . . , 133 and α1 = −0.05 and β2 = −1 for
t = 134, . . . , 200 (ase 4a). In Figure 5.4a, both regime-shifts are observable. The result
is remarkable beause it shows that the Hansen-Johansen (1999) approah is apable of
showing more than one break in the ase that they are aused by dierent parameters. If
suh breaks happen at the same time, the kink in the graph of τ¯1(t) may even be more
distint. To see this, onsider the DGP with α2 = 0 for the entire period, α1 = −0.10 and
β2 = −1.5 for t = 1, . . . , 100, and α1 = −0.05 and β2 = −1 for t = 101, . . . , 200. Results
for this ase are given in Figure 5.4b.
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Figure 5.3: Adjusted utuation test: ases with two breaks in beta
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Note: a) the upper left panel shows the ase of a dereasing β2 at the rst break and inreasing β2 at the
seond break , b) the upper right panel shows the ase with hanges in β2 in the reversed order, ) the
lower left panel shows the ase of monotonously dereasing β2, d) the lower right panel shows the ase
with hanges in β2 in the reversed order.
The results from Monte Carlo simulations show that the Hansen-Johansen (1999) approah
in general does not detet all breaks, a nding also mentioned by Juselius (2006). However,
there are ases in whih multiple breaks an be deteted. Moreover, if this approah signals
a break, whih an also be at the beginning or end of the sample, the estimation of the
loation of the break is unbiased.
The graphial devie τ¯1(t) desribed above should be ideally aompanied by a statistial
test whih is able to test for instability of the ointegration relationship at various points of
the sample inluding its beginning and end. Therefore we reommend the use of Andrews
and Kim's (2003) ointegration breakdown tests, whih are designed to test for instabilities
that our in short periods of time. This approah an be used to test for multiple strutural
breaks in a suessive manner. We desribe the test statistis and the simulation of ritial
values in the next setion and illustrate their suessive appliation in Setion 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.4: Adjusted utuation test: ases with one break in beta and one in alpha
0
✁
10
1✂
20
25
30
35
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
Mean lambda_1
C.I. 90% lambda_1
0
5
10
15
20
25
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
Mean lambda_1
C.I. 90% lambda_1
Note: a) the left panel shows the ase of a dereasing α1 at one third and a dereasing β2 at two thirds of
the sample, b) the right panel shows the ase with a dereasing α1 and β2 in the middle of the sample-
5.2.4 Cointegration breakdown test
Andrews and Kim (2003) present several test statistis for the breakdown of a stable
ointegration relationship at time T1 where the post-breakdown periodm is relatively small.
This is justied by the fat that the asymptotial behavior of this test is derived under
T1 →∞ and onstant m, whih is in ontrast to many other ointegration instability tests
whih require m→∞ as well. They reommend the use of this test after identiation of
the loation of strutural breaks in ointegration relationships by any other method. They
do not reommend using their test as the primary tool to nd strutural breaks in the
entire sample period.
Andrews and Kim (2003) onsider the model
X1t = β
′
0X2t + ut for t = 1, . . . , T1
X1t = β
′
tX2t + ut for t = T1 + 1, . . . , T1 +m (5.12)
where X2,t is a vetor that may inlude deterministi terms suh as a onstant or a linear
time trend and one or more stationary or non-stationary regressors. The null of their test
orresponds to stability of the ointegration relationship in the whole sample up to time
T1+m, i.e. βt = β0 and residuals being stationary. The alternative refers to stability up to
time T1 and either instability in the ointegration vetor β, i.e. βt 6= β0, or non-stationary
residuals ut for the observations t = T1 + 1, . . . , T1 +m. Their test statistis are based on
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the sum of squared post-breakdown residuals
Px =
T1+m∑
t=T1+1
uˆ2t (5.13)
and on the sum of squared reverse partial sums of post-breakdown residuals
Rx =
T1+m∑
t=T1+1
(
T1+m∑
s=t
uˆs
)2
(5.14)
Here, x denotes one of the ases A, B and C desribed in the following. Residuals are
determined as usual: uˆt = X1,t − βˆ ′X2,t.
In ase A, the ointegration vetor is estimated from all pre-breakdown observations but
no post-breakdown observations, i.e. βˆ = βˆ1:T1 . Any asymptotially eient estimator for
ointegration vetors suh as standard OLS (Engle and Granger, 1987), dynami OLS
(Stok and Watson, 1993) or full information maximum likelihood (Johansen, 1988 and
1991) an be used in the estimation. Critial values are simulated from the given data by a
sub-sampling approah. To this end, the test statisti is applied T1−m+1 times as follows.
In ase A, for j = 1, . . . , T1−m+1, βˆj is estimated from all observations t = 1, . . . , T1 with
t 6= j, . . . , j +m − 1 (leave-m-out estimator). The test statistis Px(βˆj) and Rx(βˆj) are
then applied to the residuals uˆt with t = j, . . . , j +m− 1. Given the T1 −m+ 1 values of
the test statisti, ritial values at level α are alulated as the empirial 1−α quantiles of
{Px(βˆj)}j=1,...,T1−m+1 and {Rx(βˆj)}j=1,...,T1−m+1, respetively. p-values an be determined
as the relative frequeny of Px(βˆj) exeeding Px and Rx(βˆj) exeeding Rx, respetively.
The stationarity of residuals as well as stability of the ointegration vetor under the null
hypothesis justify this approah. We refer to Andrews and Kim (2003) for a tehnial
derivation.
In Monte Carlo simulations for a wide range of models, Andrews and Kim (2003) show
that Pa and Ra tend to onsiderably over-rejet the null hypothesis in nite samples. To
adjust for these size distortions, they dene a ase B where the test statistis are built upon
estimators βˆ = βˆ1:T1+⌈m/2⌉ that take into aount all observation up to time T1 + ⌈m/2⌉.
This makes the test statisti less volatile and the null is rejeted less often than in ase A. In
ase C, the test statistis inorporate estimators βˆ = βˆ1:T using all observations. Andrews
and Kim (2003) nd that using the same ritial values as outlined above would lead to
132
under-rejetion of the null. Hene, ritial values are suggested to be derived from the sub-
sample statistis using a leave-m/2-out estimator βˆj,(2) that is based on the observations
t = 1, . . . , T1 with t 6= j, . . . , j + ⌈m/2⌉ − 1.
Aording to Andrews and Kim (2003), Pc and Rc appear to be the best two tests in terms
of size and power. The tests are robust against autoorrelation and heterosedastiity of
errors. The authors reommend the Pc test beause of its slightly better size properties.
However, we will also apply the Rc statistis in the empirial part of this paper.
5.3 Appliation to bond market onvergene
Camarero et al. (2002) dierentiate between the long-run onvergene and the athing-
up between bond markets. Bond markets are in the state of long-run onvergene if their
yields are ointegrated with ointegration vetor (1,−1) and a possibly non-zero onstant
whih represents a risk-premium. In this ase, there is a single ommon stohasti trend
inuening both series. Moreover, long-run onvergene an only be present if there are no
deterministi trends as they might lead to diverging levels of the series despite the ommon
stohasti trend underlying them. To allow for a risk-premium between bond yields, the
VECM in eq. (5.1) inludes a restrited onstant (Johansen ase 2):
β ′Xt−1 = X1,t−1 + β2X2,t−1 + β3 (5.15)
Here, β1 = 1 is set to ahieve a unique solution. The oeients β2 and β3, respetively, an
be interpreted as a slope oeient and an interept from an OLS regression. In ontrast to
OLS and in analogy to VAR models, however, both variables,X1 and X2, have a symmetri
inuene on the results of ointegration tests and parameter estimation.
If both markets are about to onverge, but have not yet fully onverged, β2 in the ointe-
gration vetor (1, β2) tends to -1. This is alled athing-up by Camarero et al. (2002). In
the following, we analyze the bond market onvergene of Spain, Italy and Portugal with
Germany. To this end, we set Xt = (iC,t, iGER,t) in eq. (5.15), with C being either SPA (for
Spain), ITA (for Italy) or POR (for Portugal). We estimate three dierent models, one for
eah ointegration relationship with the German bond yield series.
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5.3.1 Data desription and unit root tests
We use seondary market yields for government bonds at onstant 10-year maturity for
the period from 1995:01 to 2012:12 provided by Eurostat (see Figure 5.5). We thus over
events suh as the introdution of the Euro on 1 January 1999, the US subprime risis of
2007/2008 and the reent European sovereign debt risis in the period under investigation.
To test for unit roots, we rst apply the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)
and the non-parametri unit root test suggested by Breitung (2002). Breitung's (2002) test
omplements the KPSS test in that the null hypothesis and the alternative are interhan-
ged. It is also appliable in the ase of non-linear proesses. We inlude deterministi time
trends in both ases. Results (not reported) show that all four series are non-stationary at
onventional levels.
Sine our sample period ontains two events whih might have aused strutural breaks in
the bond yield series, the robustness of these results should be heked using unit-root tests
that have power against trend-stationary alternatives with strutural breaks. To this end,
we apply the tests proposed by Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lee and Straziih (2003).
These are unit root tests that allow for one and two strutural breaks, respetively. For both
tests, we selet the model with endogenous breaks in the level and trend and augment the
tests to take into aount serial orrelation of errors. As in the original papers, we determine
the number of lags in a general-to-spei approah starting with a maximum number of
ten lags whih is redued until the last augmented term is signiant at the 10% level.
Results (not reported) onrm the non-stationarity of all series at onventional levels.
80
5.3.2 Cointegration test
Table 5.2 provides results of Johansen's (1988) trae test. There is ointegration with the
German market yield series for yields of Portugal at the 5% level and Italy and Spain at
the 1% level. Stated dierently, the null hypothesis of zero non-zero eigenvalues is rejeted
for these ountries, whereas the null of a number of eigenvalues smaller or equal to one is
not. This allows us to apply the reursive approah to alulate τ¯1(t) in eq. (5.10) for the
ountries mentioned above.
80
Details regarding unreported results are provided by the authors upon request.
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Figure 5.5: Yields of 10-year government bonds (1995-2012)
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Table 5.2: Cointegration test and estimated ointegration vetor (whole sample)
Country
Johansen (1988) trae test
a
VECM parameter estimates
b
Lags H0: r = 0 H1: r ≤ 1 β2 β3
Italy
3
35.875*** 1.716 0.042 -4.595***
[0.0001℄ [0.8242℄ [0.9174℄ [0.0006℄
Portugal
7
22.258** 5.889 0.170 -5.415**
[0.0253℄ [0.2059℄ [0.7755℄ [0.0428℄
Spain
3
32.912*** 1.556 0.622 -6.955***
[0.0003℄ [0.8517℄ [0.1726℄ [0.0000℄
Note: a) the table shows the values of Johansen's (1988) trae test statisti and orresponding p-values
in the model with a restrited onstant (Johansen ase 2) and p lags (see the text in Setion 5.2.1 for
the derivation of p). Critial values are sample size-orreted and derived aording to Doornik (1998). b)
VECM parameter estimates for eq. (5.15) are given with p-values of Wald tests with null βi = 0. ***, **
and * denote signiane at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respetively.
The slope oeient β2 is not signiantly dierent from zero in any of the three models
onsidered (see Table 5.2). This asts doubt on the reliability of the trae test in this
ase. Figure 5.5 shows periods of athing-up at least until 1999, loser ties of bond yields
until 2008 and divergene sine then. These hanges may be the reason for the slope
oeient not being signiantly dierent from zero. This shows that it is neessary to
test for strutural breaks and to speify their timing to assess bond market onvergene
reliably.
5.3.3 Detetion of strutural breaks
Reursive eigenvalue approah
Figures 5.6-5.8 provide the adjusted utuation test statisti (5.10) for Italy, Spain and
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Portugal, respetively. We use a restrited onstant and the same number of lags as in
the estimation for the full sample to ensure omparability. In order to obtain a suient
number of degrees of freedom at the beginning of the reursion, we start the reursion
at t = 24 (1996:12) for Italy and Spain and at t=36 (1997:12) for Portugal. This setting
results from the higher number of lags in the model for Portugal (see Table 5.2).
All three graphs are dominated by a linear inrease in a period of about 9 years from
the end of the 1990s to 2008. The linear inrease reets the onstany of the relation
between reursively determined eigenvalues λˆ1,t and the eigenvalue λˆ1,T estimated for the
entire sample and results from the linear time fator in eq. (5.10). Hene, parameters of
the ointegration relation appear to be stable in this period. Aording to our ndings in
Setion 5.2.3, the dates of strutural hange in the ointegration relationships  if they
an be observed in the graphs  an be determined at the orret loation (in mean).
Periods of linear expansion in Figures 5.6-5.8 are from 1999:10 to 2008:01 for Italy, from
1999:05 to 2008:09 for Portugal and from 1999:10 to 2008:05 for Spain. We all these time
intervals the stability period in the following. We will disuss these dates after heking
their statistial robustness.
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Figure 5.6: Adjusted utuation test for Italy
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Aording to Figures 5.6-5.8, there is at least one more distint break point for eah ountry whih we
want to disuss only briey. For Italy, the steep fall in the graph of Figure 5.6 ours after June 2011. In July
2011, the Italian government passed austerity measures to derease budget deits. As these measures were
feared to further worsen prospets of eonomi growth, bond yields rose immensely in mid-2011 explaining
the break in Figure 5.6. For Spain, the sharp fall of the graph in Figure 5.8 ours after April 2010. In
April 2010 a bailout program was initiated for Greee whih inluded various austerity measures and was
followed by rating downgrades, stok market delines and a rise in bond yields for the Southern European
ountries. For Portugal, there seems to be an absene of any stable relationship with German bond yields
after the rst break in 2008:09.
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Figure 5.7: Adjusted utuation test for Portugal
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Figure 5.8: Adjusted utuation test for Spain
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Cointegration breakdown tests
In the following we test whether the end dates of the intervals identied in the previous
sub-setion are indeed points in time that are followed by a shok to the ointegration
relation leading to a ointegration breakdown. To this end, we apply the ointegration
breakdown tests Pc and Rc proposed by Andrews and Kim (2003) in two diretions. In
the time-forward mode, we trunate the sample at the start date of the stability periods
determined above and hek whether the end date is indeed followed by a strutural break.
In the time-bakward diretion, we trunate the sample at the end date and want to onrm
that the start dates were hosen properly in that they indeed belong to the stability period.
To estimate the ointegration vetor, we hoose both the standard OLS estimator and the
full information ML estimator. Critial values are determined via a sub-sampling method
(see Setion 5.2.4). Sine the estimators have relatively low power for m = 1 (Andrews and
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Table 5.3: End-of-sample ointegration breakdown tests
Country
Stable Period
m T1 +m
Pc Rc
Start End (T1) OLS FIML OLS FIML
Italy
1999:10 2008:01
3 2008:04
0.146***
[0.000℄
0.156***
[0.000℄
0.696***
[0.000℄
0.722***
[0.000℄
6 2008:07
0.333***
[0.000℄
0.381***
[0.000℄
5.408***
[0.000℄
5.936***
[0.000℄
Portugal
1999:05 2008:09
3 2008:12
0.768***
[0.000℄
1.144***
[0.000℄
0.963***
[0.000℄
1.198***
[0.000℄
6 2009:03
3.456***
[0.000℄
5.777***
[0.000℄
5.334***
[0.000℄
5.960***
[0.000℄
Spain
1999:10 2008:05
3 2008:08
0.042*
[0.089℄
0.033
[0.228℄
0.204*
[0.081℄
0.154
[0.202℄
6 2008:11
0.449***
[0.000℄
0.510***
[0.000℄
7.126***
[0.000℄
7.633***
[0.000℄
Note: the table provides results of the Andrews and Kim (2003) tests for ointegration breakdown in the
period [T1+1, T1+m]. The seond olumn states the rst observation used. p-values are given in brakets
below the test statisti. For FIML, the same model as for the full sample is applied (see Setion 5.3.2).
Kim, 2003), we hoosem = 3 andm = 6 whih orrespond to one quarter and two quarters,
respetively. Table 5.3 shows that there are almost no dierenes between the results of the
Pc and the Rc test and between the estimators seleted for the ointegration vetor. At the
5% level, all tests give the same qualitative results. For Italy and Portugal, a breakdown
of stable ointegration parameters is shown in the one quarter windows, whereas for Spain
stability is not rejeted when looking at the one quarter window after T=2008:05, but it
is rejeted when the window is expanded to two quarters. Hene, there is evidene that a
breakdown of ointegration ours after the end points of the intervals given above.
We also want to examine whether the start dates of the intervals already belong to a
suiently stable period whih would serve as a justiation for their seletion. Sine
the results do not depend on the seletion of the test statisti and the estimator for the
ointegration vetor, we restrit our attention to the Pc test in ombination with the
OLS estimator but inrease the lengths m of breakdown periods in the following. The
restrition to the standard OLS estimator allows the estimation from right to left, i.e.
we start at 2012:12 and end at 1995:01. Reversing the sample allows us to apply our
algorithm without modiation for the beginning-of-sample ase. Stability is not rejeted
for a 12-month period before the start date for Italy and Portugal and for a 6-month
period for Spain (see Table 5.4). Hene, our seletion of start dates for the stability periods
is suiently onservative in the sense that the stability period ould likely be extended
by earlier observations, espeially for Italy and Portugal.
138
Table 5.4: Beginning-of-sample ointegration breakdown tests
Country
Stable Period Pc(OLS)
Start End (T1) m = 3 m = 6 m = 12 m = 24
Italy
2008:01 1999:10
0.005
[0.704℄
0.006
[0.916℄
0.051
[0.416℄
0.251*
[0.078℄
Portugal
2008:09 1999:05
0.012
[0.559℄
0.029
[0.556℄
0.114
[0.216℄
0.425**
[0.044℄
Spain
2008:05 1999:10
0.008
[0.471℄
0.066
[0.141℄
0.186**
[0.043℄
0.315***
[0.000℄
Note: the table provides results of the Andrews and Kim (2003) Pc test for ointegration breakdown at
the beginning of the sample (see the text in Setion 5.3.3 for further explanations).
Disussion of break dates
The ointegration breakdown tests suggested by Andrews and Kim (2003) provide support
for the stability periods derived by the graphial proedure. Applying the trae test again,
ointegration is supported for the ountry-individual stability periods (see Table 5.5). The
begin dates of the stability periods lie in 1999 for all three ountries following the intro-
dution of the Euro on 1 January 1999. Although the onvergene of Spanish, Portuguese
and Italian bond yields to German yields had already started earlier (see Figure 5.5), a
stable ointegration relationship seems to have emerged only after the introdution of the
Euro. For Portugal, the stability period starts ve months earlier than in the other two
ountries. This is most likely a onsequene of the smaller bond volume traded allowing
for a faster onvergene with German bond yields.
The breakdown of stable ointegration relationships with German yields in 2008 may be
surprising when only onsidering the fat the German output fell in 2008 as a result of the
global nanial risis in 2007/08 as well. However, nanial markets had already antiipated
that strutural weaknesses of the Southern European eonomies would be barriers to a fast
and sustainable reovery of these eonomies:
 Andrade and Duarte (2011) argue that the severity of the impat of the global nan-
ial risis on Portugal was a onsequene of an already ongoing Portuguese risis. This
risis involved output stagnation, low and dereasing levels of savings ontributing
to the growth of debt levels, worsening international ompetitiveness, an expensive
parallel state struture onsisting of publi and semi-publi rms whih autono-
mously produed o-balane debt, and a large number of publi-private partnerships
that hid future expenses of the Portuguese state from the urrent deit and redued
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transpareny about the atual size of the state debt.
 Di Quirio (2010) notes that Italy's eonomy was very suseptible to the global nan-
ial risis beause of delining pre-risis output growth rates, the absene of eonomi
reforms to dene a new growth model to reat to inreased foreign ompetition espe-
ially from Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, missing links between universities
and the industry, a high taxation of ompany prots to fund redundant bureaurati
strutures and a new wave of orruption as well as lientelism sine the end of the
1990s.
 As for Spain, Carballo-Cruz (2011) points out that the onentration on the on-
strution and real estate setor sine 1997, where business was mainly naned by
the huge number of loans supplied by Spanish banks, had severe onsequenes after
the burst of the housing bubble in 2007/08. Depreiation of house values inreased
the indebtedness of private rms and threatened the solveny of banks. Banks started
to fae problems to renane themselves on the nanial markets. Rising sovereign
bond yields were fostered by market partiipants' fears of a soialization of private
debt by the Spanish state.
To sum up, loal developments pre-dating the global nanial risis had already laid the
ground for nanial markets to be skeptial about these eonomies ability to reover in a
fast and sustainable manner. Thus, inreasing debt levels and negative prospets regarding
the future ability to ope with the debt burden triggered inreasing risk premiums for
sovereign debt relative to Germany whih led to a breakdown of the lose ties of market
yields observed until 2008.
The dierenes in the timing of the ointegration breakdown as shown in Table 5.3 an
be explained by the following two observations. First, aording to Eurostat data, the
year-to-year relative hange in Italian GDP was already negative in the seond quarter
of 2008 (-0.5%) with further exaerbation in subsequent quarters, whereas Portuguese
and Spanish GDP only started falling in the last quarter of 2008. Hene, the reessive
tendenies emerged earlier in Italy than in the other two ountries leading to an earlier rise
of risk premiums for sovereign debt. Seondly, the downturn of Spanish house pries was
at its peak in mid-2008. In this respet, Eurostat's onstrution output index for building
onstrution reveals a year-to-year derease of 20.1% in 2008:04 and 27.5% in 2008:09. The
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Table 5.5: Cointegration test and estimated ointegration vetor (stability period)
Country
Johansen (1988) trae test VECM parameter estimates
Wald test for
β2 = −1
Lags H0: r = 0 H1: r ≤ 1 β2 β3
Italy
3
24.744*** 3.497 -1.053*** -0.031 3.431*
[0.010℄ [0.503℄ [0.000℄ [0.768℄ [0.064℄
Portugal
3
21.590** 1.845 -1.179*** 0.551*** 12.029***
[0.031℄ [0.802℄ [0.000℄ [0.005℄ [0.001℄
Spain
3
33.734*** 4.190 -1.143*** 0.487*** 14.675***
[0.000℄ [0.397℄ [0.000℄ [0.001℄ [0.000℄
Note: see the notes under Table 5.2 for details on all olumns exept the last. Here a Wald test statisti
and the orresponding p-value are given to test for long-run onvergene.
onvergene with German bond yields ame to an end at this point in time.
As for the stability period, full onvergene of the bond yields of Spain and Portugal to
German yields did not take plae. Wald tests for a unit slope oeient in eq. (5.15) are
rejeted at the 1% level (see Table 5.5). For Italy, the rejetion of long-run onvergene at
the 10% level, but not at the 5% level seems to be a borderline ase. The estimated slope
oeient for Italy is 1.05 in absolute value. This is the losest to unity of these three
ountries. Hene, the Southern European bonds onsidered here were still in the proess of
athing-up to German bonds when the stable ointegration relations broke down in 2008.
Results from tests proposed by Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010)
Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010) propose a sequential testing approah that yields on-
sistent estimates of the number and loation of break dates in equations that ontain
non-stationary but ointegrated variables. As is the ase with the utuation test, their
UDmax test statisti has the null of a stable ointegration relationship. In ontrast to the
utuation test, it is based on the (dynami) OLS approah and thus fouses only on the
variation in the ointegration vetor β as in eq. (5.15).
Using the sequential testing approah, Ludwig (2014) also nds two strutural breaks for
the ountry equations of Italy, Portugal and Spain. Similarly to the results stated above, the
breaks are indued by the introdution of the Euro and the reent nanial risis. However,
periods of stable ointegration relationships turn out to be longer for the approah proposed
by Kejriwal and Perron, i.e. they begin in 1997:08 for eah ountry and end in 2008:10 for
Italy, 2008:12 for Spain and 2010:04 for Portugal. It seems that the reursive approah
applied here is more sensitive to hanges indued by a single observation. In eah reursion
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one observation is added and subsequent observations whih ould oset the inuene of
this single observation are negleted at this point. As the approah suggested by Kejriwal
and Perron onsiders the observations of the entire sample at one, the inuene of some
outlier observation ould indeed by oset by surrounding data points.
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5.4 Conlusions
We showed that the reursive eigenvalue approah by Hansen and Johansen (1999) an be
used to detet multiple strutural breaks in ointegration relations. The estimator of the
break loation is unbiased. As the detetion of breaks from a graphial proedure is to some
extent tentative, we ompensate this issue by performing a test that has power against the
breakdown of a ointegration relationship in a short period suh as at the beginning or end
of a sample (Andrews and Kim, 2003).
The benets of this proedure were illustrated in an appliation on bond market onver-
gene. The reursive eigenvalue approah gives at least two break points in bivariate models
of the bond yields of Spain, Italy and Portugal with German yields for the period from
1995 to 2012. Using Andrews and Kim's (2003) test, we found a breakdown of ointegration
for the bond yields of these ountries with German yields at dierent points in 2008. We
provided reasons for the ourrene of these breakdowns and their dierene in timing.
Our ndings show that despite unstable eonomi fundamentals as well as little or highly-
onentrated output growth, the bond yields of sovereign debt of Italy, Spain and Portugal
were losely linked with German yields after the introdution of the Euro. Given the absene
of exhange rate risk as well as the equality of monetary poliy of Eurozone ountries,
nanial markets inferred the equality of solveny of the ountries under examination for
about ten years. The onvergene of bond yields ame to an end when the global nanial
82
As a onsequene, if one wants to losely trak the evolution of ointegration relations one a period-
by-period basis, reursive ointegration tehniques suh as the utuation test statisti (as presented in
this paper) and rolling ointegration tehniques (as in the paper in Chapter 6) should be applied. If one is
more interested in an ex-post analysis of breaks in a speied time period that rules out short-run outliers,
the Kejriwal and Perron approah (as used in the paper in Chapter 4) seems to be the appropriate hoie.
The eonometri tehniques mentioned before an only be applied in the ase of non-stationary variables.
In the ase of stationary variables, Bai and Perron (1998) provided the ritial values for the same test
statistis as in Kejriwal and Perron (2010). An example for the use of rolling estimation tehniques whih
enable the researher to losely trak the impat of events on the regression oeients is provided by the
paper in Chapter 3.
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risis hit these ountries and market partiipants re-evaluated growth prospets in these
ountries and their ability to redue their high deit to GDP and debt to GDP ratios
sustainably.
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6 A two-step approah to examine the dynamis of mar-
ket onvergene
Abstrat
We present an improved approah to examine onvergene of markets for e.g.
equity, bonds or ommodities. The approah is motivated by Monte Carlo simulations
and onsists of two steps. First, we test for regime-shifts in the ointegration paths
and ointegration under strutural breaks. If equilibrium errors are stationary, we
then obtain the degree of onvergene by rolling speeds of adjustment in a vetor
error orretion model. Our approah is illustrated by an appliation on stok market
onvergene.
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This hapter ontains the working paper version of Karmann, A., Ludwig, A., 2014. A two-step
approah to examine the dynamis of market onvergene, Applied Eonomis Letters 21, 284-288. Used
with permission from Taylor & Franis. This paper was o-authored by Professor Alexander Karmann.
Throughout the writing of this paper I beneted from valuable disussions with Professor Alexander
Karmann, whih are reeted in the last paragraph of Setion 6.3, Setion 6.4 and the seond footnote in
Setion 6.2 as well as the rst footnote in Setion 6.3, both of whih desribe alternative methodologial
approahes whih go beyond the sope of this paper and provide avenues for further researh.
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6.1 Introdution
The degree of onvergene of markets is often addressed by ointegration-based tehniques.
Mylonidis and Kollias (2010) and Pasual (2003) propose a rolling speed of adjustment
approah in whih a window of xed size is rolled over the whole sample to detet hanging
patterns of linkages between stok markets. The larger speeds of adjustments assigned to
a ertain market are, the stronger it reats on shoks to the system of markets.
This paper ontributes to the literature as follows. First, we show that the pure rolling
speed of adjustment approah may produe misleading results as a hange in the speed
of adjustment estimates an atually stem from a strutural break in the ointegration
equation. Moreover, we take into aount that the speed of adjustment oeient an be
alulated non-spuriously only if the residuals from the ointegration relationship assumed
are stationary. Both issues were not onsidered by Mylonidis and Kollias (2010) and Pasual
(2003).
Seond, we provide a solution to these shortomings by the following two-step proedure: i)
test for strutural breaks in a ointegration relationship and omplement this by a test for
ointegration under strutural breaks; ii) apply the rolling speed of adjustment approah to
the residuals of the ointegration relationship after having inorporated strutural breaks
in the estimation.
Third, we present an appliation of this approah to the stok market indies of Germany,
Frane and the UK for the period 1960/01 till 2012/10. The dynamis of stok market on-
vergene are of fundamental interest to asset alloators in the nanial industry. A higher
degree of onvergene of stok markets leads to lesser equity diversiation possibilities
as systemati ountry risk annot be diversied away (Chan et al., 1997). Moreover, in
eonomi apital based regulatory regimes self-enforing feedbak eets may our when
market partiipants sell equities at lower pries in times of nanial distress in order to
full solvability requirements. Lastly, ointegration of stok markets implies the absene of
olletive market eieny (Granger, 1986).
6.2 Rolling speed of adjustment approah
Desription
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Let Xt be an n-dimensional vetor of time series, a vetor error orretion model (VECM)
of order p is set up as
∆Xt = µt +ΠXt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−i + εt (6.1)
where Π is an n × n-matrix of rank r, µt is a vetor of deterministi terms and Γi are
n × n-matries desribing short-run dynamis. If ointegration holds, Π an be written
as Π = αβ ′ where α and β are n × r-matries with 0 < r < n. The matrix β ontains
ointegration oeients whih lead to deviations from equilibrium et−1 = β
′Xt−1. The
matrix α is alled the matrix of speed of adjustment oeients.
Rolling speeds of adjustment α(t) are obtained by an estimation of α in subsamples of equal
length (window) where the starting observation moves one step further in eah iteration.
Shortomings
The estimates αˆ(t) of the rolling speeds of adjustment an show a pattern hanging over
time even when the true speed of adjustment does not hange at all. To see this, we perform
a simple Monte Carlo experiment to demonstrate the misbehaviour of the rolling speed of
adjustment estimates when there are hanges in β.
Consider the following data generating proess of a VECM of order p = 2:
∆X1,t
∆X2,t
 =
α1
α2

β1
β2

′X1,t−1
X2,t−1
+
γ11 γ12
γ21 γ22

∆X1,t−1
∆X2,t−1
+
ε1t
ε2t

where Xj,0 = 0 and εj,t are i.i.d. N(0, 1)-distributed for j = 1, 2 and t = 1 . . . , 1000. For
the entire sample period, we set α1 = −0.05 and α2 = 0 whih are speed of adjustment
oeients often found in empirial analysis. The short-run oeients are modeled as
γ11 = 0.3, γ12 = −0.1, γ21 = 0.1 and γ22 = 0.3. β1 is normalized to 1, β2 is set to -2 for
t = 1 . . . , 500 and to -1.5 for t = 501, . . . , 1000 to implement a moderate regime shift. Eah
experiment is based on 1.000 repliations.
First, we use a rolling window of size 100 and ompute αˆ1(t) and αˆ2(t) for eah window
by maximum likelihood estimation. Figure 6.1 shows the eet of a regime shift in β.
As soon as the window overs observations of the seond regime, αˆ1(t) begins to hange
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Figure 6.1: Rolling speeds of adjustment estimates (ase of not onsidered break)
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Note: The graphs ontain estimates of the rolling speeds of adjustment and their 90% ondene intervals
when no break is onsidered in the estimation.
onsiderably reahing its peak when the window overs 50 observations of the rst regime
and 50 observations of the seond regime. For windows around the break, the value of αˆ1(t)
is about 40% lower than its mean.
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Graphial inspetion of Figure 6.1 might mislead to
assume a time-varying α1. But, aording to our assumptions, the underlying hange was
indued by a hange in β, not in α.
We will now show how to address this issue. If one already knows the timing of the break,
the model an be estimated separately for eah regime. The resulting β's are then used to
alulate the residuals β ′Xt−1. Next, a rolling OLS an be performed to obtain time-varying
speeds of adjustment. However, this is justied only if the series are ointegrated. Hene,
one also has to test for ointegration under strutural breaks (see Setion 6.3). Figure 6.2
shows the attening eet on αˆ1(t) when taken into aount the true point of break for β.
In empirial observations, however, we usually do not know the true timing of a regime-
shift. Therefore we employ rst a grid-searh algorithm as in Arai and Kurozumi (2007) to
identify the break. Figure 6.3 shows the resulting rolling speeds of adjustment estimates
in this ase. Although the size of the eet on αˆ1(t) dereased from 40% deviation to
about 10%, there is still a kink in the graph of αˆ1(t). This arises from the unertainty in
estimating the break date whih hannels through to the estimation of α1(t). Hene, one
has to be aware that, after testing for a strutural break in β, the resulting rolling speed
of adjustment path has still to be taken with aution in the proximity of the break.
85
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There is no suh kink in αˆ2(t) whih we expet to be a onsequene of the fat that α2 = 0 holds.
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An alternative approah is to estimate α1 only for regimes before and after the break. In this ase
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Figure 6.2: Rolling speeds of adjustment estimates (ase of known break loation)
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Note: The graphs ontain estimates of the rolling speeds of adjustment and their 90% ondene intervals
when the break loation is known a-priori.
Figure 6.3: Rolling speeds of adjustment estimates (ase of estimated break loation)
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Note: The graphs ontain estimates of the rolling speeds of adjustment and their 90% ondene intervals
when the break loation is estimated rst.
6.3 Appliation to stok market indies
We onsider the stok market indies of Frane, Germany and UK using monthly data from
the OECD Monthly Monetary and Finanial Statistis (MEI) for the period 1960/01 till
2012/10. The data are onverted to US-Dollar to aount for the international investor's
perspetive and transformed into logs. Using the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), we
nd that all series are integrated of order one. Thus, testing for ointegration is plausible.
Multiple strutural breaks in ointegration relationships an be determined in the sequen-
tial testing framework of Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010) whih provides onsistent esti-
the mean estimates αˆ1 are equal to the true parameter α1 = −0.05.
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Table 6.1: Results of the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) tests for strutural breaks
Country 1 Country 2
Tests for strutural breaks
Break date
Break
frationUDmax supF (2|1) supF (3|2)
GER FRA 14.2768** 5.1246 4.3835 1981:07 0.41
GER UK 11.7302* 4.2518 3.2009 1981:01 0.40
FRA UK 15.7692** 5.0582 3.9246 1981:04 0.40
Note: Critial values are given in Kejriwal and Perron (2010), Tables 1a and 3a. We set a trimming value
of ε = 0.15 allowing for up to M = 5 breaks. ** and * denote signiane at the 5% and 10% level.
mates of the number and loations of break dates Tj with j = 1, . . . ,M . Their framework
is based on the dynami OLS equation
x1,t = µj + β
j
2x2,t +
I∑
i=−I
πji∆x2,t−i + et if Tj−1 < t ≤ Tj (6.2)
with T0 = 0 and TM+1 = T , whih takes into aount the potential endogeneity of the
regressor x2,t. In a general-to-spei approah, we redue the number I of leads and lags
of the regressor until there is signiane of the leads and lags with the highest order
(Wald test). In all models, it is possible to rejet the null of no break (UDmax test) but
it is not possible to rejet the null of one break in favour of two breaks (supF(2|1) test).
The break points denoted in Table 6.1 are likely to have ourred due to the deregulation
of international apital movements as well as improvements in information tehnology and
ommuniation at the beginning of the 1980's.
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Further, we test for ointegration under strutural breaks against the alternative of no
ointegration applying the test proposed by Kejriwal (2008). Table 6.2 shows the values
of the test statisti V and the simulated ritial values. We annot rejet the null of
ointegration under regime-shifts at onventional levels.
87
This result is onrmed by the
stationarity of regression residuals in eah sub-period (KPSS test).
The dynami responses of these stok markets to deviations from the long-run equilibrium
86
All alulations were also repeated using stok indies in home urreny. In this ase, the Kejriwal
and Perron (2010) tests yield an additional signiant break in the model GER-UK at 1992/08 whih
oinides with the withdrawal of the UK from the ERM in September 1992. The identiation of this
break in ontrast to the model in US-Dollar provides evidene that urreny revaluations inuene the
portfolio behavior of international investors. The Kejriwal (2008) test applied to this two-break ase does
not rejet ointegration.
87
When exhanging the roles of ountries in eq. (6.2), the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) tests again yield
one signiant break in eah model with a break fration of about 0.4. Cointegration annot be rejeted
in this ase either.
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Table 6.2: Results of the Kejriwal (2008) test for ointegration under strutural breaks
Country 1 Country 2
Number of
breaks
Tests for strutural breaks
V 10% CV 5% CV 1% CV
GER FRA 1 0.0447 0.1055 0.1334 0.2193
GER UK 1 0.0774 0.1091 0.1368 0.2205
FRA UK 1 0.0611 0.1091 0.1368 0.2205
Note: We use a quadrati spetral kernel with bandwidth estimator la as in Arai and Kurozumi (2007)
whih guarantees onsisteny of the test. We simulate ritial values (CV) using 500 steps and 10,000
repliations and approximate Wiener proesses by partial sums of i.i.d. normal random variables.
an thus be examined by rolling speeds of adjustment. To this end, we plug in the residuals
e˜t−1 from eq. (6.2) for β
′Xt−1 in eq. (6.1) and apply a window of 100 months to determine
the time-varying speed of adjustment oeients αˆi(t) and their 90% ondene interval.
In eq. (6.1) we set µt = 0 and use lag lengths p whih imply the absene of autoorrelated
errors.
Till the mid-80's, both the German and Frenh stok market adjusted signiantly to
deviations from equilibrium with the UK stok market (Figures 6.5 and 6.6). From the
mid-80's till the mid-90's, both the UK and Frenh stok market, but not the German one,
responded signiantly to shoks (Figures 6.4 and 6.5). Sine the mid-90's there seems to
be an inreased interonnetedness of all three stok markets as the dierene of αˆ1(t) and
αˆ2(t) beame onsiderably smaller than before (Figures 6.4 to 6.6), i.e. there are almost
idential reations of these markets to shoks.
6.4 Conlusions
Based on the onvergene of speed of adjustment oeients in the most reent period,
we onlude that there are now fewer possibilities for diversiation of investments  from
an international investor's Dollar-based point of view  between the United Kingdom,
Germany and Frane.
The investigation of the signiane of speed of adjustment oeients also ontributes to
the literature of Granger-ausality testing. If a speed of adjustment oeient for a ertain
ountry is signiant, this ountry reats on shoks to the system of ountries in the long-
run and adjusts suh that the equilibrium path between all ountries onsidered will be
again attained. Avenues for further researh are the joint onsideration of long-run and
short-run Granger ausality tests in rolling windows. Short-run Granger ausality refers
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Figure 6.4: Rolling speeds of adjustment estimates (GER-FRA)
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Note: The graphs ontain estimates of the rolling speeds of adjustment and their 90% ondene intervals
in the model GER-FRA.
Figure 6.5: Rolling speeds of adjustment estimates (GER-UK)
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Note: The graphs ontain estimates of the rolling speeds of adjustment and their 90% ondene intervals
in the model GER-UK.
to the signiane of short-run oeients in eq. (6.1). Further, as we applied the same
lag parameter in eah window, whih was derived from appropriate riteria for the whole
sample, a window-wise optimal lag seletion proedure ould be applied instead. This ould
lead to better power properties of the signiane tests.
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Figure 6.6: Rolling speeds of adjustment estimates (FRA-UK)
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7 Summary
Solveny II will be the rst priniple-based and risk-sensitive regulatory regime for all
insurane and reinsurane undertakings in the European Eonomi Area. Its design is
based on three pillars in analogy to the regulatory aord Basel II/III for banks. Under
the rst pillar, undertakings will be required to hold solveny apital requirement to over
the 99.5% ondene level of the loss of own funds over a one-year period. Own funds that
are eligible to over this apital requirement are determined from the dierene of market-
onsistently valuated assets and liabilities in the Solveny II balane sheet. Undertakings
will either use a standard formula in whih single risk harges are rst determined by the
appliation of risk fators that are alibrated to the 99.5% ondene level themselves and
then aggregated using pre-speied linear orrelations or they will apply (partial) internal
models that have to be approved by the loal supervisory authority. Unlike Solveny I,
Solveny II also imposes risk harges for market risks.
The design of the standard formula is generally aepted by insurane undertakings (EIO-
PA, 2011a). However, it is feared that the ombination of a holisti eonomi balane sheet
approah and market risk harges may ause wide-spread portfolio realloation amongst
insurers. This realloation is likely to disfavor banks and orporate undertakings that seek
long-term funding (e.g. BIS, 2011, Fith, 2011, IMF, 2011a, Swarup, 2012). On the other
hand, bonds issued by governments of EEA ountries are not subjet to a solveny apital
requirement. Moreover, overed bonds and short-dated bonds in general reeive preferenti-
al treatment despite the insurers' desire to hold long-term assets through eonomi yles
till their maturity in order to math insurane liabilities with long durations as well as to
benet from the illiquidity premium inherent in the yields of suh assets (Insurane Europe
and Oliver Wyman, 2013).
The extent of this impat depends on the individual insurer's sarity of own funds to over
the required solveny apital, the onsideration of risk-adjusted returns given Solveny II
risk harges, the planned development and approval of (partial) internal models and the
transitional measures during the phase-in of Solveny II. Most market partiipants expet
a larger onentration of government debt and a higher demand for overed bonds in the
wake of Solveny II. The share of equity in insurer portfolios has dereased during the
reent nanial rises and is not expeted to inrease again (BIS, 2011).
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Market-onsistently valuated assets and liabilities depend on the risk-free term struture
used for disounting future ash-ows. The Solveny II valuation of traditional life insuran-
e ontrats whih inorporate long-term minimum return guarantees are expeted to lead
to substantial artiial balane sheet volatility and hene to volatile solveny ratios (Ins-
urane Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013). It is not inoneivable that insurers might stop
oering this produt after the introdution of Solveny II unless suient ounter-ating
measures are integrated into the Solveny II valuation approah. These measures would
need to buer the impat of short-term utuations in the term struture and in bond
spreads on solveny ratios under Solveny II. To this end, the joint European insuran-
e supervisory authority ommissioned a study on long-term guarantees in life insurane
produts and on ounter-ylial measures at the beginning of 2013, f. EIOPA (2013b).
Agreement on the nal tehnial details of suh measures has not been reahed whih is one
of the main reasons why the introdution of Solveny II is now sheduled for the beginning
of January 2016.
In partiular during periods of market turmoil, the market-onsistent valuation of assets
and liabilities under Solveny II will lead to an inreased volatility in insurer's available
own funds to over solveny apital requirements and hene in their solveny ratios. This
stands in ontrast to Solveny I whih allows insurers to derive available own funds using
statutory aounting standards. Suh standards typially inlude the possibility to avoid
write-os of assets as long as the derease of their market value is not expeted to remain in
the long-run. The derease of market values an be triggered by worsening fundamentals,
hanges in the risk valuation of market partiipants after a ertain event or by pure risk
ontagion whih is neither reeted in worsening fundamentals nor in the hanges of the
valuation of fundamentals.
The results of the rst paper in this thesis support the view that pure ontagion is a short-
term phenomenon. We nd that negative shoks were transmitted from Greee, Ireland
and Portugal to Spain, Italy, Belgium and Frane in sub-periods of the years 2008 to 2011,
espeially before the respetive bailouts of these ountries by the IMF and other Eurozone
members. In addition, global risk aversion in the priing of sovereign debt has beome more
relevant sine early 2010. The relevane of this European aggregate risk fator is underlined
by the fat that it is the only fator that an lead to a redution of bond yield spreads of
all ountries onsidered. The results also show that a liquidity premium is pried into the
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yield spreads of Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds when market unertainty is high. The
approah presented in the rst paper of this thesis provides a devie to trak the appearane
of ontagion on a daily basis. In the same time window that insurane undertakings will
use to alulate their solveny position for a speied valuation date, they an also perform
the examination whether ontagion led to distortions of market values as outlined in the
paper. These results will help them understand and ommuniate reasons of larger market
prie utuations and hene of solveny ratios. In turn, the supervisory authority an use
knowledge about temporarily infeted markets to allow for appropriate ounter-measures
to oset suh short-run utuations that are typially not relevant for long-run oriented
business models of insurane undertakings.
The aademi literature on the expeted impats of Solveny II on the portfolio alloation
of insurers faes the problem of modeling omplex interations between the asset and
the liability side of insurers. Yet, there are some insightful ontributions with respet to
the alibration of market risks under the standard formula. Resulting from its sole fous
on stress fators as opposed to a onsideration of the whole risk-return prole of assets,
the standard formula may lead to ineient investment deisions (Braun et al., 2013) and
inentives to take on higher risks that are not reeted in the standard formula (Fisher and
Shlütter, 2012). (Partial) internal models approved for the use under Pillar I of Solveny
II ould remove suh undesired inentives (Gatzert and Martin, 2012).
The standard formula, however, does not neessarily have to lead to hanges in the in-
vestment deisions of insurers. Firstly, if there is suient surplus apital, market risk
requirements do not have to be binding in the portfolio optimization of insurers. Seondly,
other apital requirements suh as rating models may impose even stronger apital harges
due to smaller impliit diversiation benets and may hene be binding instead of the
regulatory apital onstraint (Höring, 2012). Thirdly, insurers will adhere to their asset
alloation when large risk harges under Solveny II are rewarded with large returns, i.e.
they will onsider the risk-return prole of their assets inluding risk harges of Solveny
II (Fith, 2011, Deutshe Bank Researh, 2011).
Various aademi ontributions investigate the appropriateness of the overall design of the
standard formula and of its pre-speied parameters suh as orrelations and risk fators.
Floreani (2013) questions the appropriateness of the Value-at-Risk for solveny purpo-
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ses. Filipovi (2009) disusses the two-step risk aggregation proedure under the stan-
dard formula and highlights that some orrelations in the standard formula are impliitly
ompany-spei although the underlying nature of risk should be ompany-independent.
Sandström (2007) and Pfeifer and Straÿburger (2008) examine the validity of the square
root formula as a means to aggregate single risks whih usually follow a skewed distribu-
tion. Mittnik (2011) ritiizes the methodology that is behind the determination of shok
fators for equity risk.
Researh presented in this thesis deals with two aspets of the alibration of the stan-
dard formula whose impat on the future investment portfolio alloation is expeted to
be substantial as disussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis: (i) the zero risk weight
of EEA government bonds in the spread risk module and (ii) the impliit orrelation of 1
in the Global equity ategory in the equity risk module. We integrated the rst aspet
into the literature on bond market onvergene. The long-run equilibrium with a risk-free
asset implies that the same stohasti trend underlies both time series and hene serves
as a justiation for the zero risk harge for the respetive bond. As the study of long-run
relationships may be distorted by strutural breaks suh as eonomi risis or nanial
reforms, eonometri methods that allow for strutural breaks were applied. Using data for
the period 1995-2012, strutural breaks an be observed for the introdution of the Euro
in 1999 and the global eonomi risis 2008/2009 as well as the reent European sovereign
debt risis. Convergene with the risk-free asset ould only be deteted for eight of the 25
EU member states onsidered. This nding underlines the neessity of a realisti eono-
mi internal modeling of insurane undertakings whih should onsider the possibility of
a non-zero risk harge for European sovereign debt and possibly inlude the derivation of
appropriate tail orrelation fators between ountries if diversiation shall be taken into
aount between (groups of) ountries. Given the large amount of government bonds in
the investment portfolios of insurane undertakings, a apital harge based on eonomi
onsiderations is likely to be substantial.
The impliit assumption of a orrelation of 1 between assets in the Global equity basket
was investigated by omparing the speed of adjustment oeients in vetor error orre-
tion models. Speed of adjustment oeients provide information about the reation of
series inluded in a system of series whih is subjet to a shok. As these oeients are
also likely to vary in time, the vetor error orretion models were applied iteratively in
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rolling windows of equal length. The onvergene of speed of adjustment oeients im-
plies the similarity of reations to shoks to the system of time series under onsideration.
The analysis foused on the three largest European stok markets, the United Kingdom,
Germany and Frane, and used monthly data for the period 1960-2012. Sine the mid-90's,
speed of adjustment oeients have onverged, espeially sine the onset of the nanial
risis, and share similar values at the latest dates of the sample onsidered. The perfet
orrelation assumed for all assets in the Global equity ategory an hene be justied for
this set of ountries as of today. Insurane undertakings an make use of the results related
to the issues (i) and (ii) and the methods proposed when assessing the appropriateness of
the standard formula internally (Own Risk and Solveny Assessment under Pillar II).
These ontributions show that the standard formula an only be a rough approximation
to the true distribution of own funds whih is (theoretially) required to determine the
solveny apital requirement. It ould be seen as advantageous that the same aws of the
standard formula aet all insurers using this approah. However, this issue ould lead
to herd eets prompting insurers to similar investment deisions whih would foster the
systemati risk of the whole insurane setor and inrease the volatility of asset pries on
nanial markets. As stated above, there are several fators that aet the likelihood of suh
a senario. Loal supervisory authorities should hene losely trak the evolution of asset
portfolios of European insurers in the wake of Solveny II. The Quantitative Reporting
Templates under Pillar III are supposed to provide the appropriate means for this task.
On the other hand, insurers that sueed in approving (partial) internal models will benet
from a larger onsisteny of eonomi and regulatory risk evaluations as they will not be
tempted to follow the inentives provided by the standard formula. Insurers using the
standard formula will have to evaluate their individual risk prole under the Own Risk
and Solveny Assessment under Pillar II. This assessment should inlude the risk harges
for European sovereign debt as well.
Hene, the suess of Solveny II will largely depend on the interation of the elements
of all three pillars of Solveny II within eah undertaking and in the work of national
supervisory authorities and EIOPA as well as on the ability of all parties involved to
reognize unintended onsequenes of Solveny II and to introdue appropriate ounter-
measures in a timely manner.
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